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In the 1990s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) stopped treating
power generation as a regulated monopoly and supported the development of competitive
electricity markets. Competition has encouraged innovation and reduced costs, but the
payment system FERC and grid operators developed has struggled to provide low-cost
electricity without leaving itself vulnerable to market power abuses. In a payment system
based on marginal costs, generators necessary for grid reliability cannot recover their fixed
costs unless they charge high prices when supply is scarce. However, because these generators
have market power, permitting them to recover their fixed costs leaves energy markets
vulnerable to market manipulation. To mitigate market power abuses, every grid operator
in the United States has introduced offer caps that limit revenues available in energy
markets. Offer caps can prevent some generators from recovering their fixed costs, leading to
a “missing money” problem as critical suppliers are forced out of business and potential new
entrants cannot cover their start-up costs. Today, growing penetration of renewables is
exacerbating the missing money problem. Regulators and grid operators are responding by
administratively pricing certain resources and supporting specific units deemed too important
to retire. These interventions lead to excess capacity and undermine competitive markets. As
a result, current regulatory responses to the missing money problem recreate the inefficiencies
that competitive markets were designed to solve, and they do so under questionable legal
authority and at the expense of a clean energy grid.
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Rather than quietly revive cost-of-service rate regulation, this Article argues that FERC
should simplify reserve requirements, stop counteracting state clean energy programs, and
support the development of competitive markets for services that support grid reliability.
Specifically, FERC and grid operators need not administratively reprice resources or force
load-serving entities (LSEs), which distribute electricity to consumers, to transact with
specific generators. Instead, the Commission should support long-term resource procurement
markets that would be built on top of today’s short-term energy markets. Wholesale markets
would consist primarily of short-term energy dispatch and balancing markets. They would
not be relied on to ensure that revenues are sufficient to maintain resource adequacy. If LSEs
were permitted to determine for themselves how to comply with resource procurement
requirements, they could balance renewable policies, flexibility needs, and reserve mandates.
This approach would maintain reliability while respecting FERC’s jurisdictional limits.
Most importantly, it would prevent the Commission from quietly reviving cost-of-service
regulation in regions that ostensibly abandoned that market structure decades ago.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is so worried about
cheap renewable energy sources that in December 2019, it ordered PJM, a
regional transmission organization (RTO) that oversees electricity sales to
sixty-five million Americans,1 to prohibit renewables from submitting low
bids in capacity markets.2 One expert projected that this intervention, along
1 Who We Are, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx [https://perma.cc/
5KW2-58BQ] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
2 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 6 (June 29, 2018). Capacity markets refer
to markets that compensate generators for being available to provide energy—not for actually
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with a similar intervention in New England, could cost between $9.1 billion
and $24.6 billion annually.3 FERC explained that this handout was necessary
to ensure that energy markets remain “grounded in fundamental principles
of supply and demand.”4 This is a curious justification. Basic economic theory
teaches that markets are working when competition drives prices down.5
FERC’s order turned this principle on its head.
Similar concerns prompted FERC to bail out a large natural gas power
plant in Massachusetts by allowing the company to recover over $400 million
from ratepayers.6 ISO-NE, the grid operator that oversees electricity sales in
New England, determined that its “reliability-centered framework [was]
unable to ensure adequate fuel security.”7 This market failure, according to
ISO-NE and a majority of FERC Commissioners, “demand[ed] near-term,
out-of-market support until any long-term, market-based solutions that are
identified as necessary can be implemented.”8
FERC is not the only regulator concerned that renewables pose a threat
to the power grid. In 2018, Energy Secretary Rick Perry said that renewable
subsidies “threaten to undercut the performance of the grid well into the
future.”9 On this basis, Perry’s Department of Energy (DOE) proposed a
national system of subsidies for coal and nuclear power plants.10 The federal
providing it. See Capacity Market (RPM), PJM LEARNING CTR., https://learn.pjm.com/threepriorities/buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx [https://perma.cc/E6BS-SXNW] (last
visited May 14, 2020). Modern capacity markets originated in 2006. See Devon Power LLC, 115
FERC ¶ 61,340, slip op. at 1 (June 16, 2006) (accepting a proposal for a forward capacity market in
New England); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 1-2 (Dec. 22, 2006)
(approving a reliability pricing model in mid-Atlantic states to ensure that the region “has sufficient
generating capacity to meet its reliability obligations”).
3 Protest of Clean Energy Advocates at 7, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236
(2018) (No. ER18-1314). Commissioner Glick calculated that the Order will increase capacity
markets costs by at least $2.4 billion per year. Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Dec. 19, 2019)
(Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 23.
4 Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 3.
5 See ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 77 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Fund 1981) (1776) (“A dyer who has found the
means of producing a particular colour with materials which cost only half the price of those
commonly made use of, may, with good management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as long
as he lives . . . .”).
6 ISO New England Inc., 165 FERC ¶ 61,202, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 3, 2018); see also id. at 22
(reporting one commenter’s estimate of the proposal’s $400 million cost).
7 ISO New England Inc., 164 FERC ¶ 61,003 (July 2, 2018) (Chatterjee, Comm’r, concurring),
slip op. at 1-2.
8 Id.
9 Jacques Leslie, Op-Ed: No, Rick Perry, California’s Renewable Energy Policies Aren’t Dangerous
for the Grid, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oeleslie-californias-resilient-grid-20170611-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZT2B-PWP3].
10 See Gavin Bade, Trump Administration Preparing 2-Year Coal, Nuke Bailout, UTIL. DIVE (June
1, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/trump-administration-preparing-2-year-coal-nuke-bailout/
524788 [https://perma.cc/AX98-DX9B].
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intervention would have cost billions.11 DOE was concerned that “price
suppression is occurring in [electricity] markets. . . . [I]n some regions, these
low prices have put pressure on baseload units, particularly zero-carbon
emissions nuclear generation.”12 Again, regulators worried that renewables
and other low-cost resources were threatening to drive crucial generators out
of business.
While some of these regulatory interventions seem pretextual, they are
also symptomatic of a long-term trend that will inevitably transform
American electricity markets. For most of the twentieth century, regulators
treated electricity as a natural monopoly.13 To ensure that suppliers satisfied
consumer demand, regulators protected utilities from competition and
permitted them to charge rates sufficient to cover their costs. In exchange,
generators agreed to provide nondiscriminatory access to electricity and cap
prices.14 While this system provided reliable electricity,15 critics complained
that it limited consumer choice, failed to promote innovation, rewarded
utilities for overinvesting in supply, and reduced incentives to retire
uneconomic generators.16
11 See Emma Foerhinger Merchant, Report Projects DOE Coal, Nuclear Bailout Costs Could Top
$34 Billion, GREENTECH MEDIA (July 20, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/
report-projects-coal-nuclear-bailout-costs-could-top-34-billion#gs.LWSPbxvh [https://perma.cc/
CJ23-WUFP] (“[T]he Trump administration’s coal and nuclear support plan could cost between $9.7
billion and $17.2 billion annually.”).
12 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW: TRANSFORMING THE
NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: THE SECOND INSTALLMENT OF THE QER 4-9 (2017),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review--Second%
20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RBN-KHF3].
13 See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (2019) (prescribing that “[t]he commission shall have
sole and exclusive jurisdiction to promulgate rules and regulations for the allocation of natural or
artificial gas supply by a public utility”). Under the natural monopoly approach, utility commissions
charged rates according to the following equation: R = Br + O, where R represents the utility’s total
revenue requirements, B represents the rate base, r represents the permissible rate of return on
investment, and O represents permissible operating expenses. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH
P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 109 (3d ed. 2003).
14 See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (“[E]very public utility may have reasonable rules and
regulations governing the conditions under which it shall be required to render service.”); Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring) (“The
utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a particular geographical
area . . . is granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive regulation, including price
regulation, quite alien to the free market.”). See generally Mark A. Jamison, Regulation: Price Cap and
Revenue Cap, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY 1245 (Barney
L. Capehart ed., 2007) (describing the operation of “price caps”).
15 See Paul Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the U.S.
5-8 (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://economics.mit.edu/files/1160 [https://perma.cc/
J9Y9-SJQA] (evaluating the performance of the regulated monopoly model in the United States
during the twentieth century).
16 See 1 ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 25-32, 53-54 (1970) (arguing that
this regulatory approach inadequately incentivizes innovation and cost control).
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In the 1990s, FERC began to encourage a “market-based” approach to
promote competition and control costs.17 Under this “restructured” model,18
an independent grid operator determines demand for electricity, solicits bids
from generators, and clears enough bids to meet demand. The grid operator
clears bids starting with the lowest bid but ultimately pays every generator
the price bid by the highest clearing bidder to clear. Generators bid at their
marginal cost of generation. If a generator bids below its marginal costs, it
risks having to provide electricity even when it would lose money in doing
so. An above-marginal-cost bid risks failing to clear when it would be
profitable for the generator to operate.19
This system promotes competition and keeps short-run costs low, but it
has struggled to maintain sufficient reserves to satisfy demand for
electricity.20 Generators that are dispatched infrequently or that operate on
the margin cannot make a profit or recover their costs. These plants are known
as “peaking plants” and generally operate when demand is high (generally on
hot days in the summer or cold days in the winter).21 Without them, grid
operators would not be able to meet peak demand. When regulators limit
energy market clearing prices,22 which every grid operator in the United States
does,23 they prevent these resources from fully recovering their costs, which
See infra Section I.B; Section II.B.
“Restructuring” refers to the “federal policies” designed to “introduce competition into
electricity markets.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-987, ELEC. RESTRUCTURING:
FERC COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO ANALYZE REGIONAL TRANSMISSION
ORGANIZATIONS’ BENEFITS AND PERFORMANCE 1 (2008), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/
electric/indus-act/rto/gao-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST52-PHFV].
19 Generators are industrial facilities that produce electricity. Capital costs consist of the cost
to build a generator and the fixed costs of maintaining it each year. Marginal costs consist of ongoing
operating costs and, in some cases, fuel purchases. See OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY AND
ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/OE-0017, UNITED STATES ELECTRICITY
INDUSTRY PRIMER 4-21 (2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/12/f28/united-stateselectricity-industry-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5NF-R33S]. The literature on energy production
also refers to marginal costs as variable and production costs. See SONIA AGGARWAL ET AL.,
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN FOR RAPID DECARBONIZATION 7 n.2 (2019),
https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Wholesale-Electricity-Market-DesignFor-Rapid-Decarbonization.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6HF-7K3W] (explaining that these two terms
“are often used interchangeably to describe real-time generator costs”).
20 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC ¶ 61,079, slip op. at 2 (Apr. 20, 2006) (“[T]he
Commission finds that as a result of a combination of factors, PJM’s existing capacity construct is
unjust and unreasonable as a long-term capacity solution, because it fails to set prices adequate to
ensure energy resources to meet its reliability responsibilities.”).
21 Peaking Power, ENERGY EDUC., https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Peaking_power
[https://perma.cc/U5HQ-V2DZ] (last updated Sept. 3, 2018).
22 Regulators have good reason to cap prices, and no regulator has expressed any interest in
eliminating offer caps. As explained in Section III.C, offer caps limit market power, reduce volatility,
and temper the challenges of demand inelasticity.
23 See Order 831, Offer Caps in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations
and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,770, 87,772 (Dec. 5, 2016) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
17
18
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creates a need for administrative interventions to ensure full cost recovery and
prevent these resources from retiring. This is the “missing money problem.”24
The distinctive cost profile of renewables exacerbates the missing money
problem. In a payment system based on marginal costs, generators recover their
fixed costs in those periods when the clearing price exceeds their marginal cost
of production.25 That system requires that the marginal bidder bid into the
market at a level that exceeds zero with sufficient frequency for generators to
recover their fixed costs and make a profit.26 When traditional fossil fuel
generators set the clearing price, resource adequacy can be maintained through
limited interventions that give peaking plants additional revenue. But this is
not the case when renewables provide a large percentage of electricity. While
zero-carbon emitting generators27 have substantial capital costs, their marginal
costs are extremely low.28 They therefore bid into the market at, or at least near,

pt. 35) (“All six Commission-jurisdictional RTOs/ISOs have at one time imposed a $1,000/MWh
cap on incremental energy offers.”); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.505(g)(6)(B) (2020) (“The high
system-wide offer cap [in ERCOT] will be $9,000 per MWh and $9,000 per MW per hour.”).
24 See James Bushnell et al., Capacity Markets at a Crossroads 12 (Energy Inst. at Haas,
Working Paper No. 278, 2017), https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/files/hepg/files/wp278updated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3B8-EAB9] (defining “the missing money problem” as “the set of complications
in power markets that can depress revenues below that necessary to support sustainable investment
in generation capacity.”).
25 As one account explains,
All other generators besides the marginal unit that are producing electricity at a given
hour—the inframarginal generators—receive revenues in excess of their variable costs
for that hour, since the price is above their cost. Generators must use this
inframarginal rent to cover their fixed costs, and revenues beyond that provide profit.
The sustained lower electricity prices of the past several years have led to a significant
reduction in these inframarginal rents to the point where some generation types are
no longer economically viable.
Mort Webster, Wholesale Electricity Markets: The Times They Are a Changin’ (Again), GEN. ELECTRIC:
TRANSFORM (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.ge.com/power/transform/article.transform.articles.2018.
jan.wholesale-electricity-markets [https://perma.cc/Q3BT-M6M2].
26 Cf. id. (“The sustained lower electricity prices of the past several years have led to a
significant reduction in these inframarginal rents to the point where some generation types are no
longer economically viable.”).
27 The phrase “zero-carbon emitting generators” refers not only to renewables such as solar
and wind, but also to certain other generators that do not emit carbon. These include hydroelectric
power generators, nuclear power generators, and fossil fuel generators that use carbon capture. See
Lee Beck & Jennifer T. Gordon, The Devil’s in the Details: Policy Implications of ‘Clean’ vs. ‘Renewable’
Energy, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-devils-in-the-detailspolicy-implications-of-clean-vs-renewable/550441 [https://perma.cc/2W65-ASP8].
28 See Gennadi Kazakevitch & Henry McMillan, Are Wind Farms Messing Up the Electricity
Market?, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 20, 2016, 8:56 PM), http://theconversation.com/are-windfarms-messing-up-the-electricity-market-67244 [https://perma.cc/65AL-C6C2] (“The running
(marginal) cost of wind generators is zero (because wind is free), unlike traditional thermal
technology (which has to pay for coal and gas).”).
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zero.29 As renewables provide an increasing share of total capacity, they
suppress energy market clearing prices.30 Price suppression makes it difficult
for all generators to cover their fixed costs and drives high-marginal-cost
generators such as coal and nuclear power plants out of business.31
Academics have worried about and debated the missing money problem
for years.32 Recently, a group of energy economists showed that increasing
volumes of renewables threaten to prevent wholesale electricity markets from
providing sufficient revenue for prospective entrants to cover their fixed
costs.33 Grid operators throughout the country have acknowledged that price
suppression caused by renewables prevents energy markets from supporting
resource adequacy.34 As a result, regulators have devised other mechanisms to
maintain reserves.35
This Article’s contribution is therefore not to diagnose the existence of
the missing money problem. It is to (a) show that the problem results not
from economic fundamentals, but from a regulatory apparatus that
compensates generators based on the marginal costs of the marginal
generator; (b) emphasize that renewables exacerbate the missing money
problem; (c) explain how regulatory responses to this problem, which date

See id.
See RYAN WISER ET AL., IMPACTS OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY ON BULK
POWER SYSTEM ASSETS, PRICING, AND COSTS 13 (2017), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/
lbnl_anl_impacts_of_variable_renewable_energy_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4WP-GZSA]
(“Wholesale electricity market prices will, especially before capacity equilibration, be lower as a
greater share of low (or even negative)-marginal cost generation is deployed.”).
31 See infra Section II.C.
32 The phrase “missing money problem” was coined by Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft in a
landmark article they coauthored in 2006. See Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, The Convergence of
Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity with Special Attention to the CAISO’s Resource
Adequacy Problem: A White Paper for the Electricity Oversight Board 3 (Apr. 25, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/CapacityMarketDesign.
CramtonStoft2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SEL-DSG8] (“[T]he central problem of resource
adequacy is to restore the missing money that prevents adequate investment in generating capacity.”).
33 See JOACHIM SEEL ET AL., IMPACTS OF HIGH VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY FUTURES
ON WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES, AND ON ELECTRIC-SECTOR DECISION MAKING 35
(2018), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/report_pdf_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
26WG-FGDQ] (finding increased volatility and a sharp decline in capacity under high renewable
penetration in every United States market).
34 See, e.g., ISO New England, The Importance of a Performance-Based Capacity Market to
Ensure Reliability as the Grid Adapts to a Renewable Energy Future 1 (June 2015) (unpublished
discussion paper), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/06/iso_ne_capacity_mkt_
discussion_paper_06_03_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2MC-YAJD] (“[R]enewable resources . . . put
downward pressure on energy-market prices . . . . The capacity market will help balance the revenue
needs for resources as the energy market provides fewer opportunities for resources to recover their
fixed costs.”).
35 See, e.g., id. at 3 (reporting that increasing the number of wind and solar generators may “be
expected to increase the price of reserves[] and the revenues of flexible, reserve-providing resources”).
29
30
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back to at least 2006,36 are reviving the problems generally associated with
rate regulation; (d) show that these interventions favor fossil fuel generators,
counteract state clean energy policies, and hinder renewable development;
(e) argue that recent regulatory responses illegally intrude on states’ authority
over generation facilities; and (f) propose an alternative system that would
avoid these problems.
Price suppression in energy markets has induced regulators to intervene
to make sure that the generators perceived to be critical to reliability are able
to recover their costs.37 In exchange, these generators agree to provide
services for a predetermined time period. These are the hallmarks of utility
rate regulation, yet these arrangements are occurring in parts of the country
that are thought to have abandoned this form of regulation decades ago. As in
rate regulation, and for reasons discussed in Part IV, these administrative
interventions prevent consumers from using resources with characteristics they
prefer, counteract state renewable policies, favor incumbents, reduce incentives
to innovate, and force consumers to pay billions for capacity they do not need.38
In this way, the current response to the missing money problem undermines
the principles of competition that regulators claim to be protecting.39
These administrative interventions have stretched FERC’s jurisdictional
authority past its breaking point. FERC has justified interventions to
support fossil fuel generators by appealing to section 205 of the Federal Power
36 See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, slip op. at 24 (June 16, 2006) (“In analyzing the
proposed LICAP mechanism, the Commission noted that a capacity market mechanism should both
provide adequate revenues to appropriately compensate (and keep in service where needed for
reliability) existing capacity resources and provide incentive for the development of new
infrastructure in areas where it is most needed.”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC ¶ 61,079,
slip op. at 1-2 (Apr. 20, 2006) (accepting that “certain elements of a [proposed reliability pricing
model], with some adjustment and clarification, may form the basis for a just and reasonable capacity
market”).
37 See infra Part IV.
38 See infra Part IV.
39 FERC’s justifications for these interventions have shifted over time, though the
Commission generally defends decisions to subsidize incumbent fossil fuel generators on the ground
that such subsidies are necessary maintain market principles. It has, for example, claimed that
interventions protect “investor confidence” and market integrity. See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 163 FERC
¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 3-6 & n.6 (critiquing the majority
for failing to define its “new standard, the ‘integrity’ of the market”); ISO New England, Inc., 162
FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part), slip op.
at 4-5 (questioning whether FERC is responsible for ensuring “investor confidence” and, if so,
whether FERC should support fossil fuel investors at the expense of renewables investors). More
recently, the Commission has argued that administrative pricing “is necessary” to protect “the
competitiveness of the PJM capacity market” and to counteract state policies that the Commission
perceives to be “disruptive to competitive wholesale market outcomes.” Calpine Corp., 169 FERC
¶ 61,239, slip op. at 5-6 (Dec. 19, 2019); see also Calpine Corp., 171 FERC ¶ 61,035, slip op. at 48
(Apr. 16, 2020) (stating that administrative interventions “protect the integrity of federally-regulated
markets against state policies”).

1190

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1181

Act (FPA), which charges the Commission with ensuring that wholesale
energy sales are “just and reasonable.”40 However, the FPA prohibits FERC
from exercising jurisdiction over generation resources and gives that
authority to the states.41 When the D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s authority
to manage grid reliability, it clarified that FERC must leave room for “[s]tate
and municipal authorities . . . to require retirement of existing generators,
to limit new construction to more expensive, environmentally-friendly units,
or to take any other action in their role as regulators of generation facilities
without direct interference from the Commission.”42 Thus, FERC can create
a market for reliability but cannot prevent states from determining their
resource mixes.
Yet FERC has begun to retain supply by bailing out individual generators
and excluding renewables from capacity markets.43 In shielding generators
from competition, FERC has not only recreated the problems of rate
regulation in parts of the grid that are ostensibly competitive, but it has
done so by intruding on regulatory authority that has traditionally belonged
to the states.44 In this way, FERC has upset the careful federalist system
Congress created when it limited the Commission’s authority to wholesale
sales of electricity.45
Rather than revive rate regulation,46 this Article argues that grid operators
and regulators should simplify reserve requirements, stop counteracting state
clean energy programs, and support the development of competitive markets
for capacity. It articulates three principles that would support these goals
while respecting the limits of FERC’s authority.

16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2018).
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (stating that the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over
facilities used for the generation of electric energy”).
42 See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
43 See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 3 (Dec. 19, 2019) (directing PJM to
administratively reprice state-subsidized resources); infra Part IV.
44 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 214, 215-16 (1964) (stating that
the FPA “[drew] a bright line . . . between state and federal [regulatory] jurisdiction” in which states
have authority over retail rates and FERC has authority over wholesale rates).
45 Wholesale sales are sales “of electric energy to any person for resale,” which means sales to
a person or entity that will sell electricity to consumers. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(d). FERC has authority
to make sure that wholesale rates are “just and reasonable,” but the FPA stipulates that states have
authority over retail rates and are able to determine their own fuel supply. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); see
also 16 U.S.C. 824(b)(1) (stating that the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities
used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the
transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767-68 (2016) (describing FERC’s role in the federal system).
46 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (“Regulation does
not insure that the business shall produce net revenues.” (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas
Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40
41
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First, grid operators and regulators should rely on competitive forces—
not administrative judgments—to determine the value of specific resources.
Second, while grid operators can create reserve requirements, they should not
force load-serving entities (LSEs)—the companies that purchase electricity
from generators and distribute it to consumers—to procure reserves in any
particular way or bail out specific generators.47 Third, rather than counteract
state efforts to promote clean energy, central auctions should incorporate
price signals generated by state decarbonization policies. Subsidies pervade
the electricity sector. It is inexplicable that FERC and certain grid operators
regard some state programs as posing a unique threat to the power grid when
the energy sector has always been heavily subsidized and when, by one count,
sixty-five percent of the one trillion dollars the United States has spent
supporting the energy sector since 1950 have gone to fossil fuels.48
One possible approach is to shift resource procurement decisions for
capacity to LSEs. These entities already must comply with energy market
rules, capacity obligations, and state renewable mandates. If LSEs made
resource procurement decisions for themselves—rather than purchase
capacity from administratively determined auctions—they could balance
these various obligations cost-effectively. This approach would encourage
LSEs to enter long-term, bilateral contracts to meet fuel security and clean
energy laws. Capacity markets would be optional such that LSEs could take
advantage of fuel savings generated by a centralized auction but opt out of
the capacity market by contracting bilaterally when doing so allows them to
fulfill their obligations at lower cost. The role of grid operators would
contract. The wholesale market would consist of energy and balancing
markets to ensure that electricity is provided at low cost, but it would not
be the exclusive mechanism for ensuring resource adequacy. This would
allow LSEs to balance their various regulatory obligations. FERC and the
grid operators could determine reserve requirements, but LSEs could
comply with these requirements by self-supplying with their own generators,
47 FERC and grid operators retain authority to provide out-of-market support for critical
suppliers by entering into “reliability-must-run” (RMR) contracts with such generators. These
contracts entitle generators to recoup their costs and make a profit by charging ratepayers directly,
without entering energy or capacity markets. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Operating Agreement
of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. § 6.1 (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.pjm.com/directory/mergedtariffs/oa.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MNA-JZ5H] (establishing certain procedures for “must-run”
resources, which, “as a result of transmission constraints, the Office of the Interconnection
determines . . . must be run in order to maintain the reliability of service in the PJM Region”); see
also Marcy Crane, Stakeholders: ISO-NE Reliability Agreement for Mystic Units A
‘ New Frontier’, S&P
GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (May 24, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/
en/news-insights/trending/g7jolwarnwjgiva4syc5tw2 [https://perma.cc/T4R5-CGVL] (summarizing
critiques of one such agreement).
48 Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 6-7.
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contracting bilaterally, or transacting on central markets overseen by the
grid operators. An energy market, preferably one with high offer caps,
would ensure that in any given moment, electricity is provided as
inexpensively as possible. Two additional benefits are that this system is
more consistent with FERC’s jurisdictional authority, and that it minimizes
built-in subsidies to peaking plants.49
This Article challenges prevailing views in the legal academy about the
federal government’s unwillingness to address climate change. On one side
are scholars who have criticized the federal government for failing to take
more aggressive steps to reduce carbon emissions.50 On the other side are
those who have identified, and commended, state experimentation that has
flourished due to federal inaction.51 We agree with scholars critical of federal
environmental policy, but for different reasons. The problem is not simply
that the federal government has missed an opportunity to reduce carbon
emissions. It is that other federal programs—in particular, policies designed
to ensure reliable electricity—operate at cross-purposes with state clean
energy programs.
Moreover, while we agree with commentators who have celebrated state
renewable policies, we do not share their optimism that federal inaction is
encouraging states to develop creative solutions to climate change. Granted,
states have stepped into the void left by the federal government and come up
with innovative policies that promote low-carbon technologies,52 but this
experimentation is at the mercy of federal energy regulations that can prevent
state policies from driving a large-scale transition to renewables.

49 Energy markets give natural gas a built-in hedge against gas price volatility. See infra
Section IV.D.
50 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 5 (2014) (“[D]ramatic technological, economic, and social changes [in the energy sector] . . . would
seem to demand a legislative response.”); Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of
Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (2018) (cautioning that integrating state climate
policies with federal electricity markets could render decarbonization projects less transparent and
more homogenous); see also Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2013) (acknowledging the possibility that new challenges could
“exacerbate the well-documented” federal–state tensions in utility law).
51 See, e.g., William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 816 (2016) (“[D]espite the messy and complex
federal system, or maybe because of it, some states and [public utility commissions] are deploying
new and innovative approaches to ratemaking as a means of promoting investment in low-carbon
technologies and practices . . . .”); William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 1614, 1630-31, 1661-74 (2014) (discussing the rise of state action in the wake of federal
deregulation of wholesale electricity).
52 See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100
(2009) (explaining that although the “national government has failed to lead on climate change
regulation,” states have been active in regulating carbon emissions).
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These questions have enormous implications for the United States’ ability
to integrate the level of renewables necessary to avoid the worst effects of
climate change. The DOE’s proposed coal and nuclear power plant bailout
was widely criticized for impeding state efforts to integrate higher volumes
of renewables.53 What has gone largely unnoticed is that the interventions
described in this Article possibly amount to a larger handout to fossil fuel
companies. According to one estimate, recent reforms to PJM’s capacity
market alone could cost ratepayers more than the proposed coal and nuclear
bailout would have,54 and PJM provides electricity to only around sixty-five
million Americans.55
The central question this Article takes up is whether it is legally and
economically feasible to preserve competition in electricity markets while
integrating higher volumes of renewables, or whether more radical reform is
necessary.56 As this Article shows, the current structure for compensating
generators may be ill equipped to the cost structure of renewables, but
recent regulatory responses amount to a handout to favored fossil fuel
generators. This Article argues that competitive electricity markets can
accommodate state resource preferences and support grid reliability even
with high levels of renewables, and they can do so without counteracting state
energy programs.
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I provides a brief history of
American electricity markets. Part II describes the transition to a marketbased approach and explains how the current payment system creates a
missing money problem. Part III explains how increased penetration of
renewables exacerbates the missing money problem and describes regulatory
responses. Part IV argues that these responses recreate the problems

53 See, e.g., Jeff St. John, Trump Administration to Drop Its Emergency Coal, Nuclear Bailout Plan,
G REENTECH M EDIA (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/trumpadministration-to-drop-its-emergency-coal-nuclear-bailout-plan#gs.rENsqZ0K [https://perma.cc/
VYL7-FLQC] (“[T]he plan has drawn opposition . . . from just about everyone outside the utilities
and coal interests that stand to directly benefit.”).
54 Compare Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, supra note 3, at 7 (estimating that FERC’s
proposed Minimum Offer Price Rule would cost between $9.6 and $24.6 billion), with METIN
CELEBI ET AL., THE COST OF PREVENTING BASELOAD RETIREMENTS: A PRELIMINARY
E XAMINATION OF THE DOE M EMORANDUM 2 (2018), https://info.aee.net/hubfs/Brattle_
AEE_Final_Embargoed_7.19.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/42M5-4YT6] (estimating that the cost of the
Trump Administration’s proposed coal and nuclear bailout “would be between $9.7 and $17.2 billion
per year”).
55 Who We Are, supra note 1.
56 See Boyd, supra note 51, at 1620 (“[A] revitalized notion of public utility . . . could play an
important role in the effort to secure a low-carbon future.”).
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associated with rate regulation. Part V argues that these interventions exceed
FERC’s jurisdictional authority. Part VI considers reforms.57
I. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
This Part provides a history of energy regulation from the nineteenth
century until restructuring began in the 1990s. Over this period, the belief
that electricity was a natural monopoly contributed to regulatory decisions to
shield suppliers from competitive forces.58 This regulatory approach was
successful at providing reliable electricity, but it left little incentive for
generators to innovate and control costs. This Part presents a background on
electricity regulation and highlights the shortcomings of cost-of-service
regulation. Part IV argues that regulatory responses to the missing money
problem are recreating the drawbacks associated with that approach.
A. Early History of the Electricity Industry
Whenever someone turns on her lights, a complex technological and
regulatory apparatus allows electricity to flow instantaneously into her home.
That apparatus is supported by three components: generation, transmission,
and distribution.59 Generation is the process of converting fuels or renewable
resources into electricity at central power stations.60 Transmission refers to
the transportation of electricity across large distances at high voltages.61 The
distribution system consists of low-voltage networks that circulate electricity
to end-users.62
For most of the industry’s 140-year history, vertically integrated utilities
provided electricity to customers at regulated rates. This model extends back
to the 1880s when the technological innovations of Thomas Edison, George
Westinghouse, and others made widespread use of electricity possible.63 The

57 This Article focuses on regulatory barriers to a clean energy grid. Technological constraints
also prevent renewables from providing one hundred percent of American electricity. Note, however,
that the system we propose compensates generators only for the services they provide. Thus, our
proposal would ensure that resources needed for reliability—including fossil fuels—operate when
they are needed.
58 See KAHN, supra note 16, at 11 (listing “[t]he importance” of the utility industries, the view
that these industries are “natural monopolies” and the belief that “competition simply does not work
well” as the three basic economic justifications for utility rate regulation).
59 See Electricity Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
electricity/delivery-to-consumers.php [https://perma.cc/LZ4B-XE9R] (last updated Oct. 11, 2019).
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 32-33 (4th ed.
2015) (quoting HAROLD L. PLATT, THE ELECTRIC CITY 66-78 (1991)); Elizabeth Nix, How Edison,
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decision to regulate utilities was based on the economic view that the
provision of electricity was a natural monopoly—that there were economies
of scale such that long-run average costs declined as production increased.64
This meant that the cost-minimizing arrangement for society was for a single
large firm to meet all of a region’s electricity needs.65
One of Edison’s lieutenants, Samuel Insull, designed the original utility
business strategy while he was president of the Chicago Edison Company.66
Insull pioneered and advocated for a regulatory approach based on two
principles. First, electric power utilities should be vertically integrated.67 The
utility should own the central power stations where electricity is generated, the
wires used to transmit that electricity, and the meters which measure sale to
customers.68 As Insull wrote in an 1898 speech to his industry colleagues, “the
best service at the lowest possible price can only be obtained . . . by exclusive
control of a given territory being placed in the hands of one undertaking.”69
Second, electric power utilities should be established as regulated
monopolies.70 In each region, the government would allow only one utility
to operate.71 In exchange, the utility must serve all customers in the region
on a nondiscriminatory basis and at regulated rates.72 Recognizing the need
to prevent predatory pricing, Insull acknowledged that “exclusive franchises
should be coupled with the conditions of public control requiring all charges
Tesla and Westinghouse Battled to Electrify America, HISTORY (updated Oct. 24, 2019), https://
www.history.com/news/what-was-the-war-of-the-currents [https://perma.cc/NHB5-MKSA].
64 See Boyd, supra note 51, at 1638-39 (2014) (explaining that the utility industries shared
characteristics that created what “economists since the late nineteenth century had referred to as
‘natural monopoly’” and that “[r]ate regulation . . . provided an alternative means of regulating those
sectors of the economy that were seemingly beyond the full reach of the antitrust laws”). Others
have pointed out that rate regulation reduced the cost of capital and thus facilitated the development
of capital-intensive costs projects that might otherwise struggle to fund their operations. See William
J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of State Regulation of Electric
Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1069 (2002) (arguing that “a primary reason
utility companies, with prominent leaders such as Samuel Insull leading the way, came to embrace
regulation” was that it “reduced borrowing costs”).
65 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 63, at 62-66 (explaining the economic theory underlying the
model of a natural monopoly).
66 Id. at 32-37 (quoting PLATT, supra note 63, at 66-91).
67 See Samuel Insull, President, Nat’l Electric Light Ass’n, Address at the Twenty-First
Convention of the National Electric Light Association (June 7, 1898), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL ELECTRIC LIGHT ASSOCIATION: TWENTY-FIRST CONVENTION 14, 26-27 (1898).
68 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 63, at 62-63 (explaining why it is more efficient for one firm to
bear all of these costs within one system).
69 See Insull, supra note 67, at 27.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON.
8 (1940), reprinted in 5 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 481, 488 (1973) (“Certainly many of
the proponents of public utility regulation intended it to protect consumers against excessive charges
and discriminations; all the early state laws bear witness to this intent.”).
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for services fixed by public bodies to be based on cost, plus a reasonable
profit.”73 The utility was permitted to charge rates that would permit it to
recover its costs and make a profit: by the end of the twentieth century, a
return on equity of roughly six to ten percent.74 Both the federal government
and the state governments played a role in rate-setting. FERC set rates for
interstate transmission and wholesale electricity sales.75 State governments,
through their public utility commissions (PUCs), set rates for distribution
and retail electricity sales.76 The Federal Power Act of 1935 established these
jurisdictional boundaries.77
This arrangement—privately owned utilities operating a monopoly under
public supervision and rate-setting—was the dominant paradigm for most of
the electric power industry’s history.78 This form of regulation is known as
“cost-of-service regulation” or “rate regulation.”79 Insull’s model persisted for
much of the twentieth century.80
Id.
See Darryl Tietjen, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., Briefing for the NARUC/INE Partnership:
Tariff Development I: The Basic Ratemaking Process (2017), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub.cfm?
id=538E730E-2354-D714-51A6-5B621A9534CB [https://perma.cc/5E98-RTYJ] (outlining the process
and inputs for determining the ratemaking for the “Cost of Service” Regulation); see also
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308-12 (1989) (discussing the history of utility
ratemaking); Rate of Return (ROR) (Actual and Authorized), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, https://
www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=12093 [https://perma.cc/ZY2T-Y9BJ] (last visited May 15,
2020) (collecting the authorized rates of return for California utilities during the years 2006–2020,
which range from 7.55% to 8.79%).
75 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2018) (giving FERC jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce” and “over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric
energy”).
76 EISEN ET AL., supra note 63, at 83 (“[R]etail sales of energy and power distribution and
generation facilities are regulated by states.”); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b)(1) (limiting federal
jurisdiction of energy sales to wholesale sales, leaving the regulation of retail sales of energy and
power distribution and generation facilities to states). Wholly intrastate transmission also falls under
state jurisdiction, but only exists in Texas, Alaska and Hawaii. See, e.g., ERCOT, FED. ENERGY REG.
COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/ercot.asp [https://perma.cc/
HXD2-P65M] (last visited May 15, 2020) (“The transmission grid that the ERCOT independent
system operator administers is located solely within the state of Texas and is not synchronously
interconnected to the rest of the United States. The transmission of electric energy occurring wholly
within ERCOT is not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under sections 203, 205, or 206 of
the Federal Power Act.”).
77 See Pub. L. No. 74-333, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 803, 847 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824(a) (2018)).
78 See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
765, 767-70 (2008) (describing the historical roots of public supervision of the energy markets).
79 See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The US Electricity Industry After 20 Years of
Restructuring, 7 ANN. REV. ECON. 437, 438 (2015) (describing the pre-1990s system of “cost-ofservice regulation, in which utilities were effectively guaranteed the recovery of prudently incurred
operating costs plus a regulated return on capital expenditures”).
80 See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS
OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 11-13 (1983) (“[T]he overriding principle of state rate
73
74
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B. Competition in Electricity Markets
A number of political, technological, and theoretical changes in the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s undermined the natural monopoly model. This Section first
describes the scholarly critiques that provided the theoretical basis for
introducing competition into power generation. As Part IV argues, those
critiques have taken on renewed salience as FERC has assumed an
increasingly interventionist role in determining which generators enter and
exit the market. This Section also describes the political, technological, and
legal developments that supported restructuring.
1. Theoretical Challenges to the Natural Monopoly Model
Developments in economic theory in the latter half of the twentieth
century provided important intellectual support for restructuring. In the
1960s, a deregulatory movement emerged to challenge the belief that
generation should be regulated as a natural monopoly. These critiques
emphasized that shielding corporations from competitive forces reduced
innovation, weakened incentives to keep costs down, led to excess capacity,
and limited consumer choice.
a. High Prices and Excess Capacity
In 1962, Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson provided a groundbreaking
analysis of rate regulation.81 Now known as “gold plating”82 or the Averch–
Johnson effect,83 they formalized the intuition that regulated utilities make
regulation is that utilities should be allowed to cover the cost, prudentially incurred, of providing
service, including a fair rate of return on investment . . . . The difficulties that this regulatory process
seems to have in achieving these objectives . . . seems to be a primary motivation for recent proposals
for structural and regulatory reform.”); Dieter Helm & Tim Jenkinson, Introducing Competition into
Regulated Industries, in COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 1, 2 (Dieter Helm & Tim
Jenkinson eds., 1998) (“The concept of supply competition has caught on in Europe and the
USA . . . . In the USA . . . the 1992 Energy Act and the subsequent order 888 by [FERC] provided
for the transition to a more competitive electricity supply market, at least at the wholesale level.”).
81 See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint,
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). For important economic work building on their theory, see William
J. Baumol & Alvin K. Klevorick, Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An Overview of the
Discussion, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 162 (1970); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Behavior of the Firm
Subject to Stochastic Regulatory Review, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 57 (1974).
82 See Michael West, ‘Gold Plating’ Rife, Assets in for a Hiding, AGE (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:42 PM),
https://www.theage.com.au/business/gold-plating-rife-assets-in-for-a-hiding-20130131-2dmjg.html
[https://perma.cc/4W4D-XWJN] (“[G]old plating is the excessive expenditure by electricity
networks on poles and wires to increase their revenue.”).
83 See W. Davis Dechert, Has the Averch-Johnson Effect Been Theoretically Justified?, 8 J. ECON.
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1, 1 (1984) (describing “the Averch-Johnson effect,” in which “a monopoly
subject to a rate of return (to capital) constraint would not use a cost-minimizing input mix, but
rather it would overcapitalize”).
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excessive capital investments to increase their profits.84 This behavior turns
out to be a rational response to rate regulation. In a typical rate case,
regulators determine the firm’s revenue requirement, which is based on the
costs the firm incurs in providing services. So long as a utility can convince
regulators that a capital investment is needed to maintain a reliable power
grid—and utilities are generally better informed about their costs than
regulators85—then the costs of the investment will fall on ratepayers.86 While
regulators may try to determine whether a particular asset is necessary, once
a firm receives regulatory approval to make a capital investment, it enjoys a
right to recoup its costs plus a return by charging ratepayers.87
This incentive structure encourages regulated utilities to build excess
capacity even when they might achieve the same goals in less costly ways. A
utility might, for example, create incentives for consumers to reduce their
electricity consumption, but doing so will not increase—and might reduce—
the amount of capital the utility needs. As a result, these strategies lower the
utility’s rate base and depress revenues. A utility will therefore prefer to
increase its rate base despite the existence of more efficient alternatives.
b. Innovation
Equally problematic is that rate regulation makes firms hesitant to
innovate.88 In ordinary markets, when a company’s business model is
predicated on outperforming its competitors, it has an incentive to invest in
research and development (R&D).89 Companies in technology-dependent
See Averch & Johnson, supra note 81, at 1052-59.
See Paul L. Joskow, The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return in a Formal Regulatory
Hearing, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 632, 633-34 (1972) (detailing the difficulties faced by public
utilities commissions in ascertaining a rate of return without access to information about capital
costs and the tradeoffs faced by an individual firm).
86 See Catherine Wolfram, The Efficiency of Electricity Generation in the United States After
Restructuring, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 227, 235 (James M.
Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005) (“[G]iven the input costs, firms choose the mix of inputs that
minimizes the costs of producing a given level of output . . . . [F]uel adjustment clauses allow
utilities to pass through to ratepayers all of their fuel costs, so they have little incentive to minimize
the amount of fuel they burn to generate a given amount of electricity.”).
87 See Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361, 363 (1898) (establishing that regulated industries have a
right to “reasonable compensation” for costs); accord Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (“[T]he investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity
of the company whose rates are being regulated . . . . That return . . . should be sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise.”).
88 Cf. Wolfram, supra note 86, at 235 (“Firms facing more competition might move closer to
the technological frontier by figuring out how to generate the same amount of electricity with fewer
inputs.”).
89 See Toshihiro Matsumura, Noriaki Matsushima & Susumu Cato, Competitiveness and R&D
Competition Revisited, 31 ECON. MODELLING 541, 546 (2013) (finding that firms in monopolistic and
highly competitive markets spend more on R&D than firms in oligopolistic markets).
84
85
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industries such as pharmaceuticals and computer manufacturing often spend
ten to twelve percent of their total revenue on R&D.90 Even industries that
depend less heavily on technological innovation spend on average between three
and five percent of total revenues on R&D.91 Utilities, however, are unique.
Most investor-owned energy utilities have historically spent far less than that.92
Investor-owned utilities’ reluctance to spend on R&D can be understood
to be at least in part a natural consequence of rate regulation. In a competitive
market, a company that develops a new technology may capture market share
from its competitors. A utility, however, faces little upside for innovating
because it already controls its entire market and therefore cannot expand by
developing new technologies that allow it to offer better service than its rivals.93
In fact, utilities may even be punished for spending money on R&D.
Utilities are often allowed to include only “prudent” investments in their rate
base.94 If a regulator determines that a utility should not recover the costs of
a research project, it can force the utility’s shareholders—rather than its
ratepayers—to bear those costs.95 In this way, not only does rate regulation
eliminate the potential benefits of R&D, but it introduces the additional risk
of a regulator deciding that a particular project does not serve a useful purpose.

90 See, e.g., RAYMOND M. WOLFE, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG’G STATISTICS INFO BRIEF,
BUSINESS R&D PERFORMED IN THE UNITED STATES REACHED $356 BILLION IN 2015, at 4 tbl.3
(2017), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/nsf17320/nsf17320.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7HF-6ZMF]
(finding these industries to have high levels of R&D expenditure relative to other industries in 2015).
91 See id. (noting R&D expenditures for manufacturers and nonmanufacturers).
92 See Marilyn Waite, Why US Utilities Should Invest in Innovation, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-us-utilities-should-invest-in-innovation/441114 [https://perma.cc/
89HD-JH9D] (“The research and development (R&D) budgets of U.S. electric utilities—both
POUs and IOUs—tend to be slim, and in many cases near zero. Historically, the maximum that an
electric utility in the United States would spend on R&D is 1% of its revenue—but . . . most investorowned utilities spend 0%.”).
93 See U.S. G EN. A CCOUNTING O FFICE, GAO-RCED-96-203, FEDERAL R ESEARCH:
CHANGES IN ELECTRICITY-RELATED R&D FUNDING 6 (1996), https://www.gao.gov/archive/
1996/rc96203.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8WW-KRSM] (finding that only 6 of 112 investor-owned
utilities surveyed devoted 1% of revenues to R&D, which was the proportion recommended by the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners). Note, though, that highly competitive
market conditions can also lead to a decline in R&D spending in the electricity industry. See id. at
7 (“Increased competition was cited as the primary reason for the biggest cutbacks to date by utilities
in California, New York, and Florida . . . . [T]hey are under pressure to cut costs in order to be able
to compete in a deregulated market.”).
94 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1989) (describing the development
of the prudent investment theory). Cf. id. at 315-16 (holding that the Constitution does not require
“a single theory of valuation” for utility rates).
95 See id. at 315-16 (permitting PUCs flexibility to exclude certain costs from the utility’s rate base).
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c. Consumer Choice
Finally, rate regulation limits consumer choice. In competitive systems, a
consumer can look for products with idiosyncratic qualities she prefers. For
example, some coffee drinkers purchase fair-trade coffee and are willing to
pay extra to support humane work conditions. In rate-regulated markets,
regulators decide which products will be available to consumers.96 If a utility
does not procure renewables, consumers may not be able to purchase clean
energy. This problem is newly relevant as states and LSEs attempt to allow
consumers to procure electricity from clean energy sources. As Part IV
shows, capacity market interventions and cost-of-service agreements threaten
to prevent renewable-friendly states from realizing their preference for zerocarbon energy.
These problems—that utilities overestimate costs, make excessive capital
investments, refuse to innovate, and do not accommodate consumer
preferences—are exacerbated if a regulated firm “captures” its regulators.
Absent competition, firms will allocate resources that might have been spent
trying to outperform their rivals currying regulatory favor.97 When a highly
regulated industry works closely with its regulators over a long period of
time, the industry will have ample opportunity to develop strong
relationships with regulators.98 Insofar as a firm is able to convince regulators
to be sympathetic to its interests, it will be easier for the firm to convince
regulators to approve favorable rates.
2. Political and Technological Changes
The academic movement described in the previous subsection coincided
with—and offered theoretical justification for99—legal, political, and
96 See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 606-08
(1969) (discussing rate categories and their effects on the availability of products such as subsidized
railroad services).
97 See Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 211-17
(surveying literature on regulatory capture and summarizing the view that regulation encourages
firms to allocate funds on lobbying).
98 There is a voluminous literature analyzing the strategies utilities adopt to convince
regulators to give more weight to their interests. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The
Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 (1991)
(applying principal-agent theory to show that regulatory capture will lead to inefficient investment
outcomes in regulated industries); Mathew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory
Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721, 723 (1985) (describing how legislative delegation to administrative
agencies can lead to indirect regulation).
99 See Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a
Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768, 1772-78 (2002)
(book review) (summarizing the deregulatory movement and explaining how that movement
supported policy choices that led to restructuring).
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technological changes that led to the deregulation of electric power
generation in much of the United States.100
Technological developments that made designs for natural gas power
plants cost-competitive in the 1980s were critical to the development of
competitive markets.101 Because these facilities were smaller and less
expensive than traditional coal and nuclear power plants, it was possible for
small, non-utility players to build and operate them.102 However, delivery of
electricity—the service of transmitting and distributing electricity from
generators to end-users—continued to be seen as a natural monopoly because
it was inefficient to construct duplicate transmission lines.103
An early step toward restructuring occurred in 1978 with the enactment
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).104 In an effort
to reduce the United States’ reliance on imported oil,105 Congress passed
PURPA in part to encourage domestic development of renewable and other
nontraditional power plants.106 The law mandated that vertically integrated
utilities allow renewable and cogeneration power plants107—called “qualifying
facilities” (QFs)—to interconnect to the power grid. Utilities had to purchase
electricity generated by the QFs at “avoided cost,” which is the amount it
would cost for a utility to generate that electricity itself.108 The Act

100 Note that most of the technological advances that supported restructuring occurred not
because of research supported by the utilities, but by adapting technologies developed for other
industries. See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 79, at 2-3 (identifying the “critical exogenous
trend[]” during the deregulation period of adopting technology from other sectors, as affecting the
“relationship between average and marginal cost in the industry”).
101 See id. at 2.
102 See GILBERT M. MASTERS, RENEWABLE AND EFFICIENT ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
6-7 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the effects of this technological change in conjunction with regulatory
changes that also facilitated the operation of “small, on-site generators”).
103 See Spence, supra note 78, at 772.
104 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
105 See Morris K. Udall, How Congress Planned to Solve the 1970s Energy Crisis, NEW REPUBLIC
(June 16, 1973), https://newrepublic.com/article/118918/how-congress-planned-solve-1970s-energycrisis [https://perma.cc/96QX-GZCD] (noting that the United States paid $7 billion, a figure almost
equal to the trade deficit, for foreign oil in 1971).
106 See id.; see also Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS (July 15, 2002), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/public-utility-regulatory-policy-act
[https://perma.cc/85WM-25W4] (“PURPA has been the most effective single measure in promoting
renewable energy.”)
107 Cogeneration refers to the “combined sequential generation of electricity and thermal or
electric energy.” Joel Bluestein & Marie Lihn, Historical Impacts and Future Trends in Industrial
Cogeneration, in PROC. 1999 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN INDUSTRY
479, 479 (1999), https://aceee.org/files/proceedings/1999/data/papers/SS99_Panel1_Paper41.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7SFZ-V295].
108 MASTERS, supra note 102, at 7.
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demonstrated that utilities could transmit and distribute electricity purchased
from independent producers.
Three regulatory initiatives in the mid-1990s continued this deregulatory
trend. First, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which expanded
the number of independent facilities that could generate electricity.109
Specifically, the Act allowed “exempt wholesale generators,” which could be
of any size and use any fuel, to connect to the grid and sell to utilities.110 The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 led to the proliferation of independent power
producers (IPPs) and exempt wholesale generators (EWGs), terms that refer
to non-utility companies that build, own, and operate generators.111 IPPs were
often newly developed natural gas power plants that sold their electricity to
utilities.112 Unlike vertically integrated utilities, IPPs did not enjoy a
guaranteed rate of return.113
Shortly after the Act’s passage, FERC issued Orders 888 and 2000, which
ordered utilities to separate generation and transmission functions and
encouraged the formation of independent system operators (ISOs) and
regional transmission organizations (RTOs).114 These nonprofit entities,
known as “grid operators,” manage transmission facilities.115 FERC wanted

109 See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776, 2905-88 (repealed
2005) (describing how exempt wholesale generators could sell electricity to utilities); see also 18
C.F.R. § 366.1 (2019) (providing the current definition of “exempt wholesale generator”).
110 See MASTERS, supra note 102, at 8.
111 See id. at 6, 8.
112 See id. at 8 (explaining that IPPs “are subject to different regulatory constraints than
traditional utilities” and instead have “pre-negotiated contracts with customers in which the financial
conditions for the sale of electricity are specified by power purchase agreements”).
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (2000) (repealed 2005).
114 See generally Order 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (issued
Dec. 20, 1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)); Order 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open-Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (issued Apr. 24,
1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 (2019)).
115 See Electric Power Markets, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/market-assessments/mktelectric/overview.asp [https://perma.cc/XP3G-EB5K] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (“Along with
facilitating open-access to transmission, ISOs operate the transmission system independently of,
and foster competition for electricity generation among, wholesale market participants.”). ISOs and
RTOs serve similar functions. ISOs are the entities that were established after Order 888. RTOs
were established in response to Order 2000. As one account of their creation explains:

FERC first created ISOs with Order 888, which established open-access interstate
transmission policy. FERC later refined these concepts with Order 2000, which
created RTOs more specifically. Some market operators qualify as both an ISO and
an RTO; the names currently in use typically reflect the initial origin of the operators’
formation. (i.e., in response to Order 888 or Order 2000), rather than any particular
legal or organizational function.

2020]

Rate Regulation Redux

1203

grid operators to control transmission lines in order to prevent transmission
line owners from keeping IPPs from accessing the grid.116
II. RESTRUCTURING AND THE MISSING MONEY PROBLEM
The regulatory, technological, and theoretical developments described in
the previous Part set the stage for a large-scale industry restructuring, which
took place across a number of states in the late 1990s and early 2000s.117
Once Order 888 required vertically integrated utilities to separate
generation from transmission, a number of utilities created or joined
competitive markets for electricity generation. Rather than pay power plants
through rates set by regulators, compensation for generation in those regions
with competitive markets occurs through a bidding process.118 A grid
operator—an ISO or RTO—manages each market subject to FERC oversight.
Seven competitive generation markets formed in the late 1990s.119 These
Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market Reforms
Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 39 YALE J. ON REG. BULLETIN 106, 109 n.16 (2019). For ease of
understanding, we refer to grid operators as RTOs.
116 MASTERS, supra note 102, at 8-9.
117 See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 79, at 6 (discussing the shift in compensation for
generation from a “cost-of-service regulation model” to a “market-based pricing model”).
Restructuring focused on power generation. Reformers still viewed transmission as a natural
monopoly. Distribution also remained subject to state rate regulation, though a number of states
have also attempted, with varying degrees of success, to introduce competition into retail markets.
See id. at 2, 6-7.
118 See MATHEW J. MOREY, POWER MARKET AUCTION DESIGN: RULES AND LESSONS IN
MARKET-BASED CONTROL FOR THE NEW ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 7-10 (2001),
http://web.mit.edu/esd.126/www/MktsAuctions/EEI.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9PY-CEDX] (giving
an overview of auction designs in U.S. regional power markets).
119 Texas recognized the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) as the first ISO in
1996. History, ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/about/profile/history [https://perma.cc/WM3K-4JZA]
(last visited Feb. 11, 2020). PJM, based in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and surrounding
states, became an ISO in 1997 and assumed RTO status in 2002. See PJM History, PJM,
http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/pjm-history.aspx [https://perma.cc/L89Z-SPED] (last
visited Feb. 11, 2020). The New England states created Independent System Operator in 1997. See
Our History, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/history [https://perma.cc/
CC6R-CAAW]. The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) opened control centers in
1998. See Understanding the ISO, CAISO, http://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/OurBusiness/
Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/9HY6-ADSW] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). A number of Midwest
transmission companies created the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) in 1998
and assumed RTO status in 2001. See Celebrating 15 Years of Regional Transmission Services, MISO,
http://timeline.misomatters.org [https://perma.cc/68R2-9B6E] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). The New
York Independent System Operator (NYISO) began operation in 1999. See POWER CONTROL
CTR., N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INTRODUCTION TO THE NYISO 3 (2011), https://www.nyiso.com/
documents/20142/1392242/Introduction_to_the_NYISO.pdf/d027e637-20bf-2c9f-b3b6-43ce348a7595
[https://perma.cc/7XWJ-SGHE]. Finally, several Great Plains states formed an RTO as the
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) in 2004. See About Us, SOUTHWEST POWER POOL, https://www.spp.org/
about-us [https://perma.cc/GB62-QD9D] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
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markets are displayed in Figure 1. As of 2018, two thirds of electricity generated
in North America originates in regions overseen by an ISO or an RTO.120
Figure 1: ISOs and RTOs in the United States121

Source: FERC

Generators generally receive revenues from three different markets. The
primary source of generator revenue is—or at least is supposed to be—the
energy market.122 Generators use energy markets to make bids that are

120 See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 79, at 6-7. The Northwest and Southeast enjoyed low
wholesale electricity prices in the mid-1990s and so did not feel the same pressure to restructure.
See Electric Power Markets, supra note 115 (indicating that “[t]raditional wholesale electricity markets”
still operate in these areas).
121 Regional Transmission Organizations, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/rto/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTR2-22LD] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
122 See, e.g., William W. Hogan, Market Design Practices: Which Ones Are Best?, 17 IEEE POWER
& ENERGY MAG. 104, 104 (2019) (arguing that “organized wholesale” energy-only markets create
an “efficient dispatch and pricing model” that “would have been all that [would] be needed to support
operating and investment decisions”); see also Cramton & Stoft, supra note 32, at 18 (stating that
energy-only markets with robust scarcity pricing, if feasible, are the “economic gold-standard for
performance and investment-quality incentives”). This approach is clearly functioning in Texas. See
POTOMAC ECON., 2018 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR THE ERCOT ELECTRICITY
M ARKETS 111 (2019), https://www.potomaceconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2018State-of-the-Market-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/92SH-6G8A] [hereinafter 2018 ERCOT STATE
OF THE MARKET REPORT] (“In ERCOT’s energy-only market, the net revenues from the realtime energy and ancillary services markets alone provide the economic signals that inform
suppliers’ decisions to invest in new generation or retire existing generation.”). Even in markets
like PJM in which the “capacity market plays the essential role of equilibrating the revenues
necessary to incent competitive entry and exit of the resources needed for reliability,” energy
markets continue to account for most of the costs paid for electricity. 2 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC,
2018 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM: DETAILED ANALYSIS 42 (2019), https://
www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2018/2018-som-pjm-volume2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W67Y-C344] [hereinafter 2018 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT]; see
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cleared in a day-ahead market and in real time.123 In addition, all markets
except Texas have some sort of resource adequacy requirement.124 As
discussed in Section III.A, these requirements developed because the energy
markets were not providing sufficient revenues to support generators needed
for reliability.125 Some grid operators, such as MISO and CAISO, allow LSEs
to determine for themselves how to comply with resource adequacy
requirements.126 ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM, by contrast, have developed
centrally administered capacity markets in which they procure capacity on
behalf of LSEs.127 Finally, ancillary services markets allow operators to
also 2018 ERCOT STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra, at 9 (comparing price paid per
megawatt-hour of electricity across RTOs).
123 See Real-Time vs. Day-Ahead Pricing, AEP ENERGY (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.aepenergy.com/
2018/01/05/december-2017-edition [https://perma.cc/4XFD-BFBZ] (describing energy markets and
explaining the difference between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets).
124 See SAMUEL NEWELL ET AL., BRATTLE GRP., ERCOT INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND
RESOURCE ADEQUACY 11 (2012), https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/files/hepg/files/brattle_ercot_
resource_adequacy_review_-_2012-06-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB47-MZHY] (“ERCOT’s design
as an energy-only market distinguishes it from all other regions in the U.S. Other U.S. markets
maintain a minimum reserve margin through regulated planning, resource adequacy requirements,
or capacity markets.”). ERCOT uses scarcity pricing, which can be understood as a form of resource
adequacy requirement. See 2018 ERCOT STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 122, at 127
(“In ERCOT, with no capacity payments available, the amount a generator may receive from energy
pricing under shortage conditions must be large enough to provide the necessary incentives for new
capacity additions. This will occur when energy prices are allowed to rise substantially . . . .”).
ERCOT does, however, complement scarcity pricing by using “planned reserve margins to build in
a buffer of excess capacity to ensure reliability during peak usage periods.” Iulia Gheorghiu, Capacity
Pricing Changes: How Each Power Market Plans to Account for Resource Adequacy, UTIL. DIVE (Dec.
18, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/capacity-pricing-changes-how-each-power-marketplans-to-account-for-resour/542449 [https://perma.cc/PY6A-C276].
125 See, e.g., Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, slip op. at 24 (June 16, 2006) (“While the
region has sufficient capacity to meet reliability requirements today, reserve margins are barely
adequate, and deficits are predicted in the very near future.”); id. at 25 (stating that ISO-NE’s
capacity market “will provide the revenues needed by generators to keep them in operation to
preserve reliability”); see also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 4 (Dec.
22, 2006) (approving PJM’s proposed capacity market because the market “is expected to provide
greater incentives for new generation, transmission, and demand response, while also providing
sufficient revenues to retain existing resources that are needed”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115
FERC ¶ 61,079, slip op. at 1-6 (Apr. 20, 2006) (finding PJM’s previous proposed market rules unjust
and unreasonable for failing to attract sufficient investment to maintain resource adequacy).
126 See, e.g., MISO, 2018/2019 PLANNING RESOURCE AUCTION RESULTS 3 (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2018-19%20PRA%20Results173180.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SJK-SES8]
(outlining some options available to LSEs to demonstrate Resource Adequacy); Resource Adequacy,
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/RA [https://perma.cc/6642-RQSE] (last
visited Feb. 11, 2020) (“The CPUC adopted a Resource Adequacy (RA) policy framework . . . to
ensure the reliability of electric service in California. . . . [T]he RA program . . . requir[es] that
LSEs procure capacity so that capacity is available to the CAISO when and where needed.”).
127 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-131, ELECTRICITY MARKETS: FOUR
REGIONS USE CAPACITY MARKETS TO HELP ENSURE ADEQUATE RESOURCES, BUT FERC HAS
NOT FULLY ASSESSED THEIR PERFORMANCE 16 & n.24 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/
688811.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z96A-684W] (“Midcontinent ISO designed its auction to procure a
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procure various services that help smooth grid operation, including reserves
and frequency regulation.128
A. Energy Markets
Today, generators derive most of their revenues from the energy
market,129 though in some regions, capacity markets have begun to determine
which generators enter and exit the market.130 The energy market matches
available electricity resources to demand. The actual goods sold are
megawatt-hours (MWh) of electrical energy.131 Each power plant regularly
submits a bid (in dollars per megawatt-hour) to supply an amount of energy
(in megawatt-hours) for a given time period. A plant’s bid represents the
price at which the plant is willing to supply energy to the power grid.132
Energy markets operate according to a principle called merit order
dispatch. For every market period, grid operators collect bids from all
available resources and order them from lowest cost to highest cost.133 Grid
operators also observe total demand for each market period.134 Starting with
the least expensive power plant, a grid operator clears resources until all
specific amount of capacity commitments from power plants and other resources. The other three
RTOs designed their auctions with an administratively defined, sloped demand curve that,
combined with offers from owners of . . . resources, determines the specific amount and price of
capacity commitments . . . .”).
128 See REISHUS CONSULTING, LLC, ELECTRICITY ANCILLARY SERVICES PRIMER 5-15
(2017), http://nescoe.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/AnxSvcPrimer_Sep2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KNJ4-VX3G] (describing the purpose of ancillary services and describing types of ancillary
services products).
129 See, e.g., PJM, ENERGY PRICE FORMATION AND VALUING FLEXIBILITY 2 fig.1 (2017),
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170615-energy-market-priceformation.ashx [https://perma.cc/RD8K-8JBS] (showing that energy markets supply the majority
of revenue in PJM but that capacity markets have taken on a larger role in recent years).
130 Capacity markets now account for nearly a quarter of total revenues in some markets. See
2018 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 122, at 16 (stating that capacity markets
accounted for $10.3 billion of generator revenues in 2018, while total generator revenues amounted
to $41.4 billion (subtracting transmission payments and administrative fees from total price), such
that the capacity share is 24.9%). As of 2018, that number was nearly thirty percent in ISO-NE. See
ISO NEW ENG., 2018 ANNUAL MARKETS REPORT 4-5 (2019), https://www.iso-ne.com/staticassets/documents/2019/05/2018-annual-markets-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2AJ-XTXT].
131 Two of the main quantities measured in electricity are energy and power. Energy is the
ability to do a useful task, such as boil a gallon of water or keep a room lit for an hour, and is
measured in watt-hours (Wh), kilowatt-hours (kWh), and megawatt-hours (MWh). Power is the
flow of energy over time and is measured in watts (W), kilowatts (kW), and megawatts (MW). For
example, a 60-watt bulb requires 60 watts of power to provide light. If the bulb lights a room for an
hour, it uses 60 watt-hours of energy.
132 See Market for Electricity, PJM, http://learn.pjm.com/electricity-basics/market-forelectricity.aspx [https://perma.cc/7QDA-JYA4] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
133 See id.
134 See id.
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demand can be met.135 Clearing—also known as dispatching—a resource
entails directing that resource to supply power at its bid level for the entire
period.136 The marginal generator is the last resource dispatched to meet
demand in a period.137 Resources that submit bids that are more expensive
than that of the marginal generator are directed not to supply power for that
period.138 The market clearing price is set by the marginal generator’s bid.139
All dispatched plants receive payments equal to the market clearing price (in
dollars per megawatt-hour) multiplied by the amount of energy (in
megawatt-hours) they supply during the market period.140
Merit order dispatch incentivizes each generator to submit bids equal to
its marginal costs.141 Marginal costs are the costs incurred in generating
electricity after a power plant has been built and is ready for operation.142
Generally, these costs include fuel costs, variable operations and maintenance
(O&M) costs, and any emissions costs.143 They do not include the amortized
construction costs for the plant. Nor do they include fixed O&M costs, which
are operating costs that do not depend on the amount of electricity generated,
such as plant security and insurance.144
Under this system, it is profit-maximizing for power plants to bid their
marginal costs. A generator that bids at less than its marginal costs risks being
dispatched when the market clearing price is insufficient to cover its costs and
operating at a loss. A generator bidding above marginal costs risks not being
dispatched even when it would be profitable for the plant to provide
electricity at that price.
Table 1 presents marginal costs for a range of resources and fuel types.
Figure 2 is a representative view of the merit order on a U.S. power grid. As
the graph shows, either an old natural gas power plant or a coal power plant
See id.
How Resources Are Selected and Prices Are Set in the Wholesale Energy Markets, ISO NEW
ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/in-depth/how-resources-are-selected-and-pricesare-set [https://perma.cc/A2RH-7JBA] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
137 See id. (discussing “how economic dispatch and the uniform clearing price work together”
(capitalization altered)).
138 Id.
139 See id. (“The energy price to be paid to all resources meeting demand is set by the resource
in the supply stack that would satisfy the next increment of energy needed if demand were to
increase.”).
140 Id.; see also Udi Helman, Distributed Energy Resources in the U.S. Wholesale Markets: Recent
Trends, New Models, and Forecasts, in CONSUMER, PROSUMER, PROSUMAGER: HOW SERVICE
INNOVATIONS WILL DISRUPT THE UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL 431, 454 (Fereidoon Siohansi ed.,
2019) (“Wholesale energy markets allow for generators and storage resources to obtain payments
($/MWh) for all their energy (real power) production delivered to the bulk power system.”).
141 How Resources Are Selected and Prices Are Set in the Wholesale Energy Markets, supra note 136.
142 See id. at 12-13.
143 See id.
144 Id.
135
136
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usually sets the market clearing price in periods of moderate demand. During
periods of peak demand, a natural gas peaking plant usually sets the market
clearing price.145 A power plant’s operating profit in a period is the difference
between the market clearing price and the plant’s marginal cost, multiplied
by the megawatt hours generated in that period.
Table 1: Representative Marginal Costs for Electric Power Generators146
Generator Type
Approximate Marginal Cost
Wind
$0 / MWh
Solar
$0 / MWh
Hydroelectric
$0 - $5 / MWh
Nuclear
$10 / MWh
Coal
$15 - $25 / MWh
Natural Gas Combined Cycle, New
$25/ MWh
Natural Gas Combined Cycle, Old
$25 / MWh
Natural Gas Peaking
$35 - $45 / MWh
Diesel Peaking
$200 / MWh

See MASTERS, supra note 102, at 137, 144.
LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 10.0, at 18-20
(2016), https://www.lazard.com/media/438038/levelized-cost-of-energy-v100.pdf [https://perma.cc/
682J-AG8B]; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST
OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017, at 7 (2019),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S7E-4MWQ].
Marginal cost for each generator type is calculated by adding together “Variable O&M” and the
product of “Heat Rate” and “Fuel Price” divided by 1000. See LAZARD, supra, at 18-20 (using these
labels). Values are approximate and rounded to the nearest $5, reflecting that these values will vary
geographically and over time.
145
146
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Figure 2: Merit Order for a Representative U.S. Power Grid147

Energy markets are effective at ensuring the preferential dispatch of the
lowest marginal cost resources, as realized over a short time horizon.
Whenever energy is needed, it will be procured at least cost because the
market is structured so that the least expensive units are always dispatched
before more expensive ones.148
B. The Missing Money Problem
According to economic theorists, energy markets theoretically should
“provid[e] appropriate incentives to stimulate ‘adequate’ investment in new
generating capacity at the right time, in the right places, and using the right

147 Capacity share for each generator type is based on a rough average of capacity mixes across
existing ISOs/RTOs. Marginal costs are based on Lazard and EIA estimates. See supra note 146.
148 This is true of idealized energy markets. In practice, grid operators and FERC have
developed rules that sometimes allow more expensive units—generally coal and nuclear—to be
dispatched before lower cost units. See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, STAFF ANALYSIS OF
UPLIFT IN RTO AND ISO MARKETS 1-2 (2014), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2014/0813-14-uplift.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENQ7-AU87] (describing the role of uplift payments, which make
whole “resources whose commitment and dispatch resulted in a shortfall,” on price formation);
Energy Innovation: Policy and Technology, The Billion-Dollar Coal Bailout Nobody Is Talking About:
Self-Committing in Power Markets, FORBES (May 28, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
energyinnovation/2019/05/28/the-billion-dollar-coal-bailout-nobody-is-talking-about-self-committingin-power-markets/#34c95d5471fc [https://perma.cc/Q9A4-GCNN] (interview by Mike O’Boyle
with Joe Daniel, senior energy analyst, Union of Concerned Scientists) (explaining “selfcommitment,” a process in which “power plant owners can tell the market that the unit must remain
on . . . . Barring an emergency, the operator can’t tell the unit to turn off even if there’s cheaper
energy available on the market”).
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technologies.”149 Because energy markets can provide inexpensive electricity
while procuring resource adequacy, they theoretically could be the principal
basis for determining which generators enter the market and which ones
retire.150 To that end, energy markets create “important opportunities for cost
savings . . . associated with long-run investments in generating capacity.”151
In practice, however, regulatory interventions prevent energy prices from
rising high enough to maintain resource adequacy. Specifically, grid operators
cap prices to prevent the market clearing price from rising above set levels.152
In this way, the entities charged with regulating the grid introduce distortions
that prevent energy markets from securing adequate reserves. Thus, while
regulators claim that energy markets should—and do—determine which
resources will be built and which will retire,153 they simultaneously recognize
that the “energy market does not provide for sufficient revenue to assure
reliability given the constraints imposed by offer caps and mitigation, as well
as the need to procure capacity above the current demand level.”154

149 Paul L. Joskow, Competitive Electricity Markets and Investment in New Generating Capacity, in
THE NEW ENERGY PARADIGM 76, 76 (Dieter Helm ed., 2007).
150 See William W. Hogan, On an “Energy Only” Electricity Market Design for Resource
Adequacy 2 (Sept. 23, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/
Hogan_Energy_Only_092305.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PA9-7HK7] (“[I]n some periods [in energyonly markets] prices would rise above the variable operating costs of peaking units that were running
at capacity and would reflect scarcity under constrained capacity with the incremental value of
demand defining the system opportunity cost.”); see also Bushnell et al., supra note 24, at 11 (“In a
competitive market that satisfies several other conditions, firms will build new capacity as long as
the cumulative scarcity rents exceed the cost of capacity. Free-entry would drive the scarcity rents
to equal (on average) the cost of new capacity over time.”).
151 Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector,
11 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 125 (1997). Another important motivation was to mitigate abusive
monopoly practices. See id. at 121 (“Most utilities have historically met their obligations to supply
by owning and operating all of the facilities required to supply a complete ‘bundled’ electricity
product to retail customers.”); id. at 125 (“The primary stimulus for reform of the U.S. electricity
sector is the gap that exists in some parts of the United States between the implicit price of
generation services embedded in regulated bundled electricity prices and the ‘unbundled’ price of
generation services . . . .”).
152 See Joskow, supra note 149, at 105 (“[FERC] has adopted a variety of general and locational
price mitigation measures . . . . These mitigation measures includes general bid caps . . . applicable
to all wholesale energy and operating reserve prices, location-specific bid caps . . . , and other bidmitigation and supply-obligation . . . measures.”); see also Cramton & Stoft, supra note 32, at 11 (“The
missing-money problem is not that the market pays too little, but that it pays too little when we have
the required level of reliability.”).
153 See, e.g., PJM INTERCONNECTION, PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO ENERGY PRICE
FORMATION 1 (2017), https://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/
20171115-proposed-enhancements-to-energy-price-formation.ashx [https://perma.cc/U2VH-DFKE]
(“PJM Interconnection’s wholesale energy market has driven efficient resource entry and exit,
successfully managed the retirement of a significant number of coal resources and their replacement
primarily by natural gas resources, and maintained a reliable grid.”).
154 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 59 (Dec. 22, 2006).
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Concerns about the missing money problem have led to numerous
regulatory interventions aimed at maintaining sufficient supply.155 Part IV
shows that these interventions have become so intrusive that energy markets
no longer determine which resources enter and exit markets in large swaths
of the country.156 This Section first shows that energy markets could
conceivably provide revenue adequacy and then shows that offer caps create
a missing money problem that requires administrative interventions.
1. Energy Markets Could Provide Resource Adequacy
In order to ensure the reliable provision of electricity, supply must be able
to meet “peak demand,” which refers to the few periods in the year when
demand for electricity is highest.157 This usually occurs in July or August
when people turn on their air conditioning, though in parts of the country
with cold winters it occurs in the winter when people turn on their heat.158
An important concern is how to incentivize the construction of the last
generator needed to meet peak demand.159 In energy-only markets, a
generator’s annual operating profit derives from the difference between the
market clearing price and the generator’s marginal cost.160 A generator runs
and makes money only when the market clearing price is above its marginal

155 See, e.g., 2018 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 122, at 49 (“Energy market
revenues alone were not sufficient to cover total costs in any scenario, which demonstrates the critical
role of capacity market revenue in covering total costs.”); id. at 29 (“The PJM Capacity Market is
explicitly designed to provide revenue adequacy and the resultant reliability.”).
156 See infra Part IV; see also PJM INTERCONNECTION, supra note 153, at 7 n.5 (“Revenues
from the energy and capacity markets were 74.3 percent and 22.9 percent, respectively, of the total
generation revenue in 2015, and 71.1 percent and 26.6 percent, respectively, in 2016.”).
157 See Jonathan Susser, Why Is Peak Demand a Concern for Utilities?, ADVANCED ENERGY (Mar.
13, 2018), https://www.advancedenergy.org/2018/03/13/why-is-peak-demand-a-concern-forutilities [https://perma.cc/WTL8-KEJU] (“Peak demand is the time when consumer demand for
electricity is at its highest; this can be by day, season or year. Peak periods tend to be in the morning
during winter months (when lots of heating is occurring) and in the afternoon during summer
months (lots of cooling).”).
158 See id. (“When looking at an entire calendar year in North Carolina, peak demand occurs
in the winter.”).
159 See Gerard Reid, Renewables and the Missing Money Problem, ENERGY & CARBON (Apr. 21,
2015), http://energyandcarbon.com/renewables-and-the-missing-money-problem [https://perma.cc/
3Q84-MC89] (“This ‘missing money problem’ comes about because the building of power stations
requires significant upfront capital expenditure which needs to be financed through future revenues
from power sales. With declining power prices and utilization rates . . . , there is little or no financial
incentive to build new capacity.” (emphasis omitted)).
160 See NERA ECON. CONSULTING, ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM: ASSESSMENT OF A
CAPACITY PAYMENT SYSTEM 26 (2011), https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/
archive2/PUB_ScottishPower_0311.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCN9-3TJP] (“Investors in new
generation capacity recover their fixed costs in this framework through the ‘inframarginal profit’
between the [system marginal cost] and their own marginal costs of production.”).
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cost.161 It runs but makes no money when the clearing price equals its
marginal cost, which occurs when it is the generator on the margin.162 And it
does not run and makes no money when the clearing price is below its marginal
cost.163 The difference between the clearing rate and an individual generator’s
marginal cost comprises the generator’s operating profit for the market period.
Annual operating profits in energy-only markets derive entirely from those
periods in which the market clearing price exceeds a generator’s marginal cost.
This profit is needed to cover the plant’s fixed costs.164
While generators bid their marginal costs under ordinary conditions,
peaking plants, which bid only when demand is high, are theoretically able to
submit above-marginal-cost bids.165 In most circumstances, a generator risks
losing out on profitable bids if it submits a bid above its marginal costs.
Peaking plants, however, will be dispatched even if they submit bids well
above their marginal costs. Because those generators are the last generators
to be dispatched, they do not need to worry that they will be outbid because
there are no generators available to outbid them.166 As a result, peaking plants
can drive prices to levels that allow them to recover their fixed costs and make
a profit despite the fact that they are dispatched infrequently.

161 See COLLIN CAIN & JONATHAN LESSER, BATES WHITE, A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO
WHOLESALE ELECTRIC MARKETS 14-15 (2007), https://www.bateswhite.com/media/publication/
55_media.741.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU5R-8VLS] (“[G]enerators not only have to cover all of their
variable costs, like fuel, but they must earn sufficient revenues to pay their fixed costs . . . . Investors
will include all of these costs as an opportunity cost of doing business, and will not enter a market
if they believe they will not be able to recover all of their costs . . . through market prices.”); see also
Michael Hogan, Follow the Missing Money: Ensuring Reliability at Least Cost to Consumers in the
Transition to a Low-Carbon Power System, 30 ELECTRICITY J. 55, 56 (2017) (“When supply margins
are tight, the demand for energy and balancing services can drive marginal costs well above the
variable cost of the last kWh sold in the forward market. This in turn reveals the true window of
opportunity for consumers to play their role in balancing supply and demand.”).
162 See CAIN & LESSER, supra note 161, at 13-14.
163 See id.
164 NERA ECON. CONSULTING, supra note 160, at 9.
165 See MICHAEL MILLIGAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TECHNICAL
REPORT NREL/TP-6A20-69076, MARGINAL COST PRICING IN A WORLD WITHOUT PERFECT
COMPETITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTRICITY MARKETS WITH HIGH SHARES OF LOW
M ARGINAL C OST R ESOURCES 24-25 (2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/69076.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PVL3-B4E3].
166 See Peter Cramton, Electricity Market Design, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 589, 597
(2017) (“In real time, market power becomes a more severe problem as the system operator has fewer
options—resources are limited to those online and the ability of the resources to react is limited by
ramp rates. Some method of mitigating market power is required.”). For a fascinating and
provocative investigation into the role price formation plays in market design, with a particular focus
on electricity markets, see William Boyd, Ways of Price Making and the Challenge of Market Governance
in U.S. Energy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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2. Market Manipulation
A central challenge in electricity markets is that a system that relied
entirely on energy markets could lead to market manipulation and excessive
price volatility. To avoid these problems, every market regulator in the United
States sets a ceiling on its energy market’s clearing price.167
In the absence of these administrative constraints, generators may
manipulate the market for their own benefit. Imagine if a company owns two
baseload generators and several peaking plants. The company might induce
shortage conditions by closing one of its baseload generators for repairs. This
could cause prices to skyrocket, allowing the company to collect high prices
with its remaining baseload generator and its peaking plants. Alternatively,
generators that know that their bids will determine the clearing price can
simply drive the clearing price up by withholding supply or submitting
excessively high bids.168 Peaking plants pose special problems because they
will by definition have market power.169 They know that they do not face
competition because they are the last units dispatched. As a result, they can
raise prices beyond what would be necessary for them to recover their capital
costs and make a reasonable profit.170
167 See, e.g., Robbie Orvis & Mike O’Boyle, It’s Time to Refine How We Talk About Wholesale
Markets, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/itstime-to-refine-how-we-talk-about-wholesale-markets [https://perma.cc/44QR-4ZVB] (describing
an action by FERC to “raise[] the price cap to $2,000 per megawatt-hour in all FERC-regulated
markets” other than Texas, which already had a price cap of $9,000 per megawatt-hour). For an
insightful article arguing that traditional approaches to market power abuses are ill suited to modern
energy markets, see David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 132-33 (2012).
168 See, e.g., Abuse of Power: How Manipulative Trading Undermined Energy Deregulation,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 5, 2002), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/abuse-ofpower-how-manipulative-trading-undermined-energy-deregulation [https://perma.cc/BWU59EMX] [hereinafter Abuse of Power] (“[I]n the electricity industry, . . . generators with as little as a
5% market share can send prices soaring by withholding supplies. Because electricity is a vital
necessity with inelastic demand, and because it cannot be stored in substantial quantities, its price
is extraordinarily volatile.”).
169 See Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith & Bart J. Wilson, Controlling Market Power and
Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand-Side Bidding, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2998, 2999
(2003) (“A firm is conventionally said to have market power when it can set a price greater than the
marginal cost and still make positive sales.”).
170 See Rassenti, Smith & Wilson, supra note 169, at 3002 (2003) (“Under the conditions of no
demand-side bidding, . . . the distribution of ownership of a given set of generating assets can
contribute markedly to the exercise of market power by well positioned generator owners in supplyside auctions in which demand is fully revealed . . . : Only generators can behave strategically, and
they do so to the disadvantage of buyers.”). This is one of only many strategies generators can adopt
to exercise market power in the absence of offer caps. For a comprehensive description of how firms
exercised market power in electricity markets during the California Energy Crisis, see Frank A.
Wolak, Lessons from the California Energy Crisis, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION, supra note 86, at
145, 154-62.
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This type of market manipulation can itself cause reliability problems. In
the early 2000s, California relied on energy markets to meet demand.171
Aggressive market manipulation by generators on the margin contributed to
dramatic price spikes.172 Large companies devised a number of strategies to
induce scarcity and then provide electricity when prices skyrocketed.173
These practices have been documented in the extensive literature on the
California energy crisis.174
A related problem with energy-only markets is that electricity demand is
inelastic.175 In most markets, demand decreases when price increases.
Electricity markets are different. When consumers want electricity, they want
it immediately and, because retail rates are fixed in advance, they know they
will receive it at a predetermined price. This means that when demand is high
and additional supply is accordingly scarce, the remaining suppliers can
submit extremely high bids because there is little risk that consumers will
stop using electricity.176
Moreover, because of the significant amount of time it takes to build new
generators, even functional energy markets result in unpredictable swings in
supply. After the market signals that new supply is needed, it may take years
for new generators to finish construction and begin operating.177 Thus, even
when prices encourage generators to enter the market, there may be periods

171 See Wolak, supra note 170, at 148-50, 152-54 (discussing deregulation generally and the
resulting energy market system in California).
172 See id. at 163-64.
173 See id. at 158-59 (summarizing evidence that “the substantially higher prices during the
summer of 2000 were the result of the unilateral profit-maximizing actions of suppliers to the
California energy markets”).
174 See generally, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CAUSES AND LESSONS OF THE CALIFORNIA
ELECTRICITY CRISIS (2001), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/107th-congress-2001-2002/
reports/californiaenergy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R96-5N3G]; Wolak, supra note 170, at 158-59;
Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell & Frank Wolak, Diagnosing Market Power in California’s
Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7868,
2000); Paul Joskow, California’s Energy Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8442, 2001); Abuse of Power, supra note 168.
175 Inelastic demand means that demand for a product does not increase or decrease based on
changes in price. People will buy the same amount of the product regardless of whether the price
drops or increases. See Inelastic Demand, CORP. FINANCE INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/
resources/knowledge/economics/inelastic-demand [https://perma.cc/RF5S-52K6].
176 See Joskow, supra note 15, at 29 (“Because electricity demand is very inelastic in the short
run and electricity cannot be stored, individual suppliers may be able to move prices significantly
even in markets that are not very highly concentrated by traditional standards.”).
177 See OMS Resource Adequacy Working Group, Resource Adequacy and Capacity Markets
Principles 3 (Mar. 12, 2004), http://www.misostates.org/images/PositionStatements/OMSRAWG
PrinciplesasapprovedbyOMSBoard3-12-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY3T-UQ3H] (identifying
“long lead times for new construction” as one reason that “electric supply shortages could occur”).
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of resource inadequacy due to the fact that potential new suppliers cannot
respond quickly to market opportunities.178
3. Offer Caps Deter Market Manipulation
Every regulator in the United States has adopted offer caps to avoid the
problems described above.179 Offer caps remove incentives to manipulate
prices and manufacture scarcity by reducing the revenues generators enjoy
when supply is scarce.180 In doing so, they reduce a region’s vulnerability to
market manipulation. Offer caps also reduce volatility by preventing prices
from skyrocketing.
4. Offer Caps Create a Missing Money Problem
Although offer caps discourage market manipulation and reduce volatility,
they can prevent electricity prices from rising high enough to support peaking
plants and other generators that rely on high inframarginal rents.181 Peaking
plants are essential to a well-functioning electric grid because they ensure
that there is enough supply to meet demand.182 However, peaking plants
struggle to make a profit or recoup their costs when regulators limit the prices

178 See id. (“Electric supply can be considered inelastic over the short term because it can be
difficult for markets to respond quickly to unexpected shortages. Absent adequate planning reserves,
prolonged periods of volatile market prices are likely.”).
179 Udi Helman, Benjamin F. Hobbs & Richard P. O’Neil, The Design of US Wholesale Energy
and Ancillary Service Auction Markets: Theory and Practice, in COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY
MARKETS: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, PERFORMANCE 179, 193-94 (Fereidoon P. Siohansi ed.,
2008) (discussing the effects of “supply offer caps,” which were adopted “for purposes of market
power mitigation and the lack of demand bids”); see also 2017 IRC MARKETS COMM., ISO/RTO
COUNCIL, MARKET DESIGN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2017), https://isorto.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/20170905_2017IRCMarketsCommitteeExecutiveSummaryFinal.pdf (describing offer caps
in every RTO).
180 See William W. Hogan, Electricity Scarcity Pricing Through Operating Reserves, ECON.
ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y, Sept. 2013, at 65, 69 (“A problem with increasing offer caps arises in the
tradeoff for mitigating market power. A principal purpose of generator offer caps is to mitigate the
exercise of market power through economic withholding.”); see also Wolak, supra note 170, at 155
(describing the imposition of offer caps in CAISO’s energy and ancillary service markets in the
summer of 1998, in response to skyrocketing bids from suppliers).
181 See David Newbery, Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions
and Interconnectors 3 (Energy Pol’y Research Grp., Working Paper No. 1508, 2015), https://
www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/1508_updated-July-20151.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2VMY-PYZP] (“If investment decisions could be solely guided by strictly commercial decisions and
if markets were not subject to policy interventions or price caps, it is plausible that capacity adequacy
could be delivered by profit-motivated generation investment without explicit policy guidance.”).
182 Flexible Peaking Resource, ENERGY STORAGE ASS’N: ESA BLOG (Sept. 24, 2013),
https://energystorage.org/flexible-peaking-resource [https://perma.cc/U92W-SM8V].
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they can charge.183 In the few periods in which peaking plants are dispatched,
their high bids always set the market clearing price. When offer caps constrain
the price peaking plants and other generators bid, those units often do not
make enough of a profit during shortage conditions to cover their fixed
costs.184 Without some other source of revenue, these peaking plants would
retire and replacements would not be built.185
C. Finding the Missing Money
In the traditional utility model, concerns about reliability were addressed
when the public utility commission approved a utility’s proposed rate.186 The
utility would build generators that could provide electricity to meet spikes in
demand.187 As the previous Section showed, in moving to a system in which
generators are compensated based on their marginal costs and energy market
prices are capped, regulators created a missing money problem.
183 See Shmuel S. Oren, Capacity Payments and Supply Adequacy in Competitive Electricity Markets
3, 5-6, VII SYMP. SPECIALISTS ELECTRIC OPERATIONAL & EXPANSION PLAN. (May 21-26, 2016),
https://oren.ieor.berkeley.edu/workingp/sepope.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXK6-RRMG] (explaining
the connection between offer caps and capacity market in markets around the world, including
American RTOs).
184 See id. at 2 (“The prevalence of regulatory intervention to suppress energy prices even
when they reflect legitimate scarcity rents justifies the concern that indeed generators would not be
able to cover their fixed costs through energy sales alone.”).
185 See Paul L. Joskow, Editorial, Symposium on ‘Capacity Markets’, ECON. ENERGY &
ENVTL. POL’Y, Sept. 2013, at v, v (discussing the effects of the missing money problem on
investment incentives).
186 See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 322-23 (2017) (explaining that
under the traditional form of public utility regulation in which price is set by a utility commission,
“[t]ypically, commissions also provide some sort of incentive to utilities to maintain a certain level
of service reliability, since utilities would otherwise be tempted to skimp on quality of service in
order to cut costs and increase profits”); JANINE MIGDEN-OSTRANDER ET AL., REGULATORY
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, DECOUPLING CASE STUDIES: REVENUE REGULATION IMPLEMENTATION
IN SIX STATES 4 (2014), http://www.puc.state.pa.us/pcdocs/1417846.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH69VATW] (“Utilities have embedded investment-related and labor costs (not sensitive to volume)
included in their rates to support investments already made and necessary for good service,
reliability, safety, and other utility services, which are adjusted during periodic rate cases.” (citation
omitted)); see also DAN CROSS-CALL ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., AMERICA’S POWER PLAN
& AEE INST., NAVIGATING UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL REFORM: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
REGULATORY DESIGN 11 (2018), https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/RMI_Navigating_
Utility_Business_Model_Reform_2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WCJ-89UJ] (“The conventional
utility business model largely succeeded at delivering on historical responsibilities for affordability,
safety, and reliability.”).
187 See Is It Time to Deregulate All Electric Utilities?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2016, 10:01 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/is-it-time-to-deregulate-all-electric-utilities-1479092461 [https://perma.cc/
467D-5GCJ] (contribution from Andrew N. Kleit) (“Electricity for the most part can’t be stored,
meaning supply must nearly match demand at all times or the grid could come under stress and
crash . . . . [M]any supply-and-demand challenges could be solved if the cost of storing electricity
was brought down to economical levels.”).
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This Section describes the steps regulators have taken to deal with the
missing money problem. Regulators have responded to the missing money
problem either through scarcity pricing or resource adequacy requirements.188
Scarcity pricing sets offer caps at high levels to ensure that energy markets
provide enough revenue to maintain adequate reserves. Alternatively,
regulators can rely on resource adequacy requirements. Such policies
compensate generators for being available to provide electricity—not for
actually providing it.
1. Scarcity Pricing
One way to procure sufficient reserves is to let prices rise substantially
when supply is scarce.189 Texas is the only state that relies primarily on
scarcity pricing to maintain adequate reserves.190 ERCOT, the ISO that
manages electricity in Texas, allows prices to reach $9000 per megawatt-hour
when supply is low.191 There are four challenges with scarcity pricing, many of
which parallel the challenges of energy-only markets described in Section II.B.
a. Unpredictability
A market that procures reserves through scarcity pricing allows market
participants—rather than FERC or the grid operator—to determine when
generators will enter and exit the market. ERCOT may feel that scarcity prices
are high enough to encourage efficient entry. However, because ERCOT does
not actually procure capacity, it has to assume that (a) prices will procure the
right amount of load, and (b) generators will actually respond to price signals.
Even if regulators are able to determine the correct scarcity price, there is
delay between when the market signals that new load is necessary and when
suppliers actually enter the market. That delay could undermine reliability in
188 As this Section explains, resource adequacy requirements include both mandatory capacity
markets and markets in which LSEs are required to maintain an administratively set level of reserves.
189 See Gavin Bade, The Great Capacity Market Debate: Which Model Can Best Handle the Energy
Transition?, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-great-capacitymarket-debate-which-model-can-best-handle-the-energy-tr/440657 [https://perma.cc/AX98DX9B] (“In Texas, regulators ensure reliability through . . . scarcity pricing, which allows real-time
electricity prices to reach as high as $9000/MWh . . . . Instead of guaranteeing generation revenue
through a capacity market, the promise of high prices is supposed to incentivize generators to build
new plants and keep them ready to operate.”).
190 See id. (“Of the wholesale electricity markets that serve two-thirds of the U.S. population,
only two—[ERCOT] and [SPP]—do not have capacity markets.”).
191 ERCOT, About the Operating Reserve Demand Curve and Wholesale Electric Prices
(May 2014), https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/files/hepg/files/ordcupdate-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W9AG-LVVY] (explaining that under ERCOT’s Operating Reserve Demand Curve, “wholesale
prices in the real-time energy market will increase automatically as available operating reserves
decrease,” up to the price of $9000 per megawatt-hour when reserves drop below 2000 megawatts).
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the short run.192 If suppliers fail to respond quickly to price signals, even
properly priced markets will fail to procure sufficient supply. Regulatory riskaversion may thus induce regulators to give generators other sources of
revenue in order to maintain a stable level of supply.
A related challenge is that revenue uncertainty increases price volatility.
Because regulators cannot predict weather patterns far in advance, they cannot
determine how much money generators will make in a given time period.193
b. Market Manipulation
Another challenge with scarcity pricing is that it remains vulnerable to the
abusive practices that vexed California in 2000 and 2001. Although offer caps
limit the extent to which prices can increase, a system that relies exclusively
on scarcity pricing still has to provide a substantial windfall to generators that
sell electricity when supply is limited. In fact, ERCOT has seen extreme
volatility in the amount of supply offered in June and July.194 These price
swings have increased the amount of revenue that goes to generators that
operate when supply is scarce, leading some to theorize that large companies
are manipulating the market to manufacture scarcity conditions.195
192 See Fernando J. de Sisternes & John E. Parsons, The Impact of Uncertainty on the Need and
Design of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms in Low-Carbon Power Systems 4-7 (MIT Ctr. for Energy
& Envtl. Policy, Working Paper No. 2016-004, 2016), http://ceepr.mit.edu/files/papers/2016-004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQB6-BYL4] (discussing sources of uncertainty in the operation of capacity
markets, including “uncertainty about demand” and “uncertainty about . . . resource availability”).
This concern has prompted analysts to express concern about Texas’ ability to meet peak demand.
See News Release: ERCOT Expects Record Electric Use, Increased Chance of Energy Alerts, ERCOT (May
8, 2019), http://www.ercot.com/news/releases/show/181248 [https://perma.cc/3VVB-662T].
193 As David Patton, market monitor for PJM and other RTOs, explained during a panel at
the Energy Bar Association’s 2016 Annual Meeting:

Shortage pricing is not like a capacity market where you’re going to get a level of
revenue that might fluctuate by 10 to 20% a year. With shortage pricing, you might get
10 years of revenue in one year and then the other nine years the generators are going
to think they’re going bankrupt . . . [because shortage prices] increase exponentially
when you get unusually hot weather and unusually high loads or unusually poor
generator performance.”
Rich Heidorn Jr., Lawyers Take an Economics Class: Capacity Markets vs. Scarcity Pricing, RTO
INSIDER (June 14, 2016), https://www.rtoinsider.com/capacity-markets-vs-scarcity-pricing-27702
[https://perma.cc/Y3QP-RZWX].
194 See Is the ERCOT Market Being Manipulated?, TEXAS ELECTRICITY RATINGS: THE BLOG
(June 29, 2012), https://www.texaselectricityratings.com/blog/2012/06/29/ercot-market-manipulated
[https://perma.cc/2D9G-LCYB] (documenting how electricity prices surged from the typical $30$40 per unit to $3,000 per unit within a short period of time).
195 See id. (speculating that ERCOT’s percent price swings in June 2012 were the result of
market manipulation and observing that “ERCOT has been manipulated before”); see also L.M.
Sixel, A May Price Spike Shows Vulnerability to Market Manipulation—and Cost to Consumers, HOUS.
CHRON. (Aug. 2, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/A-
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Moreover, in 2019, ERCOT’s reserves declined below nine percent
despite the fact that the state aims to maintain approximately fourteen
percent reserve capacity.196 This has led to speculation that Texas is vulnerable
to market manipulation as companies that own both peaking and non-peaking
plants will be able to create scarcity pricing conditions by withholding supply
strategically in order to cause energy prices to increase.197
c. Political Will
The third and perhaps most important problem with scarcity pricing is
that regulators do not seem to have the political will to commit to an
electricity market in which price signals—rather than administrative reserve
requirements—secure resource adequacy. Even if scarcity pricing could
maintain adequate supply, and persuasive economic arguments indicate that
it can,198 the fact that regulators are concerned about the problems
enumerated above suggests that policymakers need to think about alternative
ways to procure reserves. No state other than Texas relies on energy markets
to procure supply.199 Other grid operators have determined that energyonly markets allow unacceptable levels of volatility and fail to maintain
sufficient reserves.200
At the very least, the fact that most of the United States refuses to commit
to scarcity pricing illustrates the need to think carefully about how to support
other markets that can procure sufficient supply while preserving competition
May-price-spike-shows-vulnerability-of-power-14188257.php [https://perma.cc/Z2BT-RVNM]
(“Power companies have exploited weaknesses in the design of Texas’ deregulated market almost
from the day it began operating in 2002 and often done so with few consequences, reaping windfalls
that have cost consumers, traders, industrial customers and retail power companies hundreds of
millions of dollars.”).
196 See News Release: ERCOT’s Reserve Margin Climbs 2% for Summer 2020, ERCOT (Dec. 5,
2019), http://www.ercot.com/news/releases/show/195806 [https://perma.cc/2SE4-SGZT] (reporting
an 8.6% reserve margin in Summer 2019); see also Ethan Howland, Texas PUC Orders Higher Scarcity
Prices Amid Dropping Reserves, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.publicpower.org/
periodical/article/texas-puc-orders-higher-scarcity-prices-amid-dropping-reserves [https://perma.cc/
J2G7-2CRF] (discussing “ERCOT’s 13.75 percent minimum target”).
197 See, e.g., Sixel, supra note 195 (“Lawmakers and regulators . . . have done little to harden the
system against manipulation and, in some ways, provided incentives for companies to game the
market. When it finds irregularities that push prices artificially high, ERCOT rarely reprices
transactions and orders power companies to give up the gains.”).
198 See Hogan, supra note 150, at 6-23 (explaining how energy-only markets could provide
resource adequacy and summarizing the economic literature).
199 See Bade, supra note 189 (“Of the wholesale electricity markets . . . , only two—[ERCOT]
and [SPP]—do not have capacity markets.”).
200 For example, when PJM first developed its capacity market, it did so because its “existing
market rules . . . fail[ed] to set prices adequate to ensure sufficient resources” and “create[d]
significant price volatility for electric supply.” PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip
op. at 2-3 (Dec. 22, 2006).
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and accommodating state renewable energy policies. A recent exchange
between Harvard economist William Hogan and PJM executives illustrates
this dynamic. After Hogan said that “[l]ife is too short to spend your time
trying to perfect capacity markets,” PJM Market Monitor Joe Bowring
responded, “it’s easy enough to say in a theoretical world that scarcity pricing
should take care of everything. But we have yet to see that demonstrated in
the real world.”201 While it is certainly possible that ERCOT will continue to
rely on scarcity pricing, the unpredictability, threat of market manipulation,
and widespread antipathy to energy-only markets means that it is important
to consider alternative market designs.
2. Resource Adequacy Requirements
Resource adequacy requirements are a more common solution to the
missing money problem. In addition to or instead of compensating generators
for providing electricity, resource adequacy requirements compensate
generators for being available to provide electricity.202 Given that every state
besides Texas maintains reliability through a resource adequacy requirement,
we expect capacity payments to increase in importance as energy market
prices continue to decline.
a. Reserve Obligations
One type of resource adequacy requirement, which we endorse in Part VI
and which is used to some extent in the Midwest and California, assigns
reserve obligations to LSEs, which procure capacity for themselves but must
meet administratively established reserve margins.203 The other option,
Heidorn, supra note 193 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Bushnell et al., supra note 24, at 3 (“Outside of ERCOT, supply resources in other U.S.
markets operated by [RTOs] can earn revenues for the provision of capacity, a product defined by
the expected potential to supply energy.”).
203 See Planning Resource Auction, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/planning/resourceadequacy/#t=10&p=0&s=FileName&sd=desc [https://perma.cc/U2YM-YHKA] (last visited Feb. 11,
2020) (“In the MISO region, customer-facing utilities are responsible for making sure they can
meet customer needs.”). California’s system is similar to that of MISO. In California, the
California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) imposes “resource adequacy” requirements on
LSEs. See Resource Adequacy, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/RA
[https://perma.cc/6642-RQSE] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (noting that the CPUC imposes resource
adequacy obligations on all LSEs in the CPUC’s jurisdiction). MISO runs a centralized capacity
auction, known as the planning resource auction, but also allows LSEs to meet the resource adequacy
requirement by submitting a fixed resource adequacy plan or through bilateral contracting. MISO,
2019/2020 PLANNING RESOURCE AUCTION (PRA) RESULTS 3 (2019), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/
20190412_PRA_Results_Posting336165.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ5Q-65RQ] [hereinafter 2019/2020
PRA RESULTS]. Unlike MISO, the CPUC does not run a centralized market. See id. However, the
California grid operator, CAISO, is beginning to add elements of a capacity market through the
Capacity Procurement Mechanism that would allow the ISO—rather than the LSEs—to procure
201
202

2020]

Rate Regulation Redux

1221

which is used in the East Coast markets, is a central capacity market, in which
the RTO runs periodic auctions to acquire capacity on behalf of the LSEs.
The RTO then allocates costs to the LSEs.204
Under resource adequacy requirements without mandated capacity
auctions, LSEs can self-supply, contract bilaterally, or purchase reserves
through a central auction.205 LSEs that prefer to self-supply or purchase load
by negotiating with independent power producers are free to do so.206 If a
state requires that an LSE procure in-state natural gas or rely more heavily
on zero-carbon sources, the LSE can find supply that both satisfies the federal
reserve mandate and meets its state’s needs.
b. Capacity Markets
The East Coast capacity markets are more intrusive than simple resource
adequacy requirements.207 In these markets, existing generators and proposed
capacity when needed. See Capacity Procurement Mechanism Replacement, CAISO, http://www.caiso.com/
informed/Pages/StakeholderProcesses/CompletedClosedStakeholderInitiatives/CapacityProcurem
entMechanismReplacement.aspx [https://perma.cc/HQ4J-666P] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020)
(describing a proposal that includes “a durable mechanism and market-based price for the ISO to
procure capacity not designated for resource adequacy in order to meet reliability needs”). The
Southwest Power Pool (SPP), which serves the Great Plains states, also has a resource adequacy
requirement but no centrally administered market. See Resource Adequacy, SPP,
https://www.spp.org/engineering/resource-adequacy [https://perma.cc/LWF4-V58X] (last visited
Feb. 11, 2020) (stating that SPP achieves resource adequacy through the implementation of
demand and supply adequacy requirements).
204 See, e.g., CAPACITY MARKET OPERATIONS, PJM, PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY
MARKET 16 (44th rev., effective Dec. 5, 2019), https://pjm.com/-/media/documents/manuals/
m18.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/6MYY-RXEU] [hereinafter PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY
MARKET] (“Under RPM, each LSE that serves load in a PJM Zone during the Delivery Year shall
be responsible for paying a Locational Reliability Charge equal to their Daily Unforced Capacity
Obligation in the Zone multiplied by the Final Zonal Capacity Price applicable to that Zone.”).
205 See 2019/2020 PRA RESULTS, supra note 203, at 3.
206 See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,176, slip op. at 1-2 (Feb. 28,
2018) (stating the LSEs in MISO can satisfy their resource adequacy obligations in any of four ways:
“(1) purchase capacity through the Planning Resource Auction (Auction); (2) submit a Fixed
Resource Adequacy Plan to demonstrate that it has designated capacity to meet all or a portion of
its Reserve Requirement, (3) self-schedule capacity and bid it into the Auction at a price of zero,
and/or (4) pay the Capacity Deficiency Charge”); MISO, FERC Electric Tariff, Module E-1, § 69A
(35.0.0), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Module%20E-1108026.pdf (“LSEs will meet their [planning
reserve margin requirement] by: (i) submitting a Fixed Resource Adequacy Plan; (ii) SelfScheduling [Zonal Resource Credits (ZRCs)]; (iii) purchasing ZRCs through the Planning Resource
Auction process; and/or (iv) paying the Capacity Deficiency Charge.”).
207 These centralized capacity markets are not strictly mandatory and do not prevent
utilities from procuring capacity through bilateral contracts. What distinguishes the East Coast
capacity markets is that a regulator or grid operator requires LSEs to participate in a centrally
administered capacity auction in which the regulator or grid operator determines the winning
bids. See PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 16 (explaining that
“[p]articipation by [LSEs] in the [Reliability Pricing Model] for load served in the PJM region is
mandatory, except for those LSEs that have elected the Fixed Resource Requirement . . . Alternative”);
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new generators submit bids (in dollars per megawatt-day) in which they offer
to be available to supply power (in megawatts) for a commitment period in
the future.208 Grid operators set up a merit order and clear enough power to
cover the administratively determined demand curve.209 The marginal
generator sets the market-clearing price for capacity. To meet its capacity
obligation, a generator must bid into the energy market for the future
commitment period even if that generator does not clear.210 LSEs are

id. at 84-88 (discussing the circumstances in which buyers and sellers can enter into bilateral
contracts for the sale and purchase of capacity); id. at 200-02 (explaining how LSEs can opt out
of the Reliability Pricing Model through the Fixed Resource Requirement, which allows LSEs
to self-supply capacity if they provide, among other things, at least four months notice and
demonstrate that they have sufficient resources to meet the reserve requirement for five
consecutive years).
208 See Capacity Market (RPM), PJM LEARNING CTR., http://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/
buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx [https://perma.cc/88UE-EBXB] (last visited Feb.
11, 2020) (noting that PJM’s capacity market requires power plants to procure enough resources to
“meet predicted energy demand three years in the future”). PJM proposed its Reliability Pricing
Model (RPM) in 2005 and implemented it in 2007. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC
¶ 61,331, slip op. at 2-3 (Dec. 22, 2006) (describing the 2005 development of the RPM proposal);
2 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2008 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM:
DETAILED ANALYSIS 249-51 (2009), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_
of_the_Market/2008/2008-som-pjm-volume2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DVK-N6MJ] [hereinafter
2008 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT] (describing the design and early implementation
of the RPM).
209 See, e.g., 2008 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 208, at 249 (“Under RPM,
there is an administratively determined demand curve that defined scarcity pricing levels and that,
with the supply curve derived from capacity offers, determined market prices in each [base residual
auction].”); SAMUEL A. NEWELL ET AL., BRATTLE GRP., FOURTH REVIEW OF PJM’S VARIABLE
RESOURCE REQUIREMENT CURVE 13 (2018), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reportsnotices/special-reports/2018/20180420-pjm-2018-variable-resource-requirement-curve-study.ashx?
la=en [https://perma.cc/M9YW-E66A] (summarizing the results of a study “to evaluate the
parameters and shape of the administrative . . . curve used to produce capacity under [PJM’s]
RPM”). The availability requirements vary between markets and across resource types. Cleared
capacity resources do not have to be available at every minute of every day during their commitment
period. See ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets, and Services Tariff § III(13)(1)(2)(2)(1)(1)
(2019), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/regulatory/tariff/sect_3/mr1_sec_13_14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M9HV-XZZ4] (allowing for monthly, seasonal, and annual periods and the
transferring of obligations); see also CAPACITY MARKET OPERATIONS, PJM, PJM MANUAL 18:
PJM CAPACITY MARKET 121-22 (39th rev., effective Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.pjm.com//media/documents/manuals/archive/m18/m18v39-capacity-market-12-21-2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/
JUQ3-DACF] (describing various exceptions—including “nuclear, coal, wind, hydro, solar, or
landfill gas facilities”—to Minimum Offer Price Rules (MOPR), which “ensure[] that certain
planned Generation Capacity Resources are offered into RPM Auctions on a competitive basis”).
210 See Bushnell et al., supra note 24, at 28 (“Resources with capacity that clears in a capacity
market or is committed to meet an RA requirement have obligations to be available and perform in
Day-Ahead and Real-Time energy markets.”).
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compelled to purchase an amount of the acquired capacity proportional to
their share of total load.211
Capacity market payments allow peaking plants and other generators
needed for reliability to cover their fixed costs and make a profit. Payment
for availability, not energy, solves the missing money problem. Mandatory
capacity markets exist in PJM,212 NYISO,213 and ISO-NE.214 As the table
below shows, recent capacity market prices have ranged significantly.

211 See, e.g., PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 19, 25-26; N.Y.
I NDEP . S YS . O PERATOR , M ANUAL 4: I NSTALLED C APACITY M ANUAL 22-23 (2020), https://
www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2923301/icap_mnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD9A-K83F].
212 See Capacity Market (RPM), PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EAD5-HN87] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (noting that PJM’s RPM “ensures longterm grid reliability by securing the appropriate amount of power supply resources needed to meet
predicted energy demand in the future”).
213 See Installed Capacity Market (ICAP), N.Y. ISO, https://www.nyiso.com/installedcapacity-market [https://perma.cc/G976-75F4] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (noting that New York’s
capacity market ensures “reliability of the bulk power system”).
214 See Forward Capacity Market, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/
markets/forward-capacity-market [https://perma.cc/M9HV-XZZ4] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020)
(stating that New England’s Forward Capacity Market (FCM) “ensures that the New England
power system will have sufficient resources to meet the future demand for electricity”).
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Table 2: Representative Capacity Market Pricing
Forward
Commitment Price Range over
Name
Period
Period
Last Ten Auctions

Reliability
Pricing
Model
Installed
Capacity
Market
Planning
Resource
Auction

3 years
ahead

1 year215

$16 to $165 /
MW-day216

1 month
ahead

6 months217

$0 to $604 /
MW-day218

3 years
ahead

1 year219

$66 to $583 /
MW-day220

In regions that rely on mandatory capacity markets, the trend has been
for these markets to make up an increasing share of generator revenue. PJM’s
capacity market, for example, now provides four times more revenue than it
did when it was developed in 2007 and twenty percent of total revenue for
generators operating in the Mid-Atlantic.221 In ISO-NE, PJM, and NYISO,
the three markets with mandatory capacity markets, between roughly twenty
215 PJM, RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION FAQS 1 (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.pjm.com/-/
media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-base-residual-auction-faqs.ashx?la=en [https://
perma.cc/2RCM-WAYH].
216 PJM, 2020/2021 RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION RESULTS 6 (2017), https://pjm.com/-/
media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2021-2022/2021-2022-base-residual-auction-report.ashx?
la=en [https://perma.cc/M879-4D27].
217 Installed Capacity: View Strip Auction Summary, NYISO, http://icap.nyiso.com/ucap/public/
auc_view_strip_detail.do [https://perma.cc/PM8D-MA4E] (last visited June 2, 2020) (displaying
results of two auctions per year, conducted thirty days prior to each period’s commencement).
218 See id. (strip auction results from Winter 2015–16 to Summer 2020, accounting for lows and
highs in each auction). Note that $1/kW-month * (12 months / 365 days) * (1000 kW / 1 MW) =
$32.9/MW-day.
219 About the FCM and Its Auctions, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/marketsoperations/markets/forward-capacity-market/fcm-participation-guide/about-the-fcm-and-itsauctions [https://perma.cc/CJ6C-DXSH] (last visited June 2, 2020).
220 Markets: Results of the Annual Forward Capacity Auctions, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.isone.com/about/key-stats/markets#fcaresults [https://perma.cc/Y7ME-W4MT] (last visited Feb. 11,
2020). Note that $1/kW-month * (12 months / 365 days) * (1000 kW / 1 MW) = $32.9/MW-day.
221 See PJM, Understanding the Difference Between PJM’s Markets: Markets at a Glance 1
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/understanding-the-differencebetween-pjms-markets-fact-sheet.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/6FL7-F4BQ] (finding that capacity
payments accounted for $11.89/MWh of the $59.96/MWh of wholesale electricity costs in PJM’s
region); see also MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, Q3 2019 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR
PJM: JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 291 (2019), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/
PJM_State_of_the_Market/2019/2019q3-som-pjm.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHL6-8QPD] (stating
that RPM revenue increased from $2,486,310,208 in 2007 to $10,331,688,133 in 2018, though it was
projected to decline to $8,734,613,179 in 2019).
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percent (NYISO, PJM) and forty percent (ISO-NE) of wholesale electricity
costs was due to capacity market payments.222
III. RENEWABLES EXACERBATE THE MISSING MONEY PROBLEM
The previous Part showed that offer caps have contributed to a missing money
problem that has prompted regulators to find other sources of revenue to support
resource adequacy. This Part explains why growing volumes of renewables
increase the need for regulatory interventions to support resource adequacy.
It is worth making clear at the outset that it is theoretically possible for
energy-only markets to provide resource adequacy even with high levels of
renewables. If regulators were comfortable with extreme price swings and
power producers could make investment decisions with perfect foresight,
energy market prices could conceivably rise high enough to provide sufficient
compensation for peaking plants and other generators that support grid
reliability.223 The purpose of this Part is therefore not to show that there is
no scenario in which energy markets could accommodate higher levels of
renewables. It is rather to show that by suppressing energy market prices,
renewables exacerbate the features of the grid that have already led regulators
to intervene in electricity markets.
Perhaps more importantly, regulators and grid operators believe that the
missing money problem will increase as renewable penetration grows, and
they are already taking intervening steps to provide other sources of revenue
for generators perceived to be necessary to reliability. According to ISO-NE,
“[a]dditional renewables are expected to decrease wholesale electric energy
prices, which will result in increased capacity prices to ensure resource
adequacy.”224 Other grid operators have echoed this view.225 Thus, despite the
ability of theoretical economists to model a system in which energy-only
markets procure resource adequacy in a high-renewable world, academics and
policymakers need to consider alternative approaches that preserve
competitive dynamics while integrating clean energy resources.
A. Declining Clearing Prices Are Transforming Electricity Markets
The combination of increasingly competitive renewables, state clean
energy policies, and inexpensive natural gas has already transformed the

See 2018 ERCOT STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 122, at 9.
See Hogan, supra note 150, at 1-3 (showing that if offer caps were removed and demand was
responsive to supply, then the market might provide sufficient revenue during scarcity conditions to
support necessary supply).
224 See ISO New England, supra note 34, at 1.
225 See infra Section IV.C.
222
223
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United States’ resource mix and reduced the contribution of energy markets
to generator revenue.226 As natural gas and renewables have become less
expensive,227 they have begun to make up a larger percentage of the power
grid.228 Lower natural gas prices translate to lower marginal costs for natural
gas power plants. This reduces the market-clearing price as the marginal
generator is usually a natural gas power plant.
Renewable generators have marginal costs close to zero, such that the
entry of these resources shifts the supply curve to the right. This shift causes
prices to decline because a lower marginal cost generator sets the clearing
price.229 Figure 3 demonstrates these two effects.
Figure 3: Price Depression Effects of Cheap Natural Gas and Renewables230

226 The rise of renewable power has begun to suppress energy market prices. The cost of wind
turbines fell seventy percent between 2009 and 2019, and the cost of solar panels fell eighty-nine
percent. See LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 13.0, at 7
(2019), https://www.lazard.com/media/451086/lazards-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-130-vf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UEN-GNG5]. Renewables (excluding hydroelectric) expanded from 3.1
percent of total generation in 2009 to 9.9 percent in 2018. See Electric Power Annual, Table 3.1.A,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_03_01_a.html
[https://perma.cc/GS3S-GYNR] (sum of “Solar” and “Renewable Sources Excluding Hydroelectric
and Solar” divided by “Total Generation at Utility-Scale Facilities”).
227 See LAZARD, supra note 226, at 7; Coley Girouard, The Numbers Are in and Renewables Are
Winning on Price Alone, ADVANCED ENERGY PERSP. (Dec. 5, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://blog.aee.net/
the-numbers-are-in-and-renewables-are-winning-on-price-alone [https://perma.cc/74LX-4SUT].
228 See Short-Term Energy Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/electricity.php [https://perma.cc/73JC-TKL5] (tracking
United States electricity generation by source between 2014 and 2019).
229 See SEEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 3-4 figs. 1-2 (showing this effect with graphs).
230 Data for Figure 3 came from LAZARD, supra note 146; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
supra note 146.
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As Figure 4 shows, increased use of natural gas and renewables has already
caused energy market prices to decline significantly. Energy market prices
peaked in 2008 and fell more than fifty percent in the ensuing decade.231 In
2006, energy prices averaged approximately $80 per megawatt-hour. Prices
increased to $160 per megawatt-hour in 2008 and have steadily declined to
about $35 per megawatt-hour.
Figure 4: Monthly Average Wholesale Electricity
Prices in Select U.S. Markets, 2006–2017232

Lower energy market prices have begun to challenge the ability of some
generators, especially coal and nuclear power plants, to cover their fixed
costs.233 Since 2010, declining prices have forced roughly a third (by capacity)

231 The data for Figure 4 came from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Historical
Wholesale Market Data for the years 2006–2017. See Wholesale Electricity and Natural Gas Market
Data, U.S. E NERGY I NFO . A DMIN . (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/wholesale
[https://perma.cc/37LE-NQCM]. Specifically, energy market prices have fallen 66 percent in
CAISO, 64 percent in ISO-NE, 62 percent in PJM, and 52 percent in MISO. See id. Figures reported
are monthly averages weighted by sales volume and adjusted for inflation. In the years leading up to
2008, energy prices creeped up from around $60 per megawatt-hour to above $100 per megawatt-hour.
With the discovery of abundant shale gas in 2008, prices fell to around $50 per megawatt-hour. See id.
There have been occasional price spikes since then, most notably in response to the 2014 polar vortex,
but prices have generally remained in the $30-$50 per megawatt-hour range. See id.
232 Wholesale Electricity and Natural Gas Market Data, supra note 231; see also supra note 231.
233 Coal and nuclear power plants in regulated regions, such as the Northwest and Southeast,
are also affected, though the price signal is muted by utility and commission decisionmaking. As
generation in these regions remains subject to utility rate regulation, the retirement decision for
these power plants is subject to public utility commission ratemaking rather than market forces. For
more detail on the geographically differentiated history of restructuring, see supra Part II.
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of the then-active coal power plant fleet to retire.234 To date, the major driver
of these lower energy market prices and resulting plant closures has been
inexpensive natural gas. According to a Lawrence Berkeley National Lab
report:
[T]he primary driver of the decline in average wholesale electricity prices
between 2008 and 2016 in ERCOT and CAISO is the decline in natural gas
prices. We find that growth in [variable renewable energy] generation
contributed less than 5% to the overall price decline, whereas natural gas price
reductions contributed 85-90% of the overall decline in wholesale electricity
prices in these markets.235

As detailed below, the growing penetration of renewables is expected to
reinforce and continue this price suppression trend.
Price suppression has also begun to reduce the role of energy markets in
much of the United States. According to FERC and the grid operators,
increased volumes of renewables and declining gas prices have increased the
importance of capacity markets in many parts of the United States.236 In ISONE, for example, capacity markets were responsible for slightly more than
10.5% of wholesale electricity costs in 2008 but had ballooned to over thirtyfive percent of wholesale electricity costs in 2018.237 ISO-NE explained that
“[t]he region should expect to see the annual energy-market value continue
to decline over time as renewable resources drive down energy-market
prices.”238 The grid operator believes that capacity markets will provide the

234 Between 2010 and 2019, 102 gigawatts out of the then-operating 317 gigawatts of the coal
power plant fleet have retired, or 32.2% of the total. See U.S. Coal-Fired Power Plants Continue to
Retire, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/fossilfuels/coal/u-s-coal-fired-power-plants-continue-to-retire [https://perma.cc/C7PM-JWPT]. An
additional seventeen gigawatts have announced retirement. Id. For context, a gigawatt is roughly
enough to meet the instantaneous demand of one million homes at once. See CAL. ISO, CALIFORNIA
ISO GLOSSARY, https://www.energy.ca.gov/resources/energy-glossary [https://perma.cc/7XCS5M9U] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). The installed capacity of all U.S. generators was 1177 gigawatts
in 2016. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2016, at 71 tbl.4.4 (rev. 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/pdf/03482016.pdf [https://perma.cc/84WZ-7U6V].
235 WISER ET AL., supra note 30, at 23.
236 See infra Section III.C; infra Table 3.
237 See Key Grids and Market Stats: Markets, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/
key-stats/markets [https://perma.cc/KDG4-3KM7] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (showing a
visualization estimating these proportions); see also CONSUMER LIAISON GRP. COORDINATING
COMM. & ISO NEW ENG., 2018 REPORT OF THE CONSUMER LIAISON GROUP 34 tbl.7-1 (2019),
https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2019/03/2018_report_of_the_consumer_liaison_
group_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM53-JHB2] (reporting the underlying data).
238 Key Grids and Market Stats: Markets, supra note 237.
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revenue shortfall.239 As long as FERC and grid operators feel that these units
are necessary for reliability, they will continue to allow the capacity clearing
price to rise. Figure 5 illustrates the increasing percentage electricity market
payments that are due to capacity markets.240
Figure 5: Percentage of Revenue from Capacity, Energy,
and Ancillary Services Markets (ISO-NE)241
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Declining energy market prices have also forced some plants that used to
receive most revenues from energy markets to become newly reliant on
capacity market payments. In PJM, for example, seventy-nine percent of
nuclear power plants recovered their costs from energy and ancillary services
markets in 2013 and one hundred percent recovered their costs from those
239 See id. (“[A]s energy-market revenues decrease over time, the prices in the capacity and
ancillary markets will likely rise to cover the costs for resources that rely solely on market revenue . . . and
are needed to balance renewable resources and provide energy security, particularly in winter.”).
240 Id.
241 To calculate these numbers, we took that data from ISO-NE’s internal market monitor’s
yearly reports. We divided revenues from each market (capacity, energy, and ancillary services) by
the sum of the revenues that came from those markets (capacity + energy + ancillary services). The
market monitor reports also include regional network load costs. We excluded those payments
because they cover transmission facilities and administrative costs and thus are not payments to
generators. We also excluded net commitment period compensation revenues (NCPC). NCPC do
not fit neatly into any of the markets because they are payments to units that follow the instructions
of the grid operator, often as a result of transmission security concerns. NCPC payments were very
low throughout the period. Over the past decade, a larger and larger percentage of ISO-NE revenue
has come from capacity markets. According to ISO-NE’s internal market monitor, capacity markets
accounted for less than eleven percent of generator revenue in 2014 and now account for nearly forty
percent of generator revenue.
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markets in 2014.242 By 2017, only twenty-one percent of nuclear plants
recovered their costs from energy and ancillary services markets.243 The result
was to increase the importance of capacity payments for nuclear power plants.
B. Long-Term Prospects for Energy Markets
Energy prices will continue to decline as renewable penetration increases.
A number of states have developed ambitious clean energy targets that call
for renewables to take on a larger share of total power generation.244
California, for example, recently adopted a bill that calls for fifty percent of
the state’s electricity to be powered from zero-carbon sources by 2025, sixty
percent by 2030, and one hundred percent by 2045.245 New York has set a goal
of producing only carbon-free electricity by 2040.246 Many of these states
have renewable portfolio standard (RPS) mandates. Moreover, many states
in the Midwest have deployed substantial renewable capacity without RPS
mandates or other forms of state support.247 Because these states do not
subsidize renewables, the only explanation for this trend is that renewable
energy sources have become cost-competitive.
A number of studies have analyzed the causes of declining energy prices.
A recent report published by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
242 2 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2017 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM:
DETAILED ANALYSIS 330 tbl.7-30 (2018), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_
State_of_the_Market/2017/2017-som-pjm-volume2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYK7-ARXR].
243 Id.
244 See Spencer Fields, 100 Percent Renewable Targets, ENERGYSAGE (May 2, 2019),
https://news.energysage.com/states-with-100-renewable-targets [https://perma.cc/9GHX-EYB7]
(identifying which states have 100 percent clean or renewable energy targets, either passed as statutes
or announced in executive orders, organized by source of authority and their target compliance dates).
245 See Camila Domonoske, California Sets Goal of 100 Percent Clean Electric Power by 2045, NPR
(Sept. 10, 2018, 9:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646373423/california-sets-goal-of-100percent-renewable-electric-power-by-2045 [https://perma.cc/VL7H-9EQL] (describing the future
impact of California’s ambitious plan of relying entirely on zero-emission resources, as the fifthlargest economy in the world).
246 See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66-P*2 (McKinney 2019) (charging New York’s Public Service
Commission with establishing a program to require that “by the year two thousand forty . . . the
statewide electrical demand system will be zero emissions”); Emma Foehringer Merchant, NY
Governor Wants Zero-Carbon Electricity by 2040, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/new-york-names-100-carbon-neutral-electricity-aspriority [https://perma.cc/G6QG-HE42] (citing survey results that 81 percent of registered voters
“strongly” or “somewhat” supported the plan to move to 100 percent renewable energy); see also State
Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/ED33UW4S] (providing an overview of similar efforts taken by legislatures across the United States).
247 See GALEN BARBOSE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., U.S.
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: 2019 ANNUAL STATUS UPDATE 16 (2019), https://etapublications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/rps_annual_status_update-2019_edition.pdf (showing that
renewable-energy growth “far-outpaced RPS needs” in the Midwest in the period 2000–2018).
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found that achieving a renewable penetration level of forty percent—a
relatively modest level of renewable penetration compared to a number of
states’ energy goals—would likely increase the number of hours with very low
energy prices by nearly twenty percent in some markets.248 This level of
renewables could lead to the retirement of fourteen percent of Texas’s “firm
capacity,” which is capacity that is guaranteed to deliver electricity even under
adverse conditions.249 The report found that NYISO would experience a
thirty-seven and thirty-nine percent decline in average energy prices under a
forty-percent-renewables, or “high VRE,” scenario.250
Another group of energy economists reached a similar result about the
effects of renewables on price suppression and volatility.251 A study conducted
by the National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) stated that “regions with
enough generating units with low or zero marginal costs at a given time will
tend toward locational marginal prices of approximately zero.”252 Based on
this finding, NREL concluded that “[t]he prevalence of near-zero locational
marginal prices implies that markets for multiple services in addition to the
248 See SEEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 1-2, 35 (finding that low-marginal-price hours would
increase by up to nineteen percent in ERCOT, in a modeled scenario with more than forty percent
renewable penetration).
249 See id. at 17 (reaching this result under the assumptions of a modeled high-wind scenario);
see also Energy Terms: Firm Power, ENERGY ME, http://www.energy.me/energy-terms/firm-power
[http://www.energy.me/energy-terms/firm-power] (last visited May 15, 2020) (defining firm capacity
or “firm power”).
250 SEEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 21-22.
251 It is worth noting that the missing money problem is not the only reason renewables will
exacerbate price volatility. The fact that renewables are intermittent resources—they operate only
when the sun is shining and the wind is blowing—means that periods of abundant supply will lead
to scarcity when the sun stops shining and the wind stops blowing. The need to compensate
generators that can quickly increase supply during periods of scarcity exacerbates price volatility.
Michael Milligan et al., Wholesale Electricity Market Design with Increasing Levels of Renewable
Generation: Revenue Sufficiency and Long-Term Reliability, 29 ELECTRICITY J. 26, 32-33 (2016).
Numerous economic studies support these conclusions. See AARON BLOOM ET AL., NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TECHNICAL REPORT NREL/TP-6A20-64472, EASTERN
RENEWABLE GENERATION INTEGRATION STUDY 155 (2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/
64472.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QQF-NJ52] (“In futures with high amounts of wind and [photovoltaic
energy], system and plant operators will need to focus their attention on different times of day and
could expect to cycle or ramp their resources more frequently. If . . . structures are not in place to
incentivize this flexibility, resources may exit the market . . . .”); DAVID J. MAGGIO, IMPACTS OF
WIND-POWERED GENERATION RESOURCE INTEGRATION ON PRICES IN THE ERCOT NODAL
MARKET 2-3 (2012) (presented at the 2012 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Power
and Energy Society General Meeting), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6344611 [https://perma.cc/
KWP8-FXZA] (calculating the added cost of greater reliance on ERCOT’s ancillary services as the
proportion of wind-powered generation resources in ERCOT’s total system energy increases and
forecast error increases as a result); Milligan et al., supra, at 32 (“New electricity market entrants
with very low variable costs create revenue sufficiency challenges for marginal units.”).
252 NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 1 RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY:
EXPLORATION OF HIGH-PENETRATION ELECTRICITY FUTURES 4-11 (2012), https://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy12osti/52409-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6CU-Y285].
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energy market would likely be needed to reduce revenue risk and to provide
financial incentive to generators for producing renewable energy and
ensuring reliability.”253 Given that most states have already intervened to
limit volatility and reduce price spikes, and that grid operators have expressly
stated that they expect renewables to increase the need for capacity markets,
it stands to reason that many states will become increasingly reliant on
capacity payments and potentially outright bailouts.
These analyses may not predict with pinpoint accuracy how extensively
energy prices will decline as renewables make up an increasing share of total
electricity production. Because we expect regulators to intervene to ensure
resource adequacy, we do not expect prices to follow these patterns
precisely.254 The point is simply that price suppression driven by renewables
has a dramatic effect on energy market revenues. A world with high levels of
renewables translates into lower wholesale energy prices, which reduces
revenues available to all generators. If regulators continue to rely on a
payment system based around energy market prices with relatively low offer
caps, generator revenues will become more volatile and operating profits for
many generators will continue to decline. This threatens the investment
incentives of all resources and creates pressure for regulators to turn to other
sources of revenue. Unless offer caps increase significantly, which regulators
seem reluctant to allow, then FERC and grid operators will rely more heavily
on capacity payments and subsidies that support critical generators.
FERC and economists sometimes liken energy markets to some sort of
idealized competitive process that exists free from regulatory interference,255
but it should by now be apparent that any “threat” posed by renewables is a
regulatory failure—not an economic failure. FERC and grid operators have
developed a payment system in which unit commitment and economic
dispatch depend on the marginal costs of the marginal bidder, and they have
implemented offer caps that make it difficult for generators to recover costs
when supply is scarce. The economic challenges posed by high volumes of
renewables thus result from the series of regulatory and legislative
interventions that have occurred since FERC deregulated energy markets.

Id.
As discussed in the next Part, regulators are stepping in prospectively to prevent price
suppression and support units needed for grid reliability.
255 See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 19, 2019) (claiming that
certain subsidies “threaten the competitiveness of the capacity market administered by PJM
Interconnection”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 32 (Dec. 22, 2006)
(“In a competitive market, all suppliers will be paid the same price.”).
253
254
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C. Regulatory Views of the Missing Money Problem
Perhaps the most important reason to consider alternative payment
systems is that the regulators charged with overseeing electricity markets
believe that renewables suppress energy market prices and increase volatility.
For example, David Patton, whose firm Potomac Economics acts as the
Internal Market Monitor256 for MISO, ISO-NE, NYISO, and ERCOT,257
has described the importance of capacity payments in a high-renewables
electric power grid: “Unless you’re willing to price shortages at
$200,000/MWh, you’re not going to meet your planning requirements with
the energy market alone.”258 Numerous grid operators have acknowledged
that increasing volumes of renewables will render energy markets a less
important source of generator revenue. Table 3 compiles quotes to this effect.
Table 3: Grid Operator Statements About the Effect of
Renewables on Wholesale Electricity Prices
ISO / RTO
Concern About Renewables

PJM

“The investments required for environmental compliance
have resulted in higher offers in the Capacity Market, and
when units do not clear, in the retirement of units. Federal
and state renewable energy mandates and associated
incentives have resulted in the construction of substantial
amounts of renewable capacity in the PJM footprint,
especially wind and solar powered resources. Renewable
energy credit (REC) markets created by state programs
and federal tax credits have significant impacts on PJM
wholesale markets.”259

256 Internal Market Monitors in wholesale electricity markets are independent organizations
that submit periodic reports about electricity markets. See Internal Market Monitor, ISO NEW
E NG ., https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/market-monitoring-mitigation/internalmonitor [https://perma.cc/JA4Y-P8D6] (last visited May 15, 2020).
257 See P OTOMAC E CON ., https://www.potomaceconomics.com [https://perma.cc/KZ8ZS8CY] (last visited May 15, 2020) (under heading “RTO Market Monitoring”).
258 Heidorn, supra note 193.
259 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, Q2 2016 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM:
JANUARY THROUGH JUNE 281 (2016), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_
of_the_Market/2016/2016q2-som-pjm.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFF4-NHMF]; see also PJM
INTERCONNECTION, PJM’S EVOLVING RESOURCE MIX AND SYSTEM RELIABILITY 15 (2017),
https://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170330-pjms-evolvingresource-mix-and-system-reliability.ash [https://perma.cc/44K6-5P72] (“Should the actual,
future fuel mix evolve such that the potential exists for the quantity of generator reliability attributes
to fall below that which is necessary to maintain reliable grid operations, then operations, market
incentives and regulatory structures may need to shift to provide incentives to ensure adequate levels
of these attributes are maintained.”).
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“Additional renewables are expected to decrease wholesale
electric energy prices, which will result in increased
capacity prices to ensure resource adequacy.”260
“The region should expect to see capacity prices increase
over time as renewable resources reduce energy prices,
making developers of new resources and owners of existing
resources more reliant on capacity market revenues.”261
“[I]nitiatives by the New England states to develop more
renewables and clean-energy resources are posing
challenges to competitive pricing in the markets, which
could ultimately weaken resource adequacy—that is, the
assurance that the region has enough resources to meet
demand. Further, the markets don’t always show the true
costs of inadequate fuel security.”262

NYISO

“The centralized grid exists as a dependable mainstay, yet
faces unprecedented growth and evolution as large-scale
renewables and distributed energy resources connect and
place new demands on grid functionality.”263

260 ISO New England, The Importance of Performance-Based Capacity Market to Ensure
Reliability as the Grid Adapts to a Renewable Energy Future (June 3, 2015) (unpublished discussion
paper at 1), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/06/iso_ne_capacity_mkt_discussion_
paper_06_03_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2MC-YAJD] (describing how the shift in revenue from
the energy to capacity market will put financial pressure on energy market-dependent resources).
261 ISO NEW ENG., 2018 REGIONAL ELECTRICITY OUTLOOK 18 (2018), https://www.isone.com/static-assets/documents/2018/02/2018_reo.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY8J-YX8E].
262 ISO New England, State of the Grid: 2018: Remarks and Slides 4 (Feb. 27, 2018), https://
www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2018/02/02272018_pr_remarks_state-of-the-grid.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PUR7-PM26] (remarks by Gordon van Welie, President and CEO of ISO New England).
263 N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, POWER TRENDS: NEW YORK’S EVOLVING ELECTRIC
GRID 2017, at 8 (2017), https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2223020/2017-Power-Trends.pdf/
7baea2ba-cdca-93a6-2e45-4d948383ccbd [https://perma.cc/9AEF-YSBF]; see also id. (“Limited
transfer capability from upstate to downstate means that this tale of two grids is also a tale of two
markets—where the expansion of clean energy resources is unable to reach downstate load centers,
suppressing upstate wholesale prices to the point where the economic viability of generation needed
for reliability is jeopardized.”); id. at 37 (“Lower natural gas prices have effectively driven down
wholesale power prices for all generators, regardless of whether they are using natural gas, coal,
nuclear power or renewable resources to generate their electricity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Moody’s: Fall in Natural Gas Prices May Lead to Large-Scale Plant Retirement, SNL ENERGY
(Apr. 8, 2016))); N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INTEGRATING PUBLIC POLICY: A WHOLESALE
MARKET ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF 50% RENEWABLE GENERATION 10 (2017),
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/1404721/2017%20Market%20Assessment%20with%2050%20
percent%20Renewables%20Report.pdf/9780266a-f5e2-6049-f4f0-105322a2be92 [https://perma.cc/
JRZ5-83R7] (finding that “a significant entry of renewable resources will cause the NYISO to
increase the megawatts of Installed Capacity required to meet its resource adequacy criteria”).
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MISO

“Renewables like wind and solar have low incremental
operating costs but variable output subject to the real-time
availability of wind and sun. Zero fuel cost and incentives
from state and federal entities incent these resources to
generate as much as possible at low and sometimes even
negative prices. These low costs can impact the energy
market revenues paid to all resources by reducing LMPs.
Operationally, other resources ramp to adjust to changes to
variable renewable energy production to meet net load.”264

CAISO

“[H]igh levels of hydroelectric and renewable generation
add lower cost supply, depressing monthly and hourly
average wholesale electricity prices due to their relatively
low cost. Conversely, low levels of hydroelectric and
renewable generation raise costs as higher-cost natural gas
generation is necessary to meet demand.”265

SPP

“As more renewables are added to the system, there have been
an increasing incidence of negative prices . . . and higher realtime price volatility . . . . Lower on-line capacity levels may
be a consequence as market participants and market operators
adjust to these changes in market conditions.”266
“In the SPP market where there is an abundance of
capacity and significant levels of renewable resources,
negative prices can occur when renewable resources need
to be backed down in order for traditional resources to
meet their scheduled generation.”267

264 MISO, RESOURCE AVAILABILITY AND NEED 22 (2018), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/
20180405%20RSC%20Item%2007%20RAN%20Issues%20Statement%20White%20Paper164746.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C2FW-JPR9].
265 DEP’T OF MARKET MONITORING, CAL. ISO, Q2 2018 REPORT ON MARKET ISSUES AND
PERFORMANCE 3 (2018), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2018SecondQuarterReportonMarket
IssuesandPerformance.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR5N-PPU3]. In comments about an RMR agreement
in California, a fossil fuel industry group made this point as well: “These problems will continue as
greater penetration of renewable resources diminishes resource opportunities to receive RA contracts
and reduces resource utilization and opportunities to earn margins to cover going forward costs to
remain operational.” Comments of the Electric Power Supply Association at 7 n.14, CXA La Paloma,
LLC, No. EL18-177-000 (F.E.R.C. Aug. 24, 2018), https://epsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
EPSA-Comments-La-Paloma-Complaint-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T3R-KPVU].
266 MARKET MONITORING UNIT, SW. POWER POOL, STATE OF THE MARKET 2017, at 69-70
(2018), https://www.spp.org/documents/57928/spp_mmu_asom_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8RX-5Z3C].
267 Id. at 103.
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What is notable about these statements is not that they show that energy
markets will fail to adequately compensate renewables. It is that the entities that
monitor and regulate electricity markets believe that intermittent renewables
exacerbate the missing money problem and have determined that capacity
payments and other administrative interventions are the appropriate solutions.
While this Article is critical of the specific strategies grid operators have
used to maintain resource adequacy, regulators are correct that renewables
will suppress energy market prices and increase price volatility. To trust energy
markets to support resource adequacy in a high-renewables world, regulators
would have to raise offer caps significantly.268 This would further increase
volatility and heighten the incentives and consequences of market manipulation.
IV. RATE REGULATION REDUX
The previous Part showed that price suppression driven by renewables
will exacerbate the missing money problem, increase price volatility, and
suppress energy market prices. This Part shows that regulatory responses to
the missing money problem are recreating the inefficiencies that plagued
utility rate regulation. Specifically, this Part analyzes capacity market rules,
Minimum Offer Price Rules (MOPRs), and reliability-must-run (RMR)
contracts. Like cost-of-service regulation,269 capacity markets and MOPRs
lead to excess capacity and increase prices beyond what is necessary to
maintain reliable service. RMR contracts go a step further and reimpose costof-service regulation in parts of the grid that claim to have restructured. All
of these regulatory interventions favor fossil fuel generators and counteract
state clean energy policies.
A. Mandatory Capacity Markets
While mandatory capacity markets might appear to be a sensible response
to the missing money problem, in reality they favor incumbents, lead to
overcapacity, and raise electricity prices for consumers. PJM, for example, set
a reserve target of 16.1 percent for summer 2018, but operated with a 32.8
percent reserve margin.270 That is more than twice as much capacity as the
268 See Jenny Riesz, Joel Gilmore & Iain MacGill, Assessing the Viability of Energy-Only Markets
with 100% Renewables: An Australian National Electricity Market Case Study, ECON. ENERGY &
ENVTL. POL’Y, Mar. 2016, at 105, 121 tbl.1, 122 (estimating that the market offer cap in the Australian
National Electricity Market would have to increase to $60,000-80,000 per megawatt-hour to provide
sufficient aggregate revenues to cover costs in a system relying on 100% renewable energy sources).
269 See supra Section I.A.
270 Stephanie Tsao & Richard Martin, Overpowered: PJM Market Rules Drive an Era of
Oversupply, S&P GLOBAL: MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/
marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/54111666 [https://perma.cc/9U6B-
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grid operator claims is needed for reliability.271 PJM has in this way ensured
that generators with 11,000 megawatts of unnecessary capacity will remain in
the market for at least three additional years.272 As one advocate explained,
“[t]hat is roughly equivalent to an extra twenty-two coal or gas power plants
(at 500 megawatts each) or eleven extra nuclear power plants (at 1,000
megawatts each).273 ISO-New England’s capacity markets are similarly
bloated.274 Altogether, redundant capacity is costing consumers in ISO-NE,
NYISO, and PJM over a billion dollars a year.275
Regulators could reduce some of the issues plaguing capacity markets by
improving market design. Other challenges, however, are foundational. That
is why capacity markets are a second-best option that should be rejected in
favor of scarcity pricing or less intrusive resource adequacy requirements. This
Section first critiques specific capacity market rules. It then discusses the
fundamental features of capacity markets that would render them problematic
even if FERC eliminated the rules that discriminate against renewables.
1. Discriminatory Capacity Market Rules
A core problem with capacity markets is that regulators—rather than
market participants—determine the value attached to resources. Grid
operators identify resources that provide essential services and introduce
regulatory barriers that prevent other resources from increasing their own
revenues, even when they are able to provide the services needed to support
reliability. In doing so, regulators shield incumbents from competitive forces.
TM6W]. That number is expected to balloon to forty-five percent by 2021. See id.; see also PJM,
2020/2021 RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION RESULTS 1 (2018), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/
markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2020-2021-base-residual-auction-report.ashx [https://perma.cc/
3S7H-JA7E] (summarizing the results of PJM’s 2017 auction). The reason PJM’s auction for 2017
secured capacity for 2020/2021 is that the grid operator runs capacity auctions three years in advance.
See PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 18 (“The Base Residual Auction
is held during the month of May three (3) years prior to the start of the Delivery Year.”),
271 See PJM, supra note 270, at 1 (stating that the target reserve margin for the same period
was 16.6%).
272 See id. (stating that at 165,109.2 megawatts produced, PJM’s RPM cleared its target reserve
level by 6.7%, or the equivalent of about 11,000 megawatts).
273 Jennifer Chen, Got Clean Energy? Not So Much from PJM’s Latest Auction, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL (May 23, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/jennifer-chen/got-clean-energy-not-muchpjms-latest-auction [https://perma.cc/MRN9-EJ7E].
274 See ISO New-England, 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, slip op. at 38 (Mar. 9, 2018) (describing the
risk of price suppression in the context of an environment with overcapacity).
275 See ROB GRAMLICH & MICHAEL GOGGIN, SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT, TOO MUCH
OF THE WRONG THING: THE NEED FOR CAPACITY MARKET REPLACEMENT OR REFORM
6-7 (2019), https://gridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2019/11/too-much-of-the-wrong-thing-theneed-for-capacity-market-replacement-or-reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV6C-74CM] (“PSO,
ISO-NE, and NYISO have large excess reserve margins . . . . A rough estimate of the cost of this
excess capacity is around $1.4 billion per year across the three markets . . . .”).

1238

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1181

These rules tend to be justified as necessary for reliability but are often
overbroad or unrelated to the Commission’s goals.
a. Performance Duration Requirements
Performance duration requirements have put energy storage resources,
such as batteries, at an economic disadvantage in many capacity markets.276
These requirements might be justified if they were related to a legitimate
regulatory goal, though we would prefer that utilities that have an incentive
to keep costs down—not administrative bodies—determine the value of these
resources. Duration requirements are usually justified as necessary to ensure
that capacity units are available during peak demand.277 The problem with
overly long duration requirements is that peak demand usually lasts only
three or four hours, yet some regions stipulate that batteries cannot
participate fully in capacity markets unless they can store electricity for ten
hours.278 Yet batteries that can store electricity for four hours provide
significant capacity benefits and reduce peak load.279 They should therefore
be compensated for providing capacity.

276 See Jeff St. John, Taking Aim at PJM’s 10-Hour Duration Capacity Rule for Energy Storage,
GREENTECH MEDIA (July 22, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/taking-aim-atpjms-10-hour-duration-capacity-rule-for-energy-storage [https://perma.cc/7EN5-9L9X] (critiquing
PJM’s ten-hour performance duration requirement for batteries operating in its capacity market).
277 See, e.g., ROB GRAMLICH, MICHAEL GOGGIN & JASON BURWEN, ENABLING
VERSATILITY: ALLOWING HYBRID RESOURCES TO DELIVER THEIR FULL VALUE TO
C USTOMERS 22 (2019), https://gridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/enabling-versatilityallowing-hybrid-resources-to-deliver-their-full-value-to-customers.pdf [https://perma.cc/FCA8S69K] (“The need for duration is a function of how long peak conditions last.”); St. John, supra note
276 (describing advocates’ argument against PJM’s ten-hour duration requirement, which relies on
the fact that demand peaks “can presently be met by efficient dispatch of shorter-duration storage,
given the current mix of supply resources”).
278 See, e.g., St. John, supra note 276 (describing PJM’s ten-hour requirement); see also SYS.
PLANNING DEP’T, PJM, PJM MANUAL 21: RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINATION
OF GENERATING CAPABILITY 24-25 (14th rev., effective Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.pjm.com/~/
media/documents/manuals/m21.ashx [https://perma.cc/P5EK-2XCL] (“All or any part of a unit’s
capability that can be sustained for a number of hours of continuous operation commensurate with
PJM load requirements, specified as 10 hours, shall be considered as unlimited energy capability.”).
279 See KEVIN CARDEN ET AL., ASTRAPÉ CONSULTING, CAPACITY VALUE OF ENERGY
STORAGE IN PJM 2 (2019), https://www.astrape.com/astrape-capacity-value-of-energy-storage-inpjm [https://perma.cc/QGZ4-XB94] (“The results of our analysis demonstrate that with energy
storage deployments up to 4,000 MW, 4 hours of duration allows those resources to provide full
capacity value . . . . With energy storage deployments up to 8,000 MW, 6 hours of duration allows
those resources to provide full capacity value . . . .”).

2020]

Rate Regulation Redux

1239

b. Seasonal Commitment Periods
A similar problem is that in many markets, resources are eligible for
capacity payments only if they can perform year-round.280 Wind and solar
produce more electricity at certain times of day and at certain times of the
year.281 To reflect the fact that they are less reliable than other generators,
grid operators reduce the capacity factor of these “Intermittent Resources” to
reflect the average capacity they provide over the course of the entire year.282
As with performance duration requirements, administrators justify these
regulations on the ground that they serve a legitimate goal—in this case,
ensuring that capacity is available when needed.
Grid operators could provide the same level of reliability at lower cost by
bifurcating capacity markets into summer and winter periods and developing
separate performance requirements based on season.283 Peak demand tends
to be higher in the summer, which also happens to be when solar arrays are
able to operate at higher capacity.284 A seasonal commitment period would
allow expensive resources such as coal-fired power plants to reduce their own
costs by taking seasonal outages when demand for electricity declines.285
Generators that are needed at only certain times of the year would be able to
mothball—to deactivate for a period of time—and turn on when they are
needed.286 Seasonal commitment periods could provide the same level of
reliability as year-round commitment periods while lowering costs and
eliminating unnecessary capacity.287
280 See PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 18 (discussing planned
commitments in the unit of “Delivery Year[s]” and requiring “a constant load obligation” during
that period).
281 See id. at 115 (noting seasonal variation in the generation capacity of renewable resources
such as wind, solar, landfill gas, and hydroelectric power).
282 See, e.g., id. at 115-16 (describing PJM’s test for calculating the expected output of
“Intermittent Resources . . . such as wind, solar, . . . and other renewable resources” by measuring
how many megawatts these resources produce during defined periods in the summer and winter).
283 See, e.g., id.
284 See Robert Walton, Solar, Efficiency Drive Declining Peak Load in ISO New England, UTIL.
DIVE (May 9, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/solar-efficiency-drive-declining-peak-loadin-iso-new-england/523209 [https://perma.cc/5WFC-FJPY] (explaining that the use of solar energy
will help to slow the annual increase in demand for energy during the summer).
285 See SAM NEWELL ET AL., BRATTLE GRP., OPPORTUNITIES TO MORE EFFICIENTLY
MEET SEASONAL CAPACITY NEEDS IN PJM 11-12 (2018), http://files.brattle.com/files/13723_
opportunities_to_more_efficiently_meet_seasonal_capacity_needs_in_pjm.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M4P5-HUKQ] (describing how a seasonal approach that, for example, would give higher capacity
ratings to wind energy in the winter and solar energy in the summer, would enable producers to
better match demand).
286 See id. at 12 n.22 (proposing giving “[a]nnual resources . . . the option to offer at a different
price to clear based on a 6-month summer-only or winter-only capacity obligation,” which “would
allow for a seasonal export or mothballing arrangement”).
287 Id. at 8-16.
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According to one advocacy group, the failure to “address variations in
seasonal peak loads . . . creates an inefficiency—the market sends signals for
investment in year-round capacity even though the existing year-round
capacity combined with seasonal resources might be able to meet the demand
at all times during the year.”288 In PJM, a seasonal capacity market could
create an estimated $100 to $600 million per year in societal benefits.289
c. Discounting Renewables
Another problem with capacity market rules is that wind and solar
generators receive lower capacity ratings than conventional generators.
Again, the rationale for these rules, that intermittent resources are less
reliable than other resources, is a sensible response to a genuine reliability
concern. Grid operators, however, rely on crude and unsophisticated
valuation techniques that excessively discount renewables. A PJM renewable
integration study showed that methods for calculating capacity used in
different grid operators resulted in dramatically different capacity factors for
the same resources.290 PJM, for example, proposed in 2018 to reduce wind’s
capacity value from thirteen percent to around eight percent of “nameplate
capacity” based on its calculation of median output during critical hours.291
More sophisticated analyses calculate a generator’s capacity factor by
establishing the probability that an individual resource will be available when
it is actually needed.292 Using this method, PJM found that it could
substantially increase the capacity factor of wind and solar.293
Not only do the rules described in this Section undercompensate clean
energy and storage resources for services that they provide to the grid, but
they also lead to excess capacity and high prices. Some clean energy and
storage resources will enter the market despite being excluded from capacity
288 SYLWIA BIALEK & BURCIN UNEL, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY & ELEC. POLICY
INSIGHTS, CAPACITY MARKETS AND EXTERNALITIES: AVOIDING UNNECESSARY AND
P ROBLEMATIC R EFORMS 20 (2018), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Capacity_
Markets_and_Externalities_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRQ6-5LUP].
289 NEWELL ET AL., supra note 285, at 15.
290 EXETER ASSOCS., INC. & GE ENERGY, PJM RENEWABLE INTEGRATION STUDY, TASK
REPORT: REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE INTEGRATION OF WIND
AND S OLAR G ENERATION 120-34 (2012), https://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/
subcommittees/irs/postings/pris-task3b-best-practices-from-other-markets-final-report.ashx
[https://perma.cc/C9FE-NJ6N] (surveying how different RTOs and utilities’ methodologies for
calculating capacity result in different capacity factors).
291 See MICHAEL GOGGIN ET AL., GRID STRATEGIES LLC, CUSTOMER FOCUSED AND
C LEAN : P OWER M ARKETS FOR THE F UTURE 27 (2018), https://windsolaralliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/WSA_Market_Reform_report_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3T3-PKC3].
292 See id. at 27-28 (describing the use of such studies by PJM and MISO, which resulted in
wind capacity values of 15-20% and solar capacity values of 55-65%).
293 Id.
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markets.294 The owners of these resources may conclude that they can cover
their costs entirely through long-term bilateral contracts, that they can
recover costs from energy markets, or that state subsidies make up for
unfavorable capacity market policies. Because such resources provide
electricity during peak demand, they support resource adequacy.295 However,
the capacity markets additionally incentivize non-clean energy or storage
resources to provide the same resource adequacy. In this way, mandatory
capacity markets forces the procurement of redundant resources beyond the
level necessary for a reliable supply of electricity. The added cost for this waste
falls on consumers.296
The rules described above are not a comprehensive list of capacity market
rules that make it difficult for new resources to compete with incumbents,
and other parts of electricity markets also exhibit a bias against renewables.297
They do, however, show that capacity markets rely on administrative
decisions to determine the value of resources. FERC and the grid operators
identify a critical characteristic but, rather than support a market that would
compensate any generator that could provide that service, they ensure that
such generators receive revenues sufficient to recover their costs regardless of
whether or not they are actually needed. Like cost-of-service regulation, these
rules shield incumbent generators from competition and retain resources
even when cheaper alternatives are available to take their place.
294 See Christina Simeone, Understanding the Challenges of Integrating Seasonal Resources into
PJM’s Wholesale Capacity Market, KLEINMAN CTR. FOR ENERGY POL’Y (June 20, 2016), https://
kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/policy-digests/understanding-challenges-integrating-seasonal-resourcespjm%E2%80%99s-wholesale-capacity [https://perma.cc/E7TV-GSGZ] (explaining that in the 2018/2019
and 2019/2020 Base Result Auctions, only 80% of total market resources are eligible under the PJM
Capacity Performance Requirement, which determines which resources qualify for capacity payments).
295 See id. (“It is expected that the [Capacity Payment Requirement “pay-for-performance”
model] will incent generators to secure fuel supplies, add dual-fuel capabilities, help protect
operations in extreme weather events, and will largely provide economic benefits to resources that
are available year round.”).
296 See Iulia Gheorghiu, PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE Pay $1.4B Annually for Excess Capacity, UTIL.
DIVE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-nyiso-and-iso-ne-pay-14b-annuallyfor-excess-capacity-report/567798 [https://perma.cc/Z723-H4TW] (“MOPR costs for consumers
across PJM, New York and New England are projected to add up to $45 billion over the next
decade.”); see also Todd S. Aagaard & Andrew N. Kleit, The Complexity Dilemma in Policy Market
Design, 30 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 57 (2019) (arguing “that FERC has become lost in its
complexity, apparently unable to see how the details of its [capacity] market design have
undermined some of the core premises of its market”).
297 See, e.g., Joshua C. Macey, Zombie Energy Laws, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1079-80 (2020);
Jacob Mays et al., Asymmetric Risk and Fuel Neutrality in Capacity Markets 15-24 (U.S. Ass’n for
Energy Econ., Working Paper No. 19-385, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3330932 [https://perma.cc/M3HW-B5K4] (showing that capacity markets favor natural gas);
Jeffrey Tomich, Battle Reignites Over $2.5B Midwest Transmission Line, E&E NEWS (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061847775 [https://perma.cc/9WDE-CKX8] (describing disputes
about siting authority that impeded wind development).
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2. Structural Challenges with Capacity Markets
On a more fundamental level, capacity markets are problematic because
they overcompensate outdated resources and do not actually procure the
resources needed to meet demand. FERC seems to treat capacity markets as
a stand-in for reliability. There are two problems with this approach. First,
because capacity is only one of a number of qualities needed to support a
reliable power grid, the failure of capacity markets to actually compensate
resources needed for reliability leads to additional interventions, which are
described in Sections IV.B and IV.C. Second, capacity markets protect
incumbents by requiring uneconomic incumbent generators to continue to
operate even when less expensive units become available. Capacity markets
thus procure generation with the wrong attributes (they do not reward
flexible generators, for example298), likely procure the incorrect amount of
resources, and rely on questionable eligibility requirements to determine
which resources are allowed to participate.
a. Capacity Is Not Reliability
Capacity markets often predict demand three years in advance and retain
enough supply to meet that demand,299 yet they fail to sufficiently distinguish
between different types of capacity.300 Grid reliability can be threatened for
many reasons. Sudden spikes in demand require generators to increase supply
quickly.301 Generators located in certain areas may be especially valuable
because they reduce congestion on transmission lines.302 Not all supply
procured in capacity markets will provide these services, and capacity markets
298 Jacob Mays has critiqued capacity payments for undercompensating flexible generators and
overcompensating generators that do not offer flexible services. Jacob Mays, Missing Incentives for
Flexibility in Wholesale Electricity Markets 7-9 (U.S. Ass’n for Energy Econ. Working Paper No. 20-453,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3623962 [https://perma.cc/62WN-Y7WB].
299 See, e.g., Capacity Market (RPM), supra note 208 (stating that by conducting procurement
years in advance, PJM ensures “long-term grid reliability”).
300 See id. (defining capacity generally as “a commitment of resources to deliver when needed”).
301 See, e.g., Joshua Rhodes, Texas Electric Grid Sets New System-Wide All-Time Peak Demand
Record, Twice, FORBES (Jul. 19, 2018, 1:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuarhodes/2018/07/
19/texas-electric-grid-sets-new-system-wide-all-time-peak-demand-record-twice/#7e7d06b31521
[https://perma.cc/4WD6-2TQ6] (documenting an incident in which the electric grid in Texas set
two hourly peak demand records back-to-back on a single day in July 2018, creating a demand for
over 72,000 megawatts of electricity for the first time).
302 PJM does separate its capacity market into subregions and generators that provide capacity
in resource-constrained areas receive greater capacity payments. See PJM MANUAL 18: PJM
CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 23-26. Still, because these payments are administratively
determined and remain stable over a three-year period, generators that received a premium for
reducing congestion will be compensated for doing so even after they stop providing that service.
See id. at 110 (“The Base Residual Auction is held during the month of May three (3) years prior to
the start of the Delivery Year.”).
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will therefore overcompensate inflexible units because they provide the same
level of compensation to inflexible generators as to flexible ones.303
By contrast, when energy markets provide a large percentage of revenue,
prices increase to reward needed services.304 A generator that can quickly
supply more electricity to meet a spike in demand or reduce transmission
congestion will collect revenues from energy markets for providing those
services.305 However, when generators are retained years in advance in
capacity auctions, they receive compensation for providing a single service
that is necessary but not sufficient to support a reliable grid. As energy
markets provide a smaller share of total revenue, their ability to reward
flexible units diminishes. When critical generators retire, regulators intervene
in the ways described in Sections IV.B and IV.C.
b. Uneconomic Incumbent Generators
A related concern is that mandatory capacity markets delay the retirement
of uneconomic generation. By procuring generation years in advance and
imposing barriers to exit for generators that clear capacity auctions, mandatory
capacity auctions lead to excess capacity and high prices.306 That is in part
because resources may enter the market—and provide capacity—even when
they did not clear the capacity auction. Since the resources that did clear the
capacity auction have committed to operating in that period, and since the
capacity auction did not account for the resources that did not clear the capacity
auction, mandatory capacity markets will tend to procure excess capacity.
In recent years, the price of natural gas and renewables has declined
significantly.307 However, because generators commit to operate three years

303 See GRAMLICH & GOGGIN, supra note 275, at 11-12 (“[T]he crude definition of capacity
does not distinguish between flexible and inflexible resources, and many fossil and nuclear resources
that receive large capacity payments provide little to no flexibility.”).
304 See GOGGIN ET AL., supra note 291, at 12 (explaining that while energy sales currently
produce the most revenue in wholesale electricity markets, increased use of renewables will have an
overall effect of reducing energy prices).
305 See id. (“Frequency regulation and reactive power are among the most valuable
reliability services.”).
306 See PJM Capacity Prices Nearly Double in Most Territories, ENERGYWATCH (June 12, 2018),
https://energywatch-inc.com/pjm-capacity-prices-nearly-double [https://perma.cc/AZT5-CDAG]
(identifying the reception of fewer bids from newer resources as one reason for higher capacity
prices in the PJM region).
307 See LAZARD, supra note 226, at 7 (showing that the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for
solar photovoltaic energy fell from $359 per megawatt-hour in 2009 to $40 per megawatt-hour in
2019, that the LCOE for wind fell from $135 per megawatt-hour in 2009 to $41 per megawatt-hour
in 2019, and the LCOE of combined cycle gas fell from $83 per megawatt-hour in 2009 to $56 per
megawatt-hour in 2019).
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in the future,308 ratepayers were stuck paying for uneconomic capacity.309 For
example, natural resources have entered markets that have too much capacity,
and they have done so at rates that exceed the rate at which generators have
left the market.310 The fact that markets that rely on capacity markets
continue to procure additional electricity even when there is no need to do so
suggests a market failure. Nonetheless, generators that cleared capacity
markets agreed to operate until their capacity commitment ended, despite the
fact that bloated reserve margins indicates that they were no longer needed
to support regional capacity goals.311
This dynamic resembles traditional cost-of-service regulation. In both
systems, regulators identify the generators that are needed to meet future
demand and guarantee those generators revenues sufficient to cover their costs.
In exchange, the generators agree to provide service for a certain period of time.
Like cost-of-service regulation, the regulatory interventions shield incumbent
generators from competition, lead to excess capacity, and increase prices.
B. From Capacity Markets to Fossil Fuel Protectionism
As the previous Section showed, mandatory capacity markets fail to
actually procure flexible resources needed for reliability. Regulators have
responded by intervening to maintain resource adequacy, but with the effect
of inefficiently and unnecessarily protecting fossil fuel generators.
Specifically, in 2018, two grid operators—ISO-NE and PJM—took aggressive
steps to further bolster fossil fuel generators. In both cases, FERC felt that
an administrative intervention was necessary to protect “investor confidence”
or the “market’s integrity.”312 It is not clear that these regulatory interventions
are even necessary. If these interventions are pretextual and not necessary to
maintain reliability, they reveal a willingness to expand administrative pricing
and shift further away from competitive markets to paper over capacity
308 See GOGGIN ET AL., supra note 291, at 27 (stating that procurement three years in advance
can fail to map onto actual demand).
309 This phenomenon of mismatch between procurement and demand levels has been
particularly acute in the PJM market. Id.
310 See GRAMLICH & GOGGIN, supra note 275, at 7-10.
311 See id. at 6-7.
312 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 65 (June 29, 2018) (justifying its holding
that PJM’s existing tariff was unduly discriminatory by stating that the PJM plan risked the creation
of price distortions which “compromise the capacity market’s integrity”); ISO New England, Inc.,
162 FERC ¶ 61,205, slip op. at 9 (Mar. 9, 2018) (“Ultimately, the purpose of basing capacity market
constructs on these principles is to produce a level of investor confidence that is sufficient to ensure
resource adequacy at just and reasonable rates.”). But see Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (Glick,
Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 4 n.6 (criticizing FERC for focusing on “investor confidence” as the
critical issue in its earlier order on ISO-NE’s proposal and then shifting, without explanation or
serious mention of “investor confidence,” to a new market “integrity” standard in its order on PJM).
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market flaws. And to the extent that they respond to any revenue adequacy
problem, they do so only because FERC and grid operators fear that existing
market designs cannot accommodate state subsidies without jeopardizing the
financial stability of resources actually needed for a reliable power grid.
As this Section shows, concern that capacity markets do not actually
secure reliability has driven FERC and grid operators to make it difficult for
renewable resources to access capacity markets. FERC has argued that it is
necessary to impose barriers to entry that limit renewables’ ability to
participate in capacity markets in order to correct the distortions caused by
state renewable subsidies.313 The Commission seems to be concerned that
state subsidies undermine the Commission’s idealized view of capacity
markets,314 though as the previous Section showed, capacity markets
themselves are rife with administrative decisions about the relative value of
different resources. It is difficult to understand how state subsidies create
“financial stresses” and “compromise the ultimate goal of the capacity market
to provide investor confidence to attract new entry and assure resource
adequacy”315 in a manner that is different from capacity market pricing
decisions that themselves determine winners and losers.
The implication is that FERC, ISO-NE, and PJM do not trust capacity
markets to procure the services needed for reliability. If capacity markets fail
to procure resources that can ease congestion in transmission lines or that
provide needed flexibility services, those failures will become more
pronounced as renewables provide a greater share of electricity—and they
313 See Cullenward & Welton, supra note 115, at 108 n.6 (noting that the Second and Seventh
Circuits have accepted FERC’S position that the Commission can “impose punitive wholesale
electricity market designs”). These views are supported by FERC’s assertion that capacity markets
“have become untenably threatened by out-of-market payments provided or required by certain
states for the purpose of supporting the entry or continued operation of preferred generation
resources that may not otherwise be able to succeed in a competitive wholesale capacity market.” See
Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 3.
314 PJM has stated:

As a consequence of steadily declining energy prices, certain coal and nuclear units in
PJM have become economically challenged . . . . Many state policymakers have,
therefore, either acted or are considering the possibility of acting to provide subsidies
to nuclear and coal resources to ensure they remain in operation. If not mitigated,
PJM shares the view of the [Independent Market Monitor] in the 2017 State of the
Market Report that subsidies are contagious and could spread. In effect, subsidies tend
to suppress market prices and broaden the financial stresses that triggered subsidies
in the first place. If subsidies do become more widespread, they could compromise the
ultimate goal of the capacity market to provide investor confidence to attract new
entry and assure resource adequacy.
PJM INTERCONNECTION, RESPONSE TO THE 2017 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT 11 (2018),
http://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/state-of-the-market/20180511-pjms-responseto-the-2017-state-of-the-market-report.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/RQS9-7QTR].
315 Id.
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will do so regardless of whether renewables benefit from state subsidies. The
MOPRs described in this Section and the RMR agreements described in the
next Section can thus be partly understood as poorly designed interventions
to raise revenues for specific resources deemed critical to the grid. A superior
solution would rely on competitive procurement mechanisms—not economic
protectionism—to retain critical services.
1. ISO-NE
In early 2018, ISO-NE proposed, and FERC approved, a two-stage
capacity auction designed to ensure resource adequacy.316 In the first stage,
state-supported renewables317 must submit bids at an administratively
determined price.318 This is the “minimum offer price” known as the
MOPR.319 Even if renewables could operate profitably if they submitted
lower bids, the MOPR prohibits state-supported renewable resources from
making low bids that would suppress capacity market prices. The MOPR will
likely prevent state-sponsored resources from clearing the first stage of ISONE’s capacity auction.320
Resources that clear the first stage of the capacity auction can declare that
they would be willing to retire if compensated for doing so.321 At that point,
renewables can purchase these resources’ capacity commitments. To do so,
they must be willing to buy out the generators that are willing to retire.322
This requirement forces renewables that would have been willing to provide
low-cost electricity to buy out outdated fossil fuel generators. This, in turn,
discourages the entry of renewables and subsidizes incumbents. If a fossil fuel
generator is able to provide capacity at the same rate as the renewable, the
fossil fuel generator will clear the auction because it is able to enter during
the first stage.
This market design also makes it easier for new fossil fuel generators to
enter the market than renewables. Under ISO-NE’s new capacity market
rules, generators can be pushed out of the market in one of two ways. First,
a renewable generator can purchase capacity from an older generator in the
ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, slip op. at 2.
ISO-NE’s tariff says that a “Sponsored Policy Resource” is any zero-carbon resource that
receives “an out-of-market revenue source.” Id. at 3 n.6 (quoting ISO New England’s proposed
Tariff § I.2.2).
318 Id. at 2-3.
319 Id.
320 Partial Protest and Comments of the Massachusetts Attorney General at 2, ISO New
England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (No. ER18-619-000) (“The practical effect of [the rule] is
that sponsored policy resources have a strong likelihood of not clearing in the FCM . . . .”).
321 Transmittal Letter at 5-6, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (No. ER18619-000) [hereinafter “ISO-NE Transmittal Letter”].
322 See Cullenward & Welton, supra note 115, at 114 (explaining this mechanism).
316
317
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second stage of the auction at a price named by the retiring generator.
Alternatively, a generator not subject to the MOPR—in other words, a fossil
fuel or nuclear generator—can submit a bid in the first stage of the capacity
auction. If that bid clears, the new fossil fuel generator eliminates the need
for the old coal-fired power plant, which means that the old generator does
not clear the auction and will retire. In that case, there may be no opportunity
for renewables to receive revenues from capacity markets because the new
generator may refuse to participate in the second stage of the auction. Thus,
not only does the MOPR provide a handout to inefficient fossil fuel
generators, but it also distorts markets, discourages the entry of renewables,
and redistributes revenue from renewables to fossil fuel generators.
ISO-NE’s MOPR also leads to excess capacity. Renewables may
ultimately enter the market even if they cannot participate in capacity
auctions. They may do so because they feel that they will recover their costs
from energy markets, or because they have secured long-term bilateral
contracts that provide them with sufficient revenues despite the fact that
they will not be compensated for providing capacity. In such cases, ISO-NE
will procure surfeit supply because it does not factor the renewables that did
not participate in capacity auctions into its load projections.323 Of course,
doing so further increases rates as consumers are forced to pay for resources
they do not need.324
2. PJM
PJM has also tried to reform capacity markets to prevent renewables from
suppressing generator revenues. PJM stakeholders failed to agree on a
capacity market structure.325 As a result, PJM filed two alternative proposals
with FERC in April 2018.326
Under PJM’s preferred option, “Capacity Repricing,” the market operator
would have run the market one time with “subsidized resource[s]” included
at their self-determined bid price, to figure out which resources receive

323 See GRAMLICH & GOGGIN, supra note 275, at 10 (“MOPR . . . causes consumers to pay
for redundant capacity—customers first pay for the construction of resources through state policy,
but when that is unable to clear the capacity market due to the MOPR, customers are forced to buy
an equivalent amount of capacity that does clear in the capacity market.”).
324 Id.
325 See Capacity Repricing or in the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal: Tariff Revisions to
Address Impacts of State Public Policies on the PJM Capacity Market at 17, PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2019) (No. ER18-1314-000) (reporting that stakeholders were divided
between two alternatives, resulting in neither alternative receiving the two-thirds vote the measure
it required for endorsement).
326 See id. at 17-18 & n.40; see also id. at 5-6 (providing an overview of the two alternatives and
the process by which PJM submitted them for FERC review).

1248

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1181

capacity obligations.327 PJM would then run the auction a second time but
would exclude all resources that did not clear the first time. Any resource that
received a state subsidy would be “repriced to a competitive level” in the
second auction.328 This approach would increase prices but would arguably
undo the price suppression caused by state subsidies. Every generator that
cleared the first auction would be paid the higher clearing rate that resulted
from the second auction.329
Alternatively, PJM proposed extending its “minimum offer price rule
extension” (“MOPR-Ex”)—which had previously required some resources to
submit mandated minimum bids—to state-supported resources, but also
providing an exception to resources needed specifically to meet state
renewable portfolio standards.330 Under this proposal, covered renewables
would clear the capacity market only if they were cost-competitive with other
resource types after factoring out any state support.331
FERC rejected both of PJM’s proposals and, after a year-long delay,
ordered PJM to expand its MOPR, effectively setting an administrative price
on all resources that receive state subsidies.332 When it rejected PJM’s
proposal, the Commission determined that the “Capacity Repricing” option
overcompensated renewables because it would allow them to “receive the same
clearing price as competitive resources” even though those resources “would
then further benefit from the higher price set in stage two of the auction.”333
This proposal, the Commission explained, would “increase prices for load,
and then pay this higher price as a windfall to the very same resources that
initially caused the price suppression PJM is attempting to correct.”334
FERC found that the MOPR-Ex proposal would also lead to unjust and
unreasonable rates.335 Fatal to the MOPR-Ex was that it permitted “disparate
treatment between resources receiving out-of-market support through RPS
programs and other state-supported resources.”336

Id. at 42.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 42-43, 51.
Id. at 43; see also id. at 15 (describing both of PJM’s proposals as creating certain “nonactionable” subsidies).
331 See id. at 43.
332 Jeff St. John, FERC Orders PJM to Restrict State-Backed Renewables in Its Capacity Market,
G REENTECH M EDIA (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/fercorders-pjm-to-restrict-state-backed-renewables-in-capacity-market [https://perma.cc/GMY7VUZT].
333 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 30 (June 29, 2018).
334 Id.
335 See id. at 47 (“PJM has not met its section 205 burden to show that MOPR-Ex is just and
reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.”).
336 Id.
327
328
329
330
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The Commission ultimately determined that “out-of-market payments
provided . . . by states . . . threaten the competitiveness of the capacity market
administered by PJM.”337 FERC therefore directed PJM to “extend[] the
MOPR to include both new and existing resources, internal and external, that
receive, or are entitled to receive, certain out-of-market payments.”338 Such
an expansive MOPR, the Commission reasoned, is necessary “to mitigate the
impact of State Subsidies on the capacity market.”339 FERC’s definition of
“[s]tate [s]ubsidy,” its term for the subsidies subject to the MOPR, could
encompass most resources that participate in PJM auctions. Commissioner
Glick wrote that the “sweeping definition of subsidy” is so broad that it “will
potentially subject much, if not most, of the PJM capacity market to a
minimum offer price rule.”340 FERC’s concern about price suppression
caused by state subsidies thus induced the Commission to impose a system
of administrative pricing on a market that is already subject to strict
regulatory oversight.341
According to analysts, the purpose of capacity markets is to procure
sufficient supply at low cost.342 The Commission’s Order is ostensibly based
on concern that state subsidies “threaten the competitiveness of the capacity
market administered by PJM,” and so it ordered PJM to replace a market that
was already subject to a high degree of regulatory control with a system in
which administrators affirmatively select which resources clear capacity
auctions (and thus which resources enter and exit the market).343
Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 19, 2019).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 66.
Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 1. The full
definition of “material subsidy” seems to cover any resource that receives any sort of state support:
337
338
339
340

PJM proposes to define a “Material Subsidy” to include: “(1) material payments,
concessions, rebates, or subsidies as a result of any state-governmental action
connected to the procurement of electricity or other attribute from an existing
Capacity Resource, or the construction, development, or operation, (including but not
limited to support that has the effect of allowing the unit to clear in any [PJM capacity
auction]) of a Capacity Resource, or (2) other material support or payments obtained
in any state-sponsored or state-mandated processes, connected to the procurement of
electricity or other attribute from an existing Capacity Resource, or the construction,
development, or operation, (including but not limited to support that has the effect of
allowing the unit to clear in any [PJM capacity auction]), of the Capacity Resource.”
Id. at 28-29 (quoting Initial Submission of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at 19-20).
341 Id. at 32-33; see also supra Section IV.B (discussing capacity markets).
342 See 1 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2018 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM:
INTRODUCTION 1 (2019), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/
2018/2018-som-pjm-volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3CM-NZ9W].
343 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 4 (“We affirm our initial finding that ‘[a]n
expanded MOPR with few or no exceptions, should protect PJM’s capacity market from the pricesuppressive effects of resources receiving out-of-market support by ensuring that such resources are
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If grid operators were allowed to incorporate renewables into capacity
auctions, they would procure the correct amount of supply at lower cost than
they do now. There is no reason that capacity markets are unable to
accommodate state subsidies. If state subsidized resources participated in
capacity markets and suppressed prices, they might drive some incumbent
suppliers out of the market. In the event that the participation of these
subsidized resources led to an inadequate supply of resources, capacity prices
would rise to incentivize new entry.344 Thus, while FERC has declared that
price suppression undermines market “integrity,” the Commission has failed
to explain how the indeterminate and undefined goal of market integrity
relates to the actual goal of maintaining sufficient load.345
Financial analysts have estimated that these MOPRs will cost billions
annually.346 FERC itself has acknowledged that capacity market reforms will
raise prices for consumers and lead to excess capacity.347 It has defended these

not able to offer below a competitive price.’” (quoting Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op.
at 69 (June 29, 2018))).
344 See BIALEK & UNEL, supra note 288, at 18 (“[E]ven if externality payments reduce capacity
prices in the short term, capacity markets are designed to adjust to that change and keep prices at a
level necessary to ensure resource adequacy.”).
345 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 22 (“The June 2018 Order thus found
PJM’s existing MOPR provisions unjust and unreasonable and unduly discriminatory because
they failed to protect the ‘integrity of competition in the wholesale capacity market against
unreasonable price distortions and cost shifts . . . .’”); see also Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236
(Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 4 n.6 (suggesting that the Commission has failed to define
“‘integrity’ of the market”).
346 Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, supra note 3, at 7; Affidavit of Michael Goggin, Grid
Strategies LLC, at ¶ 3 (May 7, 2018) (included in Appendix B to Protest of Clean Energy Advocates,
supra note 3); MICHAEL GOGGIN & ROB GRAMLICH, CONSUMER IMPACTS OF FERC
INTERFERENCE WITH STATE POLICIES 2 (2019), https://gridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2019/
08/consumer-impacts-of-ferc-interference-with-state-policies-an-analysis-of-the-pjm-region.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VQL-632P] (“We estimate the total cost of the MOPR to PJM consumers could
reach $5.7 billion per year, a 60% increase in cost compared to the current capacity market.”);
Memorandum from Monitoring Analytics to PJM Market Participants (Sept. 17, 2019),
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Market_Messages/Messages/IMM_Response_to_Gr
id_Strategies_Report_201909217.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6XF-P793 ] (disagreeing with the specific
number reached in the Goggin and Gramlich report’s analysis but finding that an earlier MOPR
proposal could cost billions). Commissioner Glick estimated that PJM’s MOPR would cost at least
$2.4 billion a year. Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 23.
347 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 23 (“As to arguments that an expanded
MOPR will . . . increase costs to consumers, courts have directly addressed this point, holding that
states ‘are free to make their own decisions regarding how to satisfy their capacity needs, but they
“will appropriately bear the costs of [those] decisions,” . . . including possibly having to pay twice
for capacity.’” (quoting N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 96-97 (3d Cir. 2014) (alterations
in original))); see also Request for Rehearing of Clean Energy Advocates at 1, ISO New England
Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (No. ER18-619-000) (arguing that “[t]he predictable result” of ISONE’s adoption of a CASPR mechanism, which clean energy advocates attributed to “FERC’s
decision to close its eyes,” is that “thousands of megawatts of clean energy will be barred from
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reforms, however, by claiming that price suppression undermines investor
confidence, and that it is necessary to charge consumers high prices for
capacity they do not need to mitigate investor squeamishness.348 Incidentally,
this is the same justification that public utility commissions rely on for setting
regulated rates.349 An administrative intervention to bolster investor
confidence is, however, anathema to the idea of competitive markets.
When utilities were regulated as natural monopolies, investor confidence
was a means to maintaining reliable electricity by ensuring a return on
investments in utilities’ rate base. But the rate regulation system does not
ensure the optimal procurement of the lowest cost resources. Today, PJM and
ISO-NE have excess fossil fuel capacity.350 Immunizing the shareholders of
these fossil fuel generators certainly prevents those generators from retiring
and ensures the returns on investment for those shareholders. But in doing
so, it sacrifices the core imperative of a competitive market, subjugating the
interests of consumers and new generators to the interests of the incumbent
generators. If FERC really is concerned about reliability, all it has to do is
permit capacity prices to rise, in which case the markets would procure
sufficient supply.
PJM notes that advocates of its MOPR-Ex proposal “hope that it will
work to dis-incent states from providing subsidies in the first instance”351 by
making it prohibitively expensive for states to meet their energy goals—likely
increasing the costs of state renewable policies by hundreds of millions of
dollars.352 PJM even acknowledged at one point that FERC’s proposed
MOPR could leave states with “no practical option to pursue generationrelated public policy goals through subsidy.”353 Some stakeholders thus

accessing the ISO-NE capacity market, and the region’s customers will be forced to spend vast sums
to buy an equivalent amount of redundant capacity”).
348 See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 64-65 (holding PJM’s Tariff to be
“unjust and unreasonable and unduly discriminatory” for failing to protect the capacity market from
price distortions, which undermine investors’ ability to predict how their investments will perform).
349 Fed Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603, 605 (1944) (“[The] return . . . should
be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
credit and to attract capital . . . . Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain
its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed
certainly cannot be condemned as invalid.”).
350 Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at at 57-58; Iulia Gheorghiu, PJM, NYISO and
ISO-NE Pay $1.4B Annually for Excess Capacity: Report, U TIL . D IVE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://
www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-nyiso-and-iso-ne-pay-14b-annually-for-excess-capacity-report/
567798 [https://perma.cc/HUB4-3QRS].
351 Capacity Repricing or in the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal, supra note 325, at 56 n.138.
352 See Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining that both of PJM’s
proposals, including the MOPR-Ex, would “saddle consumers with billions in extra costs . . .”).
353 Initial Submission of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at 6, Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239
(2019) (Nos. EL16-49-000, ER18-1314-000, -001, EL18-178-000).
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explicitly view PJM’s MOPR not as a way of ensuring grid reliability, but as
a device to make it too expensive for states to pursue clean energy policies.354
C. Reliability-Must-Run Agreements
While FERC’s decision to limit or exclude renewables from capacity
markets implicitly raises many of the same problems as rate regulation, in
some instances FERC and the grid operators have gone further and explicitly
restored rate regulation for certain generating units. In order to retain critical
generating units, FERC has insisted that grid operators develop a process for
designating generators “reliability-must-run” (RMR) units.355 Unlike
capacity auctions, these RMR policies do not even invoke the specter of
competition but are rather explicitly designed to respond to market failures.
Although RMR agreements have existed for years,356 these contracts
received heightened scrutiny in December of 2018 after ISO-NE used an
RMR agreement to bail out a large gas plant.357 On December 20, 2018,
FERC voted to approve cost recovery for Exelon’s Mystic Generating
Station.358 This order gave the natural gas power plant ratepayer-financed
contracts through May 2024.359 Despite the fact that New England has
restructured its electricity market, ISO-NE determined that the plant was
essential for grid reliability because it supports the Everett liquefied natural
gas facility, which is a critical source of fuel for the region.360 It therefore
agreed to allow the facility to recover its costs.361
FERC’s approval of the Mystic cost-of-service agreement was especially
surprising in light of the fact that Massachusetts, one of the states that would
Capacity Repricing or in the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal, supra note 325, at 56 n.138.
See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 150 FERC ¶ 61,116, slip op. at 1-3 (Feb. 19, 2015) (directing
NYISO to develop RMR agreements); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, slip op.
at 17 (May 6, 2004) (directing PJM to “develop a policy which would provide a reasonable
opportunity for recovery of going forward costs,” which could include RMR contracts or capacity
payments); see also Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 138 FERC ¶ 61,112, slip op. at 1-2 (Feb. 16, 2012)
(acknowledging CAISO’s history of reliability controls).
356 See News Release: About the Reliability-Must-Run Agreement for Greens Bayou Unit 5, ERCOT
(June 3, 2016), http://www.ercot.com/news/releases/show/98507 [https://perma.cc/WGP3-TAEZ]
(“Since 2002, ERCOT has executed 73 other RMR agreements, of which 69 have been for the
purpose of transmission stability.”) These agreements have generally been intended to stabilize
the grid. Id.
357 See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC ¶ 61,267, slip op. at 2, 12 (Dec. 20, 2018)
(approving cost-of-service agreements between ISO-NE and Mystic, with the effect that “Mystic 8
and 9 will be operating for two years on a reliability must-run (RMR) basis”).
358 Id. at 2.
359 Id. at 6-8.
360 Id. at 4-6.
361 See id. at 17-19 (approving the cost-of-service agreement but expressing concern about the
methodology used to calculate Mystic’s return on equity).
354
355
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ostensibly experience resource adequacy challenges if the plant retired—
submitted evidence questioning whether the plant was needed to maintain
reliability in the region.362
The Mystic cost-of-service agreement is a departure from previous
reliability-must-run agreements because ISO-NE justified the agreement using
concerns about fuel security and resource adequacy rather than transmission
constraints.363 It is worth noting, though, that ratepayers have been supporting
generators through RMR agreements since the early 2000s.364
While grid operators do not always disclose the cost of RMR agreements,
they appear to cost hundreds of millions of dollars annually. In addition to
the Mystic bailout, FERC recently approved a cost-of-service agreement for
a California gas plant that put tens of millions of dollars of costs onto
ratepayers.365 MISO and PJM both report numerous multimillion-dollar
RMR agreements through 2024, though the lack of standardized reporting
practices makes it difficult to obtain data on the actual costs of each RMR
agreement.366 Texas used an RMR agreement to bail out a natural gas power
plant near Houston.367
FERC, moreover, seems prepared to extend RMR agreements. While one
may be tempted to dismiss the Mystic agreement as a one-off, FERC recently
approved a CAISO tariff filing that gives the ISO authority to enter into an
362 See ISO New England Inc., 165 FERC ¶ 61,202, slip op. at 7 (Dec. 3, 2018) (summarizing
a filing of the Massachusetts Attorney General).
363 See Sonal Patel, FERC Thwarts ISO-NE’s Attempt To Keep Mystic Gas Units Online, POWER
MAG. (July 5, 2018), https://www.powermag.com/ferc-thwarts-iso-nes-attempt-to-keep-mystic-gasunits-online [https://perma.cc/HZ2B-56JM] (“The tariff waiver . . . is unprecedented because it
effectively seeks to retain resources for reliability risks related to region-wide fuel security.”).
364 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MKT. OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N, 2004 STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT 88 (2005), https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/
Files/20050615093455-06-15-05-som2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/T77M-YUTH] (“In 2004, New
England load-serving entities (LSEs) paid $165 million to cover the fixed costs of generators
under RMR contracts.”).
365 See Letter Order, Metcalf Energy Ctr., LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,073 (Apr. 30, 2018) (No.
ER18-240-001) (approving a settlement agreement that establishes the terms of the cost-of-service
agreement); Joint Explanatory Statement, Metcalf Energy Ctr., LLC (Mar. 22, 2018) (No. ER18240-001) (summarizing the terms of the settlement); Jason Fordney, Metcalf Reliability-Must-Run
Draws Scrutiny, RTO INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.rtoinsider.com/caiso-metcalfsubstation-reliability-must-run-agreements-62919 [https://perma.cc/XJV7-8W69].
366 See Michael Giberson, Integrating Reliability-Must-Run Practices into Wholesale Electricity
Prices 7 (R Street Policy Study No. 114, Oct. 2017), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/10/114.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQN4-72Y4] (critiquing those markets for failing to disclose
important data).
367 See Reliability Must-Run Agreement of NRG Texas Power LLC and Electricity Reliability
Council of Texas, Inc., Ex. 1 at 2 (June 2, 2016), http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/89476/
Reliability_Must_Run_Agreement___NRG_Texas_Power_LLC_and_ERCOT___Effective_Date_
06_01_2016__Fully_Executed___003_.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UQR-MZG5] (executing an RMR
agreement).
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RMR agreement “to address any reliability need.”368 Commissioner Glick
warned that FERC thereby gave CAISO “near-carte blanche discretion to
enter into out-of-market contracts without review by the Commission” and
authorized an “end-run around the Commission-approved market
structures.”369 Commissioner Chatterjee has suggested that a mechanism
similar to RMR agreements be used to support financially distressed coalfired power plants.370
It is entirely possible that every one of the units subject to the RMR
agreements described above is necessary for grid reliability. FERC, however,
need not rely on RMR contracts to retain these units. FERC and the grid
operators wrongly assume that they should bail out the shareholders and
creditors of every generator needed for reliability. If a critical generating unit
claims that it will retire unless FERC approves a cost-of-service contract,
state regulators should oversee an auction in which parties submit bids to
purchase the assets. The entity that agreed to provide the services at least cost
would be able to do so.371 In this way, essential generators would not be able
to strong-arm regulators into passing the company’s market risk from
investors to ratepayers.
Fifteen years ago, an analyst proposed that FERC develop this process
when PJM inaugurated its capacity market.372 FERC rejected the proposal
because it did “not treat all capacity suppliers equally.”373 The Commission
justified this decision by claiming that “[i]n a competitive market, all
suppliers will be paid the same price.”374 FERC felt that a unitary capacity
payment better approximated a real market.375 Yet this system’s failure to
retain the resources FERC needs has forced intrusive interventions that
pay some suppliers more than others. These interventions would be
unnecessary if FERC recognized that capacity markets do not procure the
services the grid needs, and that it is important to support markets for these
other qualities.

Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 168 FERC ¶ 61,199, slip op. at 3, 5 (Sept. 27, 2019).
Id. (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 1, 3.
Gavin Bade, Chatterjee: Sympathy for Coal ‘Doesn’t Factor in’ to Baseload Support Plan, UTIL.
DIVE (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/chatterjee-sympathy-for-coal-doesntfactor-in-to-baseload-support-plan/511449 [https://perma.cc/W5QS-GV3X].
371 For one example, see R. Moreno et al., Auction Approaches of Long-Term Contracts to
Ensure Generation Investment in Electricity Markets: Lessons from the Brazilian and Chilean
Experiences, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 5758, 5761-63 (2010).
372 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, slip op. at 27-28 (May 6, 2004).
373 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 32 (Dec. 22, 2006).
374 Id.
375 See id. (determining that a capacity market with a downward sloping demand curve “better
approximates a market”).
368
369
370
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D. The Slippery Slope to Reregulating Generation
If policymakers continue to maintain reliability by subsidizing individual
generators and excluding disfavored resources from important markets, they
will quickly reregulate all power generation. The interventions described
above create a positive feedback loop. One set of uncompetitive generators
receives a subsidy, which suppresses energy market prices. Suppressed prices
render another set of generators uncompetitive. Those generators then appeal
to policymakers for an additional subsidy and the cycle continues.
This dynamic has begun to play out in several markets. The proliferation
of low-marginal-cost natural gas plants and zero-marginal-cost renewable
power has made many nuclear power plants uncompetitive.376 In response,
nuclear power plants have emphasized their zero-carbon and reliability
attributes.377 Rather than permit these plants to go out of business, several states
have responded by agreeing to subsidize nuclear facilities.378 New York’s
program alone is expected to cost $500 million,379 an Illinois program is projected
to cost $235 million,380 and a New Jersey program could cost $300 million.381

376 Brian Mann, Unable to Compete on Price, Nuclear Power on the Decline in the U.S., NPR (Apr.
7, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/07/473379564/unable-to-compete-on-price-nuclear-poweron-the-decline-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/PR74-JH73].
377 See, e.g., How Can Nuclear Combat Climate Change?, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://www.
world-nuclear.org/nuclear-essentials/how-can-nuclear-combat-climate-change.aspx [https://perma.cc/
57SF-SL6F] (last visited June 2, 2020) (“Decarbonising the electricity supply, whilst providing
affordable and reliable electricity to a growing global population, must be central to any climate
change strategy. Nuclear energy has shown that it has the potential to be the catalyst for delivering
sustainable energy transitions . . . .”); Nuclear, EXELON, https://www.exeloncorp.com/companies/
exelon-generation/nuclear [https://perma.cc/77RQ-WR5D] (last visited June 2, 2020) (“Nuclear
power dominates in clean energy and also reliability.”); Nuclear Provides Carbon-Free Energy 24/7,
NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., https://www.nei.org/fundamentals/nuclear-provides-carbon-free-energy
[https://perma.cc/56HA-BKT7] (last visited June 2, 2020) (“Nuclear energy contributes clean,
reliable electricity to a diverse energy system.”).
378 For an overview of zero emissions credits, which are state nuclear subsidies, see Five States
Have Implemented Programs to Assist Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 7,
2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41534 [https://perma.cc/N9WB-SS7A].
379 Patrick McGeehan, New York State Aiding Nuclear Plants with Millions in Subsidies, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/nyregion/new-york-state-aiding-nuclearplants-with-millions-in-subsidies.html [https://perma.cc/Z5FM-KRG3].
380 Peter Maloney, Updated: Illinois Gov. Rauner Signs Exelon Nuclear Legislation, UTIL. DIVE
(Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/updated-illinois-gov-rauner-signs-exelon-nuclearlegislation/431803 [https://perma.cc/4HV2-3W8S].
381 Scott DiSavino, New Jersey Governor Signs Nuclear Power Subsidy Bill into Law, REUTERS
(May 23, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-jersey-pseg-exelon-nuclear/new-jersey-governorsigns-nuclear-power-subsidy-bill-into-law-idUSKCN1IO2RL [https://perma.cc/6U3T-42CL].
These are overt subsidies. The number would be larger if one included regulatory evasion. See, e.g.,
Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and the Erosion of
Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879, 910-35 (2019) (showing that coal companies have used bankruptcy
to evade regulatory obligations).
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This support allows nuclear power plants to submit low bids in both
energy markets and capacity markets. That, in turn, further suppresses
clearing prices and threatens the economic viability of coal and natural power
gas plants. Coal representatives have responded by arguing that they are
essential to reliability because they can store onsite coal that can be used when
other resources are unavailable.382 This is the argument the DOE embraced
when it proposed bailing out coal and nuclear power plants.383 Natural gas
power plants may argue that their fast-ramping characteristics—the ability to
respond quickly to a spike in demand or loss of supply—make them essential
for a high-renewables grid. State or federal policymakers may be convinced
and grant support to these generators. The Mystic bailout suggests that
FERC has already begun to shield natural gas power plants perceived to be
critical to reliability.
What emerges is a situation in which regulatory favor—not market forces—
determines which resources are viable. As soon as a regulator concludes that a
certain resource provides a critical service, it introduces a subsidy to support
that resource. The subsidy suppresses energy and capacity prices, which further
decreases the revenues other resources enjoy. That, in turn, increases the need
for additional administrative interventions. PJM recently expressed concern
about this phenomenon when it said that “the spread of rent-seeking activities
could tear apart the essential fabric of regional coordination in planning
gravitating toward integrated resource planning.”384
As noted in Section III.B, renewables are expected to provide a significant
share of electricity in many areas in the near future.385 If natural gas begins
to receive state support—if, for example, RMR agreements become more
common—then close to one hundred percent of overall generation would be
receiving out-of-market support. Alternatively, if capacity markets continue
to become a vehicle to support natural gas and coal power plants, then the
entire industry will already be sustained to a significant degree through
individual subsidies designed to protect particular resources.

382 E.g., Kathiann M. Kowalski, Coal Industry Group Revives Reliability Argument to Ohio
Lawmakers, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 5, 2020), https://energynews.us/2020/02/05/midwest/
coal-industry-group-revives-reliability-argument-to-ohio-lawmakers [https://perma.cc/N3BC-JXGL].
383 Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, Trump Wants to Bail Out Coal and Nuclear Power. Here’s
Why That Will Be Hard., N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018, 12:32 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/06/13/climate/coal-nuclear-bailout.html [https://perma.cc/5MD8-84HW] (“The
administration has argued that the loss of coal and nuclear plants, which can run around the clock,
would make America’s electric grid less reliable.”).
384 PJM INTERCONNECTION, RESPONSE TO THE 2017 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT 11
(2018), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/state-of-the-market/20180511-pjms-responseto-the-2017-state-of-the-market-report.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/3EHN-7X69].
385 See supra Section III.B.
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If this trend continues, electricity markets would no longer dictate energy
prices. They would simply reflect regulatory preferences about which
resources should stay in business. Rather than compete to provide
inexpensive electricity, generators would compete for regulatory favor. The
result closely resembles utility rate regulation. Part VI proposes alternative
payments systems that would more efficiently procure electricity. First,
though, it is worth considering the legality of recent FERC interventions
that support fossil fuel generators and counteract state clean energy policies.
V. STATES AND THE FPA
In addition to the economic problems discussed above, interventions to
prop up fossil fuel generators are stretching FERC’s jurisdiction to its limits.
The legal basis for FERC’s authority to oversee grid reliability is Section 205
of the Federal Power Act (FPA), which requires the Commission to ensure
that wholesale rates are “just and reasonable.”386 The FPA is clear that the
Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the
generation of electric energy.”387 That authority is reserved for the states.388
In our view, the only way to resolve the tension between FERC’s
authority over wholesale electricity prices and states’ authority over
generating units is to clarify that FERC has authority to regulate reliability
pursuant to its authority to regulate practices “affecting . . . rates,”389 but that
federal jurisdiction over wholesale energy rates ceases when it prohibits states
from regulating generation units. FERC regulations can increase the costs of
state policies, but FERC cannot prevent states from acting to realize
preferences for certain resources. Courts reviewing FERC reliability orders
should consider whether the net effect of FERC policies is to prevent states
from exercising that authority.
A. Federalism in the FPA
While FERC has begun to claim that it has plenary authority to ensure
grid reliability, courts have unanimously embraced our view. When the Third
Circuit upheld the Commission’s decision to develop a MOPR, the court did
so not because the MOPR was necessary to support reliability, but because it
was necessary to make sure wholesale energy prices—not capacity prices—
386 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2018); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477,
480-81 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
387 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).
388 See id. § 824(a), (b)(1). For an extended analysis of the FPA’s federalist system, see Matthew
R. Christiansen & Joshua C. Macey, Long Live the Federal Power Act’s Bright Line, 134 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming).
389 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
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remained just and reasonable.390 The Commission was concerned with buyerside market power. Specifically, it worried that utilities that owned
transmission lines were manipulating energy markets by submitting artificially
low bids in capacity markets.391 Owners of transmission lines are required to
purchase a certain amount of supply from capacity markets.392 By submitting
very low capacity bids, they purposefully suppressed capacity prices, thereby
reducing the amount of money they were forced to spend to purchase
capacity.393 Capacity markets and MOPRs were therefore justified to prevent
manipulative behavior.394 The Third Circuit determined that FERC has
jurisdiction to adopt MOPRs not because the Commission has plenary
jurisdiction over markets for reliability, but because market manipulation in
capacity markets is a “practice[] . . . ‘affecting’ rates.”395
The courts that have reviewed capacity markets have been careful to point
out that FERC should not weaponize its jurisdiction over markets for
reliability to commandeer states’ authority over generation resources. In a
case finding that FERC can oversee capacity markets, the D.C. Circuit
clarified that this authority cannot conflict with states’ authority over
generation facilities.396 As the court explained, while “the Commission may
directly establish prices for capacity,” they cannot thereby prevent states from
regulating generation facilities.397 The court went on to clarify that “[s]tate
and municipal authorities retain the right to forbid new entrants from
providing new capacity, to require retirement of existing generators, to limit
new construction to more expensive, environmentally friendly units, or to
take any other action in their role as regulators of generation facilities without
direct interference from the Commission.”398 That finding was embraced by
the Supreme Court in 2016.399
N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utilities v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 96 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 84-85; see also Richard B. Miller, Neil H. Butterklee & Margaret Comes, “Buyer-Side”
Mitigation in Organized Capacity Markets: Time for a Change?, 33 ENERGY L.J. 449, 459-60 (2012)
(explaining that buyer-side mitigation was originally designed to prevent market power abuses).
392 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 85.
393 See id. (“When . . . LSEs buy more capacity than they offer into the auction, they have an
incentive to keep auction prices as low as possible . . . . Such offers crowd out other capacity that is
priced at a higher, cost-based rate, and thus result in a lower overall clearing price.”).
394 See id. (“To counteract that manipulation of the market, the MOPR seeks to identify
uneconomic offers and ‘mitigate’ them by raising them to a price that more accurately approximates
their net costs.”).
395 Id. at 95-98.
396 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
397 Id. at 481, 482.
398 Id. at 481.
399 See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016) (“States, of course,
may regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws incidentally affect
areas within FERC’s domain.”); FERC. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 775 (2016)
(stating that FERC cannot “issue[] a regulation compelling every consumer to buy a certain amount
390
391
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It is therefore perplexing that FERC has seemingly embraced an
interpretation of the FPA that prevents states from exercising jurisdiction
over their generation facilities—despite repeated admonitions of the courts
that FERC’s jurisdiction over capacity markets must further the Commission’s
goal of ensuring “just and reasonable” rates and accommodate state authority
over generation.400 The interventions described in Part IV may be bad policy,
but individually they may not excessively interfere with states’ authority over
generation.401 Altogether, though, these policies counteract state renewable
policies. Insofar as they prevent states from realizing their resource preferences,
they are in tension with D.C. Circuit precedent establishing that states retain
authority to determine which generators enter and exit the market.402
B. Recovering the FPA’s Federalist Vision
To be sure, in the interventions described in the previous Parts, the
Commission has claimed to recognize the need to respect the FPA’s federalist
vision.403 It is therefore surprising that FERC has taken such bold steps to
counteract state policy decisions.404 When FERC ordered PJM to revise its
MOPR, FERC cited its “statutory obligation, and exclusive jurisdiction, to
ensure that wholesale capacity rates in the multi-state regional market are just
and reasonable,” and explained that the intervention was necessary to
preserve “a capacity market that relies on competitive auctions to set just and
reasonable rates.”405 Yet as Part IV showed, the steps FERC has taken to
accomplish these goals have had precisely the opposite result.
FERC has justified capacity market interventions by saying that these
interventions are necessary to maintain “investor confidence” and “market
of electricity on the retail market” because such a rule would “specif[y] terms of sale at retail—which
is a job for the States alone”).
400 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018). Todd Aagaard and Andrew Kleit have argued that certain
MOPR reforms ordered by FERC violate the FPA and Administrative Procedure Act. See Todd S.
Aagaard & Andrew N. Kleit, A Road Paved with Good Intentions?: FERC’s Illegal War on State
Electricity Subsidies, 33 ELECTRICITY J., June 2020, at 1, 3-4 (2020).
401 Whether the rules are just and reasonable is another question. The fact that many of the
rules described in Part IV have no conceivable justification may give rise to other legal challenges.
The focus of this Article, however, is whether FERC actions suggest a power grab by the
Commission. To that end, we focus on the federalism issue and bracket other legal challenges as
outside the scope of this paper.
402 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
403 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 6 (Dec. 19, 2019) (“Nor does this order
prevent states from making decisions about preferred generation resources: resources that states
choose to support, and whose offers may fail to clear the capacity market under the revised MOPR
. . . will still be permitted to sell energy and ancillary services in the relevant PJM markets.”).
404 Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (“The Commission . . . shall not have jurisdiction . . . over
facilities used for the generation of electric energy . . . .”).
405 Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 4, 6.
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integrity.”406 But both New England and PJM have much more capacity than
they need to provide reliable electricity.407 Given those circumstances,
capacity markets should not give investors confidence that they will recover
their costs. Doing so recreates the problems of cost-of-service regulation by
guaranteeing shareholders a return on investment and shielding them from
market risk. If these markets find themselves with insufficient resources, prices
would rise regardless of whether some resources receive support from states.408
FERC could be borrowing these terms from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which is the agency charged with protecting investor
confidence and market integrity.409 FERC is, however, using these terms in a
very different way. The SEC conceives of the goal of investor confidence as
a procedural right. On its view, “[t]he laws and rules that govern the securities
industry in the United States derive from a simple and straightforward
concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should
have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and
so long as they hold it.”410 Investor confidence is therefore ordinarily used to
make sure that insiders do not have an unfair advantage over ordinary market
participants—not to interfere with market signals created by legitimate state
and federal policy decisions.411

406 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op.
at 5-6 (observing that the majority order never defines market “integrity”); ISO New England Inc.,
162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part), slip
op. at 4-5 (questioning the aim of “investor confidence”).
407 See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2018 SUMMER RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 20
(2018), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_05252018_
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4BC-VQD4] (finding that ISO-NE has more than sufficient capacity
reserve margins that protect against reliability concerns); Iulia Gheorghiu, PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE Pay
$1.4B Annually for Excess Capacity: Report, UTIL. DIVE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/pjm-nyiso-and-iso-ne-pay-14b-annually-for-excess-capacity-report/567798 [https://perma.cc/
J4WH-WNPH] (calculating the wasted expenditures that result from excess capacity procurement
in the ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM markets); ISO-NE Transmittal Letter, supra note 321, at 11
(“[T]he region now has significant excess capacity . . . .”). Reserve margins represent the extra
generation capacity available above and beyond the forecasted peak capacity demand in a given year
and reference margins are the levels needed to ensure resource adequacy. NERC’s Summer Reliability
Assessment Highlights Seasonal Electric Reliability Issues, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 29, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36592 [https://perma.cc/YD49-5E5Y].
408 See BIALEK & UNEL, supra note 288, at 18 (explaining that capacity markets will
“automatically adjust[]” in the event of an actual resource adequacy challenge).
409 See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Article/
whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/5UR3-T3PF] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (“The mission of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”).
410 Id.
411 See id. (describing how “investor confidence” is intended to create a level playing field for
market participants).
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Unlike the SEC, FERC has begun to use the goal of market “integrity”
to justify administrative interventions that shield fossil fuel generators from
market risk and immunize them from the effects of state clean energy
policies.412 But if a market has procured sufficient supply, one might think
that it is “unjust” and “unreasonable” to force consumers to pay to retain
supply they do not need.413 In ordinary markets, shareholders and creditors
are aware that they bear the risk that regulations can change in the future. Yet
in electricity markets, grid operators are insulating fossil fuel generators from
those risks.
At the very least, these interventions make it more difficult for states to
determine which generators enter and exit the market. In addition, the
Mystic bailout and other RMR contracts make it impossible for states to
realize their generation preferences. Given these circumstances, it seems hard
to see how this RMR agreement is consistent with Section 201(b) of the FPA.
The problem, perhaps, is that state challenges to FERC interventions have
focused on a specific FERC order that makes it more difficult for states to
realize their resource preferences. Because FPA jurisdiction is often
concurrent, so long as that individual intervention does not commandeer
states’ authority over generation, it should be upheld.
Altogether, though, these interventions threaten to swallow state
jurisdiction whole. The Mystic bailout requires Massachusetts ratepayers to
support a generator despite the fact that the state was not convinced that the
unit was necessary for reliability. The fact that FERC failed to permit a large
offshore wind facility to participate in the ISO-NE capacity auction will force
New England ratepayers to pay hundreds of millions to retain resources
without determining whether other approaches might have resolved the
problem more efficiently.414 In our view, a challenge to FERC’s general
approach to reliability could show that FERC is interfering excessively with
states’ authority over generation.

412 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op.
at 5-6 (observing that the majority order never defines market “integrity”); ISO New England Inc.,
162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part), slip
op. at 4-5 (questioning the aim of “investor confidence”).
413 See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018) (“Whenever the Commission . . . shall find that any rate,
charge, or classification . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,
the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate.”).
414 See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC 61,267 (Dec. 20, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r,
dissenting), slip op. at 2-3 (“I continue to believe that, had the Commission convened a process to
examine fuel security in New England more holistically, the region might well have produced a
solution that is more effective, less costly, and on far firmer legal footing.”).
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VI. FINDING THE MISSING MONEY IN A HIGH-RENEWABLES GRID
Rather than revive utility rate regulation, FERC should encourage payment
systems that preserve competition, support reliability, and accommodate state
preferences for renewables. This Part first outlines general principles that
would advance these goals. It then proposes specific policy changes to maintain
competitive electricity markets in a future electric power grid.
A. Principles for Legal and Competitive Reserve Markets
Regulatory interventions aimed at securing resource adequacy are
problematic because they (1) undermine the Federal Power Act’s federalist
structure, (2) rely on administrative judgment—not competitive processes—
to procure resource adequacy, and (3) counteract state renewable policies. The
principles described in this Section would support efforts to procure sufficient
reserves while respecting the FPA’s jurisdictional limits, retain competitive
forces in electricity markets, and integrate state clean energy policies.
1. Reserve Requirements Do Not Trump the Rest of the FPA
While FERC and the grid operators should be able to create reserve
requirements, they should not do so at the expense of other provisions of the
FPA. Not only do states have authority over generation resources,415 but
FERC is also statutorily required to ensure that rates are “just and
reasonable” and not “unduly discriminatory.”416 FERC has to balance these
numerous regulatory obligations. Reliability concerns do not give the
Commission license to disregard these other statutory mandates.
Yet FERC seems to be using its authority over reliability to approve
regulations that discriminate against renewables and that prevent states from
exercising control over their resource mix. As discussed in Part IV, capacity
market reforms and RMR contracts counteract state renewable policies and
are not needed to support grid reliability. Rather than prevent undue
discrimination in wholesale electricity markets, FERC’s decision to favor
incumbent fossil fuel generators suggests that the Commission is itself
contributing to discriminatory pricing practices in violation of Section 206 of
the FPA.417 Giving states and LSEs a role in determining how to comply with
FERC’s reserve requirements would better accommodate the FPA’s different
jurisdictional and regulatory ambitions.

16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2018).
Id. §§ 824d(a)-824e(a).
Cf. id. § 824e(a) (requiring FERC to adjust any “rate, charge, or classification” it determines
is “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential”).
415
416
417
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2. Competitive Processes—Not Bailouts—for Resource Procurement
Similarly, FERC should not use its authority over reliability to force
LSEs to procure reserves in any particular way or bail out specific
generators.418 Renewables do increase the need for capacity payments, but a
centrally administered capacity market operates at cross-purposes with states’
ability to determine their own resource mixes. Capacity markets wrongly
assume that sufficiently large reserve margins will secure all of the services
needed to maintain reliability. When they fail to support flexible resources or
other crucial generators, grid operators bail out the units deemed necessary
for reliability. The result is a series of haphazard subsidies in which grid
operators, with FERC’s blessing, prospectively identify critical resources and
ensure that they operate. In this way, capacity markets increase the barriers
to entry for renewables and counteract state clean energy policies. Rather
than mandate the use of specific resources and impose barriers to entry and
exit that protect incumbents even after they are no longer needed to support
grid reliability, FERC and the grid operators should remove restraints on
entry and exit. When a resource can provide the services consumers value, it
should be able to compete to provide that service.
This principle has implications for both technical capacity market rules
and bailouts of specific generators. There is no need for grid operators and
FERC to stipulate that only resources that currently provide a service can be
compensated for doing so. FERC should instead make sure that there is a
competitive process in all ISOs and RTOs to retain the services consumers
demand from the power grid. For example, capacity markets should be
seasonal to better accommodate seasonal and intermittent renewables, battery
performance requirements should be shortened so that batteries can be
compensated when they provide electricity at peak hours, and capacity
payments for intermittent resources should be discounted based on actual
performance.419 More importantly, they should be voluntary so that LSEs can
procure some—or all—of their capacity bilaterally when doing so is necessary
to comply with other regulatory requirements.
The same principles apply to bailouts of fossil fuel generators perceived
to be critical to grid reliability. Bailing out shareholders through RMR
418 In addition to the recent Mystic bailout, FERC has required grid operators to create a
process for designating RMR contracts with critical generators. These contracts entitle generators
to recoup their costs and making a profit by charging ratepayers—not by entering energy or capacity
markets. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,
Schedule 1: PJM Interchange Energy Market § 6.1 (Feb. 18, 2012), https://www.pjm.com/directory/
merged-tariffs/oa.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP89-EP42] (introducing the procedures that apply to
“generation resource[s]” that have been designated necessary to run in order to “maintain the
reliability of service in the PJM region”).
419 See supra subsection IV.A.1.

1264

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1181

agreements revives the problems that are traditionally associated with costof-service regulation. Generators such as Mystic have an incentive to inflate
costs and overbuild capacity. Other resources cannot replace the incumbent
even when it would provide superior services.
A competitive auction is a more efficient and effective way to retain
critical units. Once a generator declares that it needs to retire, an auction
would give competitors an opportunity to take over the critical resource.
Alternatively, firms could submit proposals about alternative strategies that
would maintain reliability even if the plant retired. Such a process recently
played out in California when a natural gas peaking plant petitioned for cost
recovery. Instead of immediately granting the petition, the state solicited
proposals.420 This process demonstrated that coupling new solar with
batteries would actually deliver the same level of reliability at lower cost.
This approach would have mitigated the problems that occurred when
FERC bailed out the Mystic natural gas power plant. If Mystic determined
that it genuinely needed additional revenues to continue to operate, an
auction would have ensured that New England ratepayers received service
from the entity that won the auction—whether that entity took over Mystic’s
generators or submitted an alternative proposal that FERC and ISO-NE had
not considered when they announced that Mystic had to be bailed out.
3. Accommodate State Preferences
Finally, FERC and the grid operators should integrate—not counteract—
state programs to support zero- and low-carbon resources. Decisions by states
or consumers to pay for specific characteristics such as backup capacity or
carbon-free electricity should be welcomed by FERC. So long as there is a
market for capacity, state policies will not force needed fossil fuel generators
to retire. That is because the price for units that provide capacity needed by
the grid will rise to support critical generating units.For years, FERC and
grid operators have accommodated state subsidies.421 If a state is willing to
shoulder some of the costs of a generating unit, there is no need for FERC
or a grid operator to prevent it from doing so.

420 See Julian Spector, PG&E Must Solicit Energy Storage and DERs to Replace 3 Existing Gas
Plants, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/pgemust-solicit-energy-storage-ders-to-replace-three-existing-gas-plants#gs.xMhsj3bh [https://perma.cc/
B7P6-DB66] (discussing California’s “shakedown” process of awarding energy contracts which
amounts to a choice between “giv[ing them] the lucrative deal or los[ing] the vital resources”).
421 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 32-33 (Dec. 19, 2019) (expanding the
definition of resources subject to the MOPR to include state-subsidized renewables).
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B. A Three-Tranched Resource Procurement Requirement
To advance the principles outlined above, this Article proposes resource
adequacy requirements to LSEs.422 This would allow LSEs to balance the
imperatives of procuring a low-cost, reliable, and clean energy electric power
supply. FERC should set performance standards governing the tranches with
reference to state policies and allow LSEs to determine for themselves the
most efficient way to comply with various state and federal energy regulations.
LSEs could “tranche” their portfolio. One tranche would consist of a clean
energy tranche, another would be a flexibility tranche, and another a capacity
tranche. The clean energy tranche would be based on aggregated state
renewables and zero-emission mandates that affect particular markets. For
example, if California requires that sixty percent of electricity come from
zero-carbon sources by 2030, the clean energy tranche for the California
market would require sufficient renewable capacity to meet the sixty-percent
target. The flexibility tranche requirement would be based on a region’s
calculated need for flexible resources, determined at least in part by the clean
energy tranche requirement. Finally, the capacity tranche requirement would
be set based on peak demand plus a reserve margin. The capacity tranche
would resemble today’s capacity markets, but instead of a mandatory central
auction, LSEs would have the option to participate in a central auction or to
procure capacity for themselves. Furthermore, the capacity tranche would
operate as a residual to the clean energy and flexibility tranches, rather than
as the core of the capacity market.
LSEs would not be forced to buy a percentage of electricity from fossil
fuel generators when doing so would prevent them from complying with state
environmental laws. LSEs would be able to satisfy these requirements by
building their own generators, contracting bilaterally, or transacting on a
central market overseen by FERC or the grid operators. To ensure that LSEs
do not secure excess capacity, regulators would allow the tranches to overlap.
Since capacity refers to all of the reserves an LSE needs, the capacity tranche
would actually encompass all of the electricity an LSE had procured,
including electricity that the entity also used to satisfy the flexibility and
clean energy tranches. LSEs would use the capacity tranche to show FERC
and its grid operator that it had procured enough electricity to comply with
422 Parts of this proposal already exist in California, which allows generators to charge for
being available to supply electricity without awarding a handout to incumbent suppliers that do not
need to receive a subsidy every time the market needs to signal that new generators should enter
the market. See CAL. ISO, FINAL FLEXIBLE CAPACITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR 2017, at 3-5
(2016), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/FinalFlexibleCapacityNeedsAssessmentFor2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q2BU-36CL] (discussing California’s system of studying and allocating
flexible capacity need).
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its reserve requirement. An additional benefit is that LSEs would be able to
incorporate price signals sent by states and consumers willing to pay more for
certain resources. Because LSEs would be able to contract directly with
generators, potential suppliers would compete for contracts. In this way, our
proposal would preserve competition in electricity markets.
Another benefit of this proposal is that it would make it easier to retire
uneconomic generators. As discussed in Section IV.B, the length of capacity
market commitment periods causes retention of inefficient generators for
years after they could retire. If LSEs procured capacity for themselves, they
could pay inefficient generators to retire when less expensive alternatives
became available. Old generators struggling to survive might prefer to be paid
to retire than be forced to operate with low margins. The LSE would be in a
position to encourage new generators to enter the market when it is economic
for them to do so.
Optional capacity markets would resemble exchanges for long-term
contracts and would thereby reduce the transaction costs associated with
finding new load. Energy markets would become real-time flexibility
markets used by grid operators and LSEs to balance load. Rather than
compete for the favor of regulators, generators would compete to provide
the services Americans expect from the power sector. There is no reason that
all capacity should clear at the same rate when different generators provide
different services depending on their ability to ramp up, curtail supply, ease
transmission congestion, or support state renewable policies. Energy
markets, in turn, would reward flexible generating units—the attribute that
actually supports grid resilience. Rather than retain reliability through
regulatory fiat, this structure would realize the goal of restructuring by
relying on competitive processes to secure all of the services consumers
demand from the power grid. It would do so, moreover, without bailing out
fossil fuel generators.
CONCLUSION
It is somewhat ironic that FERC has resurrected utility rate regulation by
claiming that aggressive regulatory interventions are needed to protect
competition in the electric power industry. The Commission seems to be using
the language of “investor confidence” and market “integrity” as a rhetorical
device to justify a sweeping federal strategy to counteract state clean energy
programs, prevent renewables from displacing traditional generators, and
resurrect a system of administrative pricing in important wholesale markets.
This Article provides a sobering analysis of the technical and regulatory
obstacles to reducing carbon emissions in the electricity sector. Hidden
regulatory interventions designed to shore up grid reliability are being used
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to counteract ambitious decarbonization proposals. Although there is no
reason for FERC to bail out fossil fuel generators, FERC has nevertheless
used its authority over grid reliability to shield incumbent fossil fuel
generators from competitive forces. From an economic standpoint, these
interventions make little sense. They revive rate regulation of generation
along with all of the inefficiencies that plagued that system. From a legal
standpoint, these interventions are inconsistent with the federalist vision
embraced by the FPA.
Rather than revive rate regulation, this Article has argued that FERC
should simplify reserve requirements, stop counteracting state clean energy
programs, and support the development of competitive markets for capacity.
FERC could—and should—secure the services needed to operate a clean and
reliable power grid without shielding favored generators from competition.
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